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Abstract 
This dissertation brings to rhetoric a study of vernacular music that amplifies what is 
known about rhythmic practice in the rhetorical tradition. Responding to emergent conversations 
at the intersection of rhetorical and sound studies, this work engages with questions about sound 
and music’s rhetorical roles in myth making, racial formation, cultural eloquence, progressive 
thought, and historiography. While recent scholarship has identified the sonic elements of 
rhetoric’s classical roots, I argue that vernacular, folk, or “roots” music can be a key element—a 
sonic rhetoric—for interpreting the ebb and flow of cultural ideals within more contemporary 
historical moments, particularly during times of crisis. In 1933, folklorists John A. Lomax and 
his son Alan set out as emissaries for the Library of Congress to record the “folksong of the 
American Negro” in several Southern African-American prisons. As this dissertation 
demonstrates, the music they gathered for the Library’s Folklife Archive contributed to a new 
mythology of “authentic” Americana for a people in financial, social, and identity crisis. During 
the 1930s, this music had paradoxical effects: even as the songs reified long-held conservative 
orthodoxies, they also performed as agents for social change and reconstitution. The recordings 
the Lomaxes made in the prisons, for example, were produced under the coercive auspices of 
white privilege, yet also provided incarcerated African-American men rhetorical agency they 
would not otherwise have enjoyed. Similarly, pianist and composer Jelly Roll Morton enjoined 
Alan Lomax and the Library of Congress in his desire to insert and authenticate himself within 
the early history of jazz. He did so through deftly articulated sonic rhetorics—virtuosic 
performances and oral histories—but the recorded sessions brought more fortune and fame to 
Lomax than Morton, who died soon after. By 1939, Lomax was hosting a national radio program 
titled Folk Songs of America (one of many programs on CBS’s American School of the Air) 
where, with a particularly authentic American irony, songs recorded in the prison yard were 
silently repurposed by professional musicians and broadcast to the country’s white suburban 
classrooms. 
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When Pete Seeger passed away on January 27, 2014 at the age of 94, his death prompted 
hundreds of articles, memorials, and remembrances. The National Post published one such 
remembrance four days later by Geoffrey Clarfield, who for three years worked as the Director 
of Research and Development for the Alan Lomax Archive housed with the Association for 
Cultural Equity (ACE) in New York. In the piece, Clarfield relates some of the details of his first 
and only visit with the aging folk singer and activist. They spoke over lunch about the various 
projects going on at the Alan Lomax Archive, and, as he writes: 
After lunch, we retired to the living room. Pete took down his banjo from the 
wall, and […] sang a tongue-in-cheek version of the Texan cowboy song Home 
on the Range. Just as we were all finishing the most popular verse, Pete said, 
“There’s another verse, did you ever hear this one?” And then he sang, “How 
often at night, when the heavens are bright, by the light of the glittering stars. I 
stood there amazed, and I ask as I age, does their glory exceed that of ours?” 
Seeger, in his evocation of this vivid but often overlooked verse, acknowledged, perhaps, his 
own pondering of the unknown cosmos. But also, part of the lyric as Pete renders it was an 
update to the third verse of the well-known folksong: “I ask as I gaze” is how the verse typically 
ends. Pete’s playfully profound change in reference to his own aging body juxtaposed against the 
cosmic eternities was also an example of what he often called the “folk process”—the notion that 
folk songs are not static entities but are in constant flux. They change to suit the needs of the 
singer, the moment, the audience, the cause. Seeger then goes on to relate a story about the 
song’s origins:  
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The man who wrote it, oh, that goes back over a hundred years to about 1875. He 
was a man from New England, who split up with his wife and went from 
Connecticut out west to Kansas. But he liked to write poems and he wrote the 
words down, and a friend of his, a young man who worked in a local drug store 
said, “Would you mind if I try and put a tune to those words?” And the man who 
wrote the words said, “Sure, if you want to.” And with his girlfriend and his 
girlfriend’s brother, the three of them made up this tune. And a few people sang it 
here and there. 
John Lomax who was in Texas, heard that there was a cook in a cowboy 
camp and he knew this song and sang it. Lomax wrote it down and put it in his 
book and then it became famous […] but the man who wrote the words was dead 
and he never knew how famous the song had become. 
Along with Seeger’s impromptu update to the song, he takes a moment to teach about the 
historiographical nature of folklore collection and, implicitly, the ways that the mystery of song 
origins often motivates that study. It is that mystery that compels a search for truth, whatever 
shape that truth may take. 
*** 
Pete Seeger—his work, life, and legacy—is, in many ways, the inspiration for the 
dissertation that follows. He was a folksinger, though he was always quick to complicate what 
and whom the “folk” were. He was a rhapsodist: he foraged for songs and song fragments 
wherever he could—from friends and archives, roadside bars and hollers—and stitched them 
back together on a banjo emblazoned with the motto “This machine surrounds hate and forces it 
to surrender.” He was an activist, a teacher, a family man, and an advocate for marginalized 
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voices. It was in Seeger’s musical advocacy for the union worker and labor rights in the 1940s, 
for race quality and civil rights in the ’50s and ’60s, as well as his sustained environmental work 
in New York cleaning up the Hudson River that I began to see and hear how music and folk 
traditions intricately tie everyday lived values with civic duty. Pete Seeger, then, was my 
personal pioneer—one of many other pioneers in the promotion of folk tradition in the last 
century. He blazed a trail in the United States by showing that folk traditions can impact 
contemporary problems. Once found, that trail led me to the materials from which I have begun 
to build my own home on the range—a range of rhetoric, rhythm, and reverence for both 
tradition and progression.
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Introduction  
 
Finding Folkness in Rhetorical Studies (Turn, Turn, Turn) 
 
To everything: turn, turn, turn 
There is a season: turn, turn, turn 
And a time to every purpose, under heaven. 
 
-Pete Seeger, via the poet of Ecclesiastes 
 
 Folk Symbols | Folk Seasons | Root Systems 
Like so many songs that come to be called “traditional,” it is remarkable that the song 
“Home On the Range” (mentioned in the Preface above) has a recorded author or origin at all. 
Indeed, “traditional” as a byline is usually a marker used to designate authorial indeterminacy 
and that mystery and myth is an important component of folk ethos. Stephen Wade, a 
contemporary folklorist, musician, and author of The Beautiful Musical All Around Us (2012), 
spoke recently about the excitement but rarity of discovering folksong origins—a kind of holy 
grail for folklorists and ethnographers.1 Wade’s discovery came during research for the song 
“Rock Island Line” during work on the second chapter in his book. A popular regional song in 
the South, “Rock Island Line” was also “discovered” by John Lomax and his son Alan, this time 
in an Arkansas African-American penitentiary in 1934. The disembodied voice of Kelly Pace 
leading seven of his fellow-inmates in the song is retained on acetate in the archives of the 
Library of Congress. In careful analysis of this and other recordings of the song, Wade deduced 
that while Pace or someone he knew had reworked the tune into a kind of work song, it was 
originally arranged as “a quartet song—unaccompanied, social, church based, arranged for 
singing, and staged for listening” (48). From that insight and with a couple of lucky leads, he was 
able to trace the song back to a booster campaign initiated to draw attention to the Rock Island 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Wade gave a talk in the University of Illinois Sousa Archives and Center for American Music titled “The 
Wanderings of ‘Rock Island Line’ and ‘Coal Creek March’” on December 31, 2013.  
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railroad which was, in the years preceding the Great Depression, experiencing declining 
patronage.  
Among the campaign documents, Wade found the lyrics to a booster song titled “Buy 
Your Ticket Over Rock Island Lines” composed by Clarence Wilson for his vocal quartet and 
published in the internal railroad union newsletter Rock Island Magazine. The lyrics printed in 
the railroad magazine differ in some ways from the “Rock Island Line” that would “eventually 
become part of the American musical idiom” (Wade 47) but there were enough similarities 
between them that Wade knew he had found the source. Eureka! Like other iconic railroad 
songs, “Midnight Special” and “The Wabash Cannonball” among them, “Rock Island Line” 
contributes to the public memory of an important railroad line. It also became a tool for 
remembering a by-gone epoch of American commerce, Progressive-era ideals, and their 
relationship to African American identity. And then it would break even those boundaries. Wade 
writes:  
[T]he song, like a trunk line whose branches radiate across the countryside, soon 
moved beyond this work site making new stops, shifting its contents, and 
streamlining its load. It migrated from a gospel quartet that the Arkansas prisoners 
performed to a rhythmic fable that Huddie Ledbetter created as he traveled with 
John Lomax as chauffer, auto mechanic, and musical demonstrator. Eventually, the 
song reached an incalculable number of players, singers, and listeners via skiffle, 
rock and roll, country, pop, and the folksong revival, yet for all these crossings and 
couplings, “Rock Island Line” hung onto its proud message, emblazoned in boxcar 
letters of a train fleeting past, to become the poetry by which a proud railroad is 
still remembered. (48) 
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Wade’s discovery of Wilson’s composition, written in tiny letters in the pages of an 
internally published collection of railroad ephemera some fifty years after the song’s heyday, is 
truly remarkable—and uncommon. In a strange but satisfying flip of the typical folksong 
narrative, “Rock Island Line” began as a commercial, if obscure, entity (rather than ending up 
there). But that detail was lost in the shuffle somewhere. Forgetting, it would seem, is as 
important to the folk process as remembering. Wade’s arresting passage above draws on an 
elaborate metaphor of forgetting embedded within natural phenomenon: the trunk lines, roots, 
and branches of a tree whose sapling days are too far-gone to remember. The material reality of 
the complex root and branch systems of aged trees stand in as symbols of memory, forgetting, 
and the passage of time—symbols to aid our understanding of how traditions through music 
“radiate across the countryside.” These natural metaphors also evoke a kind of seasonal, 
rotational temporality in the circulation of public memory in and through musical material 
culture, one with springtime blooms and cross-pollinations, summer abundance and fruit, autumn 
migrations and golden decay, all punctuated by periods of desolate winter. This dynamic 
ecological framework—one reliant upon a continuum of blossom and decay, progression and 
regression for the survival of its root system—sets a scene for understanding and articulating the 
natural drama of folk musical traditions as rhetorical culture: turn, turn, turn. 
This “roots” music, as vernacular musical traditions are sometimes called, carries with it 
certain tropes of “folkness” that work together, as Stephen Wade succinctly states above, to 
become the poetry of remembrance that give vernacular music (and its recovery and 
recirculation) cultural and rhetorical power. These tropes can be categorized within a few major 
categories, or topoi, which, like seasons blend into one another, moving not on a perfect 
temporal timeline, but nevertheless as a kind of environmental system of values in rotation. The 
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term “topoi” or “topics,” while an ambiguous in specific meaning across rhetorical history, 
generally names “recurrent themes appearing in a certain kind of discourse to abstract patterns of 
inference” (Leff 220). James Jasinski (2001) synthesizes Michael Leff and Kenneth Burke’s 
definitions of “topics” as a useful grouping reflective of commonly held values and beliefs (580). 
Because values and beliefs shift, my own invocation of topoi as a system of “values in rotation” 
is meant to conceptually underscore this oscillation and mark it as semi-regular to the ebb and 
flow of folk processes. These topoi, then, can be articulated in a number of vocabularies and tend 
to settle into different nomenclature depending upon which discipline is using them. I will state 
them in simple terms first, with efforts to locate them within the scholarly folklore tradition, and 
then expand upon them using rhetorical history and terminology below.  
 
Finding Folkness 
Folklore (and by extension, folk music) can be understood as an artistic material 
component to the process of cultural ideal production, dissemination, disintegration, and 
reintegration. In musicologist Charles Seeger’s words  
Folkness [is] a funded treasury of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings toward life and 
death, work and play, love, courtship and marriage, health and hearth, children 
and animals, prosperity and adversity—a veritable code of individual and 
collective behavior belonging to the people as a whole (3).  
These codes of everyday activity and practical wisdom become embedded—composed—within 
material culture and remain to be imitated, embellished, and scrutinized by internal and external 
audiences. Folk revival—the close study, recovery, and in many cases re-animation of past 
vernacular traditions (musical or otherwise)—plays an important function in the revolving 
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movement of myths and symbols within and between their epochs. Benjamin Botkin, a 
prominent twentieth-century folklorist, argued that these revolutions were related to the ongoing 
task of societal value maintenance and production: 
In a changing society with concomitant rapid growth and mixture of disciplines, a 
folklore study of socio-historical myths and symbols should help us reassess old 
and new values and to understand the present in the light of the past and vice 
versa by providing a new approach to the positive or negative role of myth and 
symbols in unifying and separating people and promoting social progress or 
reaction. In the last analysis we may discover that whatever affects our values has 
symbolic meaning and whatever has symbolic meaning affects our values. 
(Jackson xi-x).  
The performance of symbol and community values (or value-making) within socio-historical 
landscapes, make up the topoi of traditional folkness and, not-incidentally, can be traced back 
into traditions of rhetoric, where Botkin’s couplet (“whatever affects our values has symbolic 
meaning and whatever has symbolic meaning affects our values”) also applies. While the 
rhetorical power of musical and rhythmic folkness should not be elevated over other products of 
folk material culture, music and rhetoric share a deep socio-historical connection to language and 
language arts and therefore draw upon many of the same tropes found within the topoi 
mentioned above. For instance, work on epideictic and constitutive rhetoric has shown that 
rhetors, like vernacular musicians, draw upon common codes of mythic wisdom—systems of 
value, and symbolic representation—in order to create, preserve, disseminate, and disrupt 
ideological systems (See Walker, 2000; Charland, 1987). The “products” of this process are 
codified as symbolic representations of these values and can be studied in a variety of forms. 
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Speeches and written artifacts are, traditionally, the most common artifacts of scholarly interest 
within rhetorical studies, but recent and ongoing scholarly attention to other rhetorical forms in 
multiple modes reminds us that rhetoric is no respecter of representative medium. 
This study contributes to the nascent but growing body of scholarship around sonic 
rhetorics by focusing on both “roots” music and, in this introduction, the roots of rhetoric. In 
later chapters, and particularly Chapter One, I expand upon ancient rhetorical theory and 
terminology and draw upon more contemporary (but still historically embedded) ideas that link 
the socio-historical, mythopoetic, and vernacular “of-the-people” nature of folk music together 
with developing ideas of how vernacular music-as-rhetoric functions within society at points of 
cultural crisis and reconstitution. The 1930s, an epoch within the United States interposed by the 
various crises and conflicts of economic depression, provides an historical moment when the 
tension between traditional ideals and social realities were at a pinnacle. Those accustomed to 
the customary value of hard work as the logical antecedent to prosperity, for example, were left 
with the paradox of not just layoffs but rampant joblessness, poverty, and even hunger. As Terry 
A. Cooney writes, it is in “the tensions within and between values, ambitions, ideas, and 
circumstances” (xiv) that we are best poised to understand the 1930s. But the stark cultural 
contrasts of the 1930s also provide an opportunity to understand the rhetorical function of folk 
music as a representation of the various tensions that exist within society at any historical 
moment. Cooney continues:  
The desire to move in more than one direction at once, to have it both ways, to 
live with or to resolve contradictions, appears during the 1930s in the most 
broadly public spheres as well as in the narrower territories of individuals 
defining their beliefs and families furnishing their homes. (xiv) 
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These cultural contradictions have only continued to expand in complexity over the last 85 years, 
so while my focus remains situated within the cultural milieu of 1930s conflicting ideals, a larger 
goal of the dissertation is to provide a theoretical framework useful for scholars of rhetoric, 
music, and vernacular culture (which has, of late, become digital culture) studying any historical 
moment. My focus on folk music lends itself well to arguments about tradition and progression, 
cultural authenticity, and the politics of representation (particularly those around racial identity). 
But these are but a few of the potential avenues for rhetorical engagement with the musical and 
rhythmic—and music is, of course, only a small portion of a much larger sonic rhetorical 
landscape. Sonic rhetoric, imagined along side other large rhetorical sub-fields such as visual 
rhetoric, has the potential to expand into a thriving and diverse scholarly field and might also 
become a significant contributor to the growing interdisciplinary field of sound studies.  
Under the above taxonomy, music is a branch on a much larger tree of sonic rhetorics, 
but even that branch is vast. Music is a broad conceptual category, too broad to map here except 
to say its numerous cultural traditions, genres, instruments, styles, and performers as well as their 
affects and effects on history, culture, and civic life invite sustained scholarly (and multi-
disciplinary) sonic rhetorical work.2 But vernacular music, with its combination of poetic 
language, rhythm, and simple melody structures, is unique to other musical (and by extension, 
sonic) rhetorics in that vernacular music as a rhythmic and poetic practice codifying cultural 
“mythopoeia” shares a direct genealogical line with the development of rhetoric. They spring 
from the same roots. In the section below, I draw together these root systems and emphasize the 
places that their shared genealogical threads overlap in common terms, ideals, and persuasive 
purposes expressed within and through the “folkness” topoi outlined above.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Gregory Clark’s Civic Jazz: American Music and Kenneth Burke on the Art of Getting Along (2015) is an example 
here. Clark’s book goes unreferenced in my own chapter about the jazz tradition only because it was released just as 
this dissertation project was concluding.  
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This framework should help to articulate how vernacular music as rhetoric works its way 
across the cultural landscape. It also raises important questions about the nature of the topoi 
themselves as folk values, myth, and symbolic authenticity resonate within the depths of 
rhetorical history but also within songs like “Rock Island Line” or “Home On the Range” which 
“radiate across the countryside” in vernacular voices, archives, airwaves, and in and out of 
commercial markets and political platforms. And while music (and particularly the folkness of 
vernacular music) can seem incidental or even insignificant to the larger or more visible aspects 
of cultural and political rhetorics at play within society—mere campfire tunes to be sung after 
the war, the election, the long day of work—our rhetorical and intellectual traditions are imbued 
with a profoundly musical sense. Cornell West sums up this ineffable relationship between 
humanity, tradition, and music well in a comparison to Johannes Brahms’s Requiem and John 
Coltrane’s A Love Supreme:  
Music at its best […] is the grand archeology into and transfiguration of our 
guttural cry, the great human effort to grasp in time our deepest passions and 
yearnings as prisoners of time. Profound music leads us—beyond language—to 
the dark roots of our scream and the celestial heights of our silence. (West xvii)  
Perhaps, then, it is because of music’s profundity and not in spite of it that we sing around 
campfires, in our schools and churches, during various work-a-day labors, in our cars, in karaoke 
bars, with our parents and children and friends, and also by ourselves in our best and darkest 
moments. Music is a deeply personal rhetoric. It carries and completes and creates us. No 
surprise, then, that music’s power is so often exploited, abused, and manipulated to ignoble ends.   
And yet, in the words of the old hymn, “How can [we] keep from singing?” 
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Folkness in the Rhetorical Tradition 
The rhetorical tradition can be understood as having a “folkness” of its own—“a funded 
treasury of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings toward life …” productive of a “veritable code of 
individual and collective behavior belonging to the people” (Seeger 3). And with “continuing 
strands” that persist “throughout the history of Western Europe” and beyond (Kennedy 16), 
rhetoric’s folkness has had lasting and ongoing impact. Mirroring the three topoi of folkness 
outlined above (myth, symbol, values) rhetoric also comes to us from mythopoetic origins and is 
tied to a tradition of symbol and value making as well as moral and practical wisdom circulation. 
Rhetoric became an “art” once it could be abstracted conceptually and was given various 
symbolic vocabularies to describe and generalize its various uses, effects, and affects. These 
conceptualizations would authenticate rhetoric as a discipline and clear the way for its placement 
as an object of study alongside other distinct disciplines: philosophy, mathematics, medicine, etc. 
Skilled performance of practical wisdom (moral, political, cultural, etc.) demonstrates best what 
is traditional about rhetoric whereas the abstracted/symbolic formulation of rhetoric into 
technical, teachable terms is what would discipline rhetoric as an everyday practice into rhetoric 
as an art (techne) and also would ensure its persistence as a teachable skill into the future.  
There is interesting tension between “tradition” and “discipline” here. “Tradition” 
denotes a kind of temporal trajectory—the meaningful historicity of developing wisdom, 
whereas “discipline” (especially when it follows or results from tradition) can be located along 
the historical trajectory in moments of systemization or codification of that wisdom into 
practical, teachable applications. The development of the rhetorical and philosophical 
“traditions” have experienced countless moments of disciplining—periods where unifying ideals 
about truth and wisdom converge long enough to get cultural traction and dissemination, that is, 
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until circumstances change, new truths emerge, and new cultural exigencies require new 
rhetorics. Over time, useful ideals remain (and even become ritualized) and less useful or 
cumbersome ideals are sloughed off. (Note, however, that what is “useful” is not necessarily or 
even usually ethical.) Under this model, rhetoric is revealed in its capacity for mythologizing 
value as a priori, for disciplining extrinsic cultural wisdom (or, at least, utility) and calling it 
intrinsic or “essential,” but then also being the means for overturning these practical “realities” 
when shifting circumstances, expanding knowledge, or various crises of faith reveal “truth” as 
incomplete, unethical, constructed, or out of date. Rhetorical “folkness” describes the cycle 
through tradition, discipline, and progression that make up the functional paradox at the heart of 
culture making.  
 Scholars interested in rhetoric’s potential for paradox as I describe it have articulated this 
system in other ways. This work, enlivened particularly within the past several decades, has 
refocused intellectual attention on pre-Platonic (and often pre-conceptual) rhetoric with the intent 
to (in part) historicize rhetoric outside of its disciplined Aristotelian (and neo-Aristotelian) 
reverb. Rhetoric has depth beyond its utility in the courtroom or classroom and can be tied to 
both epistemological and ontological knowledge, that is, to cultural habits of mind and to world-
making practices. Searching for these ideas in the ancient record, and often within history that is, 
at best, opaque and frequently mythic, provides a kind of authenticity to the principles recovered: 
a rhetorical folkness. Like Wade, Seeger, and the Lomaxes of subsequent chapters, these 
scholars of rhetoric have mined rhetoric’s ancient history in search of mythic origins, often in 
hopes that the search will produce new frameworks—new methods and myths, symbols, and 
disciplinary values—for understanding current complex and vexing cultural problems. We see 
this in the move to adopt sophistic ideals and methods in contemporary scholarship. We also see 
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this kind of refiguring and revaluing in the work of Kenneth Burke, whom developed a complex 
new mythos for understanding the impact of language. Burke’s mythos is complete with a 
grammar, rhetoric, and (never quite realized) symbolic that we have adopted and continue to 
mine as part of a current prominent paradigm in rhetorical studies. Both of these frameworks 
play into the larger questions in this dissertation and I take them up explicitly in the next chapter.  
Ancient rhetorical history is important to this study for this same reason, but as I have 
been foregrounding, for other reasons as well. Below I describe the ways that pre-Platonic 
rhetorics relate to the folkness topoi described above (myth, symbol, values) and particularly 
how their performance plays into work around the rhythms of sonic studies in rhetoric. There are 
important corollaries between these ideas and others articulated in an ancient vocabulary: 
mythos, logos (as word, symbol, and speech), and aretē (which encompasses both value 
production and its virtuosic performance). Additionally, the term sophia, as found in the root of 
“sophist” and meaning “wisdom,” is important in a discussion of how these ideas work together 
in the articulation of cultural systems of knowing and being. These terms help to expand our 
understanding of the role of rhetoric in cultural system building. It is also worth noting here that 
Aristotle’s term “epideictic” is itself an attempt to unify these behaviors and practices 
conceptually and in that unification, they are relegated to a singular and simplified category: 
ceremonial rhetoric of praise and blame. I return to the importance of epideictic below. This brief 
ancient incursion will set a stage for the rest of the dissertation as it shows that the folk cycle I 
have been articulating might itself be described as “sophistic” and how these folk/sophistic topoi 
come together symbolically and in great power within musical discourse. 
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Teaching Aretē and the Soundness of Mind 
In Plato’s dialogue Protagoras, the first self-proclaimed sophist Protagoras3 engages with 
Socrates in a discussion over whether or not virtue—aretē—can be taught.4 As the conversation 
plays out, Protagoras argues that the reason Socrates may not be aware of the teaching of aretē is 
because of its ubiquity, not its disparity. “[E]veryone,” says Protagoras, “is a teacher of aretē so 
far as he is able, and so you don’t notice any of them” (Protagoras, 327e).5 This comment is 
preceded by a discussion about the likely sources of this kind of teaching:  
[W]hen children have learned the alphabet and are ready to read . . . then the 
teachers put works of good poets before them to read at their benches, and require 
them to learn by heart poems that are full of good advice, and stories and songs in 
praise of good men of old, so that the child will be eager to emulate them, and 
will yearn to grow up to be a man like them. (326a) 
This is followed by an important comparison to musical training, another conspicuous source for 
instruction in virtuous living:  
Musicians do much the same when they teach the lyre; they try to foster 
Soundness of Mind, and they keep the youngsters out of mischief. Besides that, 
once the children have learned to play the lyre they are taught more poetry by 
good lyric poets. Then the music-teachers set those poems to the music of the lyre 
and make sure that rhythm and harmony dwell in the souls of the children so that 
they will grow more gentle in their speech and their behavior will improve as they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Protagoras was a prominent Greek teacher and sophist in 485 BCE. See Michael Gagarin and Paul Woodruff’s 
Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists for a careful accounting of both the historical and the 
literary Protagoras.  
4 Aretē is a congnate of agathos (“good”) “The standards for judging one to be agathos were not enunciated or 
objective criteria, they were values held tacitly and uniformly in society. The tradition of Greek ethics is grounded in 
this early concept of a unified and “instinctive” good. (191).  
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gain grace in rhythm. And harmony for all human life needs the grace of harmony 
and rhythm. (326b)  
Protagoras’ argument that civic virtue, wisdom, and shared cultural values—the unity of which 
the sophist called a “soundness of mind”6—are constantly being taught, reemphasized, and 
revised as new knowledge emerges from the experience of everyday living. The sophist 
epitomizes the mind/body disciplining nature of aretē as that found in the memorization and 
recitation of poetry, storytelling, and musical performance, each which contribute to a state of 
“rhythmic grace” and “harmonious” living. And while ancient Greek virtuosity extended well 
beyond the habituated practice of rhythmic oral traditions, its evocation in this context is not 
unlike the concept of folkness introduced above. Both folkness and aretē indicate a kind of 
situated rhetorical practice embedded into everyday life. In both cases, musical and rhythmic oral 
tradition is part and parcel to that embeddedness, affect, and distribution.  
 
Virtue and Value | Rhythm and Rhetoric 
Also like “folkness,” the teaching of virtue doesn’t have an easily articulated, logical 
system for public distribution. Aretē is something better understood in the doing than in the 
saying. It is participatory and embodied. It is therefore distinct, but not altogether separate, from 
the various arts or “techne” that require aretē to be developed. Due to the breadth of practices 
that aretē embodies, it can have no formal methodology. As I return to in Chapter Three, aretē is 
less a body of knowledge than it is shared, embodied knowledge—a social agreement about the 
“normative poles” of virtue and vice (Cohen qtd. in Hawhee 187). Aristotle taught that aretē is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 “Soundness of Mind” is part of a trivium mentioned in the Protagoras which also included two other ideals: 
Justice, Piety). Soundness of mind is epitomized by the virtues of moderation, sensible, self-control, prudence, etc. 
In this way, aretē doesn’t just hearken to a single-dimensional configuration of “virtue,” but indexes a tradition of 
typified “wise” living ideals. It is the stuff ethics and morals.  
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an ability, specifically, “an ability [dynamis] . . . that is productive and preservative of goods, and 
an ability for doing good in many great ways,” to which he adds in hyperbole, “actually in all 
ways in all things” (I.9, 1366a36-b1). This definition, drawn from chapter nine of On Rhetoric, is 
offered by Aristotle as commentary on epideictic’s relationship to aretē or the “points of 
reference for praising and blaming [virtue and vice]” (I.9, 1366a). Epideictic, (or demonstrative) 
rhetoric is the third “species” (ediē) of rhetoric (alongside the genres of deliberative and judicial) 
and, as George Kennedy notes, “is the most problematic of the species and has remained a 
problem in rhetorical theory, since it becomes the category for all forms of discourse that are not 
specifically deliberative or judicial” (47). Problematic, perhaps, because epideictic’s potential 
opens theoretical doors rather than closing them as is typical for rhetoric under the Aristotelian 
paradigm.  
That said, Aristotle’s description of epideictic as funeral oratory encompassing the praise 
and blame of “virtue and vice and [the] honorable and shameful” (I.9.1366a) is useful here in its 
simplicity for several reasons. First, and as noted above, Aristotle emphasizes and begins to 
theorize the important relationship between epideictic and aretē. Epideictic functions in the 
service of aretē; it reinforces, in words of praise and blame, the “abilities” related to excellence, 
honor, virtue. Also, Aristotle categorized his three species along a temporal line, with 
deliberative oratory useful for addressing future events, judicial for the past, and epideictic for 
the present. As such, epideictic has no specific argumentative “end” or telos; its influence is felt 
in the moment—or more accurately, at all moments—and it directs present choices according to 
the cultural norms it reinforces. In this way, epideictic is constitutive of lifestyle, it can be less 
about the persuasion of others and more about the persuasion of self. Herein, then, we have a 
nascent theory of epideictic—one that recognizes a category of rhetorical influence that operates 
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more comfortably outside of the courtroom, is without clear instrumental telos, and that succeeds 
rhetorically when the pursuit of personal aretē is activated within a community. This opens up 
several questions about the nature of epideictic: what is the experience of this type of rhetoric 
like? What were its material elements? And, most importantly, do they persist?  
In his book Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity (2000), Jeffery Walker explores these 
questions and in doing so expands upon Aristotle’s epideictic theory. Walker’s study focuses on 
how ancient epidictic (epideiktika) practice was different from pragmatika, the latter of which 
“was traditionally understood to include two main types of civic discourse: speeches of 
accusation and defense in courts of law; and speeches proposing, supporting, or opposing laws or 
resolutions in political assemblies” (7). It was in response to this practical, civic need that 
rhetoric (techne rhetorike) developed to support. Epideiktikon, on the other hand, “was more 
amorphous and inclusive” and “generally identified with discourse delivered . . . at festivals and 
ceremonial or symposiastic occasions” (7). Walker’s important point follows that before 
Aristotle essentialized the meaning of “epideictic” by assigning it an instrumental function 
within the public sphere as a part of his theorized discipline for addressing the problems of civic 
life; indeed, before techne rhetorike emerged as an art for addressing “practical civic business,” 
epideiktikon was already embedded within the practices of everyday life. Oral and discursive 
language practices crafted as value-maintenance adhere around cultural traditions in a variety of 
styles, from eloquent prose to rhythmic poetry. 
Walker’s work, which delves into the pre-history of rhetoric, can be added to other work 
interested in what Thomas Cole (1991) has called “protorhetoric” and Richard Marbeck (1999) 
summarizes as “the unsystemized and uncodified persuasive and oratorical tactics of the sophists 
and the poets” (6). Walker shows how rhetoric developed alongside the poetic tradition and how 
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even when each “discipline” was codified into separate “arts,” their histories and ends were and 
remain inextricably connected. Further, he shows that rhythmic poetics, as epideictic containers 
of value and virtue for a community, are what give rhetoric its power. Civic rhetoric, Walker 
argues, “necessarily depends on and appeals to the beliefs/desires that epideictic cultivates” (10). 
This cultivation is sweeping:  
“[E]pideictic” appears as that which shapes and cultivates the basic codes of value 
and belief by which a society or culture lives; it shapes the ideologies and 
imaginaries with which, and by which, the individual members of a community 
identify themselves; and, perhaps most significantly, it shapes the fundamental 
grounds, the “deep” commitments and presuppositions, that will underlie and 
ultimately determine decision and debate in particular pragmatic forums. As such, 
epideictic suasion is not limited to the reinforcement of existing beliefs and 
ideologies . . . [it] can also work to challenge or transform conventional beliefs. 
(9) 
And while Walker’s hypothesis is situated within an ancient context, I argue that it retains its 
salience to modern rhetorical study and criticism. As such, rhetoric’s origins as an “expansion of 
the poetic/epideictic domain,” as a means of cultivating and propagating sociopolitical values, 
provides an exigency for the study of how the poetic/rhythmic-as-epideictic persist in creating 
public agreement about what constitutes civic “virtue,” as “the central . . . fundamental mode of 
rhetoric in human culture” (10).  
It is significant, then, that Protagoras claims that virtue isn’t just taught by those 
“qualified” to teach it—cultural virtues and values are part of everyday experience and are 
learned, as he mentions, in any number of venues, domestic, scholastic, musical, and athletic. 
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Each of these areas of learning are indicative of spaces of the struggle toward excellence, where 
both mind and body are engaged in movement and motion toward a specific disciplined end.  
Bodily Arts (2004), Debra Hawhee’s important book on rhetoric, athletics, and the body, 
connects the notion of aretē with agōn, usually translated as “struggle” or “contest” (15-22). 
Hawhee makes several observations that help to guide my argument. First, she draws together 
aretē and agōn in order to articulate what I see as the epideictic rhetorics—the “codes of value 
and belief”—spoken of by Jeffery Walker. Aretē was “associated with bodily appearance, action, 
and performance” and could be abstracted as a “guide” for virtuous action as “the struggling 
contest served as a stage of sorts” (17). Second, this “stage” is indicative of the public and 
performative nature of Greek becoming and was enacted in what Hawhee calls “a productive 
training practice wherein subject production takes place through the encounter itself” (16). Third, 
while Hawhee’s book is about athletics, she frequently mentions the connection between 
agonistic and musical performance (in the gymnasium and the agora): “Music established a 
rhythm through the cyclical repetition of patterns, and this rhythm was replicated in the bodily 
movements of those in training . . . For the ancients, music facilitated training through the habit-
forming quality of rhythm” (138). Supplemental to this educational use, then, music had a kind 
of mythic “soul”-changing power. As Hawhee reminds us, Aristotle described music as working 
directly on character (ethos) and soul (psyche). Plato (through his Socrates) concurs: “rhythm 
and harmonies have the greatest influence on the soul; they penetrate into its inmost regions and 
there hold fast” (Republic 401d). Finally, and as Hawhee gestures toward in her work, the 
principles discussed above are most likely to be found endorsed in ancient texts by or about the 
sophists. Indeed, sophistic wisdom and teaching were based in rhetoric’s connection to 
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performative and competitive agōn, rhythmic and near-musical eloquence, and culturally 
embedded notions of aretē.  
 
Vernacular Voices  
Above I demonstrated ways my work draws exigency from a host of concepts and 
theories that are rooted in the ancient (Western) tradition of rhetoric itself. 7 A wholesale 
application of these notions into a contemporary setting may, however, prove problematic. What 
is most compelling to me about rhetorical theory, however, is not the ways and names whereby it 
is conceptualized, but how terms from different epochs coalesce to mark, more or less, the same 
practices. As ancient terminology is evoked in the chapters that follow, it should be heard as a 
movement toward conceptual and disciplinary recognition and legibility—a familiar tune—
rather than as a definitive attempt at establishing a kind of ontological conceptual stronghold for 
the emerging field of sonic rhetoric. Reverberance between academic, historical, and disciplinary 
borders will always be the goal here.  
Related, there is also conceptual bleed between other terminologies that appears 
throughout this work. The word “vernacular,” for example, has a variety of potential meanings, 
depending on its context and discipline. I use it more or less interchangeably for the word “folk” 
to name the “everyday” lingual and discursive output of “average” people—the citizen.8 My 
scare quotes in the previous sentence betray the fact that such renderings are, themselves, 
problematic and inconsistent with common usage. “Vernacular,” for example, is often used as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See also the work of comparative rhetorics outside of the Western paradigm: George Kennedy, Comparative 
Rhetoric (1998), but also Sue Hum and Arabella Lyon. "Recent Advances in Comparative Rhetoric" in Lunsford, 
Wilson and Eberly (eds.), Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies (2009). 
8 Note, for example, that the word “folk” was often used by musicians like Pete Seeger and Woody Guthrie as a way 
of acknowledging the commercialization of “vernacular” traditions. My usage of either term tends to follow this 
imperative (but isn’t always consistent to it). Of course, when the 1960s brought with it a “folk revival,” the notion 
was complicated even further.  
	   19 
designator for not “everyday” people necessarily, but people who are in some way culturally 
distinct from those with the privilege to define what is “mainstream”—the others. I address the 
problematic nature of the phrase vernacular at the beginning of Chapter Two, including my 
decision to use it, not as a demonstrative othering, but as a way of acknowledging the legitimacy 
and diversity of all cultural traditions.  
My project’s exigency also, then, rests on the fact that vernacular music, as a persuasive, 
embedded rhetoric of everyday life, is under-theorized within rhetorical studies. The notion of 
“vernacular rhetoric,” however, is already in circulation due to the work of Gerard A. Hauser. 
Like me, Hauser is interested in mapping the sources and traces of ideological consciousness. To 
do so, he describes vernacular rhetoric in a Bakhtinian key by focusing on how the ceaseless 
conversations of public life—the everyday discourse of everyday people—contribute to an 
ongoing public negotiation between competing authoritative (traditional) and internal 
(progressive) persuasive discourse (8). For Hauser, the term “vernacular” is useful in 
understanding the rhetorical character and dialogic multiplicity of a civically minded public 
body, or more precisely, the “plurality of publics in which strangers develop and express public 
opinions by engaging one another through vernacular rhetoric” (12, his emphasis). In other 
words, vernacular rhetoric emerges out of everyday expressions of public opinion. Conversely, 
publics are themselves “emergences manifested through vernacular rhetoric” (14). Hauser’s book 
is a critique (or complication) of the Habermasian ideal of the public sphere as a kind of 
monologic ideal where democracy is born standing up. And while Public Sphere Theory is not 
central to my project here, understanding various expressions of public opinion is. Hauser’s 
argument rests on the reality that a pluralistic public and a dialogic public opinion—or the 
vernacular—create a civic environment where democracy’s ideals become obscured. Politicians 
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do not trust “the people” to make informed decisions and the “probable cause for crisis of 
confidence is the sheer complexity of the realities confronting society” (25). Public opinion, 
then, becomes subject to various attempts at political manipulation (or, more generously, 
simplification) in order to find consensus enough to produce results. Hauser sites the role of 
media—newspapers, radio, TV, and now the internet—as substitutes for the public deliberation 
of average people displacing “traditional rhetorical processes for forming public opinion and 
instilling a sense of community” (26).  
Surely we need look no further than popular programs like those on the average 
conservative talk-radio station or, to be fair, the massively popular left-leaning political “fake 
news” on cable television for examples of this kind of mediated simplify-and-codify-for-the- 
masses approach to opinion-making. Presidential campaigns, and particularly presidential 
debates, are frequently criticized for the glossing of more complex “real issues” for those more 
legible to the widest possible audience. For Hauser, vernacular voices are in danger of being 
drowned out by these louder and more carefully packaged political rhetorics unless greater 
rhetorical competence becomes a goal for a greater number of the vernacular public.  
Hauser’s anxieties resonate through this dissertation as well. My work locates vernacular 
voices in their practical (if not originating) communities and traces how those voices are 
appropriated, coopted, and in other ways became rhetorics distinct from those practical origins—
often due to the affordances of advancing mediated technologies. Such manipulations can (and 
should) be unsettling. But unlike Hauser, I am interested in how vernacular voices expressed 
through vernacular music are themselves simplifications of the more complex problems they 
represent, and also how this simplification has important rhetorical (and by extension, political) 
utility. In other words, alongside an attempt to harmonize with Hauser’s thesis, my work also 
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seeks to acknowledge vernacular music’s paradoxical nature as a simple container for complex 
assemblages of values, ideals, politics, and socio-cultural norms, including those associated with 
race and racial formation.  
 
Rhetoric and Sound Studies  
The following chapters explore and expand upon the rhetorical possibilities of the 
vernacular sonic voice. In addition to activating and expanding upon the theories of rhetoric 
evoked above, my project also works to develop meaningful intersections and associations 
between rhetorical studies and sound studies. Sonic rhetorics of any kind remain undertheorized 
and, in many ways, work with rhetoric and sound still seems to be in preproduction. For 
example, in a recent review essay for Rhetoric Society Quarterly, “Auscultating Again: Rhetoric 
and Sound Studies,” Joshua Gunn, Greg Goodale, Mirko M. Hall, and Rosa A. Eberly survey 
several recent sound-related publications relevant to but largely outside of rhetorical studies. 
Their essay is offered as a practical roadmap for as-yet untraveled rhetorical excursions into 
sound studies, meant to be (as they phrase it) “helpful to the unfamiliar” (477), acknowledging 
implicitly that most of us, in fact, are. To this end, Gunn et al. deliberately resist “the temptation 
to rhetoricize sound studies or sound-out rhetoric” (477) or to “remix sound studies into a 
rhetorical studies groove” (486) in order to instead “cast a scholarly ethic” of listening (477). 
This much-needed ethic works as a kind of principled initiate of the unfamiliar by setting the 
current and historical scene—the “problems and debates”— within sounds studies. For 
rhetoricians, the identification of these problems and debates as commonplaces offer potential 
inroads so that future work finds audience and resonance not just within rhetorical studies, but 
within much lager conversations around sound. For example, Gunn and his co-authors locate a 
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recurrent “tension in sound studies between those who examine mental or physical sonic 
experience (‘interiors’) and historical and material contexts (‘exteriors’)” (479). These tensions 
exist around competing interests between “phenomenological, psychoanalytic, and Marxian 
materialist” perspectives” (479) each of which find notable and active ancillaries within 
rhetorical studies debates.  
As a review essay and as one of only a few recent published works that offer resources 
for scholars interested in rhetoric and sound, “Auscultating Again” understandably sticks mainly 
to its educate-and-rally objective as a “collaborative liaison” between various traditions (486). 
The article sends a strong message to scholars within rhetoric interested in sound to familiarize 
themselves with sound studies’ non-rhetorical roots. This advice makes sense—there is much to 
know—but may seem odd to those of us finding a complex sonic root system within rhetorical 
studies itself. In the spirit of the ethic of listening they recommend, my reading of Gunn et al. is 
an invitation to go broad and deep in our study of sound and rhetoric. They recognize the strong, 
kairotic pull to take advantage of the “unquestionably growing interest in ‘sonic rhetorics’” (486) 
but, in our excitement with our discoveries, they remind us to not ignore our call as rhetoricians 
to draw from all “available means” (Aristotle I.1.140).  
Gunn et al.’s thesis that rhetorical work with sound should be attuned to sound studies 
leaves the details of that attunement largely to us. An earlier article by “Ascultation” co-author 
Greg Goodale titled “The Presidential Sound: From Orotund Speech to Instructional Speech, 
1892-1912,” offers one potential “tuning” and more are needed. Goodale’s work is notable here 
for two reasons. First, in addition to his deft analysis of the sounds of presidential oratory, 
Goodale offers a useful genealogy of the ways that sound has, at various times, been “a central 
concern of the field of communication” (164). He traces sound-focused work within the field 
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back to the early 1930s when a number of articles on the sound of speech, the voice, and radio 
were published in Quarterly Journal of Speech and also points to a number of more recent essays 
in hope that sound might again move to a more central place in the field.9 Second, he offers three 
suggestions aimed at helping “rhetoricians […] bolster their scholarship” (167) through more 
attention to the sonic: 
First and most broadly, reading sound adds another dimension to the study of 
rhetoric, complementing recent advances in visual rhetoric and the critical analysis 
of words that is at the heart of the discipline. Second, the analysis of sound 
provides a new method for understanding political persuasion and the relationship 
between politics and culture. […] Thirdly, we have long been aware that rhetoric 
provides a window onto the past in a manner that elucidates history. The study of 
sound provides a microphone to the past, adding to the discipline’s erudite 
historical work. (167) 
Goodale’s insights here remind us gently that sound (via speech and the written word) is already 
central to the discipline. The political, cultural, and historical circumstances that the field has 
become expert at examining will increase in sophistication as rhetorical analysis is expanded 
across the sensorium. Rhetorical studies’ current and on-going expansion into multi-sensory 
realms is a reminder that rhetoric doesn’t need to be “remixed” with sound. Rhetoric’s sonic 
dimensions have always been there.  
There is a pressing need, however, for sustained conversations about the contours and 
complexities of those dimensions. And while there is evidence of sound’s resurgence within the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Goodale cites work by Joshua Gunn and Eric King Watts as two of the most notable current examples of work with 
sound in rhetorical studies. See Goodale’s notes for a full accounting of the historical resources. Also, Goodale’s 
recently published monograph Sonic Persuasion is, by my stars, the first major contribution to the emergent sub-
field of rhetoric and sound studies. 
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field at multiple levels—in conference talks, professional workshop sessions, in “special” print 
and electronic journal issues,10 as well as in conversations around multi-modal pedagogies—
sound-as-rhetoric still suffers from a perceptible disciplinary “neglect” (Gunn, et al. 477). Gunn, 
Goodale, Hall, and Eberly do their part to help us navigate that question broadly and in ways 
sure to circulate outside of the field and Goodale’s more discipline-specific directions point to 
both the history and potential futures of sound-related scholarship within the field, even while 
the many ambient conversations listed above remind us of its potential diversity. In fact, the 
shear expanse of these sounded rhetorical potentials may be partially causal of the perceived 
neglect—such radical openness isn’t usually the stuff upon which disciplinary foundations are 
constructed and maintained. 
This dissertation is another shout across that expanse, but one that will locate some 
definitive markers for future work as my chapters locate the sonic dimensions of rhetorical 
concepts already reverberant within the field. As I have already begun to articulate, the particular 
conceptual tools I locate hail from both ancient and contemporary theories of rhetoric and are 
useful in that they name rhetorical activities common across all historical epochs. These concepts 
require a common space in which to animate them and I have chosen the 1930s in the United 
States as that context. The 1930s offer a particularly rich set of topoi for examination and 
discussion due to the diverse array of social and economic crises that shaped that decade. And 
while this dissertation does not attend in depth with many of the decade’s usual analytical 
suspects (Depression, FDR, Dustbowl, WPA, etc.) in extended detail, those circumstances are 
frequently evoked as the staging elements for the subjects that do receive careful analysis.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Recent journal issues include 2006 special issue in Computers and Composition, “Sound in/as a Compositional 
Space,” as well as edited collections produced for the web: “Music/Writing Culture” at Enculturation (1999), 
“Writing With Sound” at Currents for Electronic Literacy (2011) and “Sonic Rhetorics” at Harlot of the Arts 
(2013).  
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Conclusion 
In sum and invocation, the following dissertation brings to rhetoric a study of vernacular 
music that amplifies what is known about rhythmic practice in the rhetorical tradition. It 
responds to emergent conversations at the intersection of rhetorical and sound studies, and 
engages with questions about sound and music’s rhetorical roles in myth making, racial 
formation, cultural eloquence, progressive thought, and historiography. As explored in this 
introduction, recent scholarship has identified the sonic elements of rhetoric’s classical roots. I 
argue that vernacular, folk, or “roots” music can be a key element—a sonic rhetoric—for 
interpreting the ebb and flow of cultural ideals within contemporary historical moments, 
particularly during times of crisis. 
In order to better understand the rhetorical effects of vernacular music in the 1930s, I 
focus on the careers of folklorists John A. Lomax and his son Alan, emissaries for and 
employees of the Library of Congress. In 1933, they set out to record the “folksong of the 
American Negro” in several Southern African-American prisons. In Chapter Two, I trace the 
Lomaxes’ experiences in the prisons and examine the rhetorics of several recordings they made 
there. Throughout, I argue that the music the Lomaxes gathered for the Library’s Folklife 
Archive contributed to a new mythology of “authentic” Americana for a people in financial, 
social, and identity crisis. During the 1930s, this music had paradoxical effects: even as the songs 
reified long-held conservative orthodoxies, they also performed as agents for social change and 
reconstitution. The recordings the Lomaxes made in the prisons, for example, were produced 
under the coercive auspices of white privilege, yet also provided incarcerated African-American 
men rhetorical agency they would not otherwise have enjoyed. Similarly, and as explored in 
Chapter Three, pianist and composer Jelly Roll Morton enjoined Alan Lomax and the Library of 
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Congress in his desire to insert and authenticate himself within the early history of jazz. He did 
so through deftly articulated sonic rhetorics—virtuosic performances and oral histories—but the 
recorded sessions brought more fortune and fame to Lomax than Morton, who died soon after. 
By 1939, Lomax was hosting a national radio program on CBS titled Folksongs of America on 
the popular radio initiative known as the American School of the Air. Lomax’s radio program is 
the subject of the fourth chapter, and it is there, with a particularly authentic American irony, 
songs recorded in the prison yard were silently repurposed by professional musicians and 
broadcast to the country’s white suburban classrooms. 
In order to give context to the case study chapters, Chapter One continues the 
introductory tone found here and is designed to orient the reader to the historical and intellectual 
climate of the 1930s, as well as to the theories and methods that guide the various strands of my 
argument. I conclude the dissertation with a chapter that projects the possibilities and futures of 
rhetoric and sound studies through a “reanimation” of the work of Walter J. Ong (a controversial 
figure in both rhetorical and sound studies) with the evocation of the concept “digital folkness.” 
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Chapter One 
 
Sonic Rhetorical Cultures: Historiography, Re-Orientation, and the Sounds of Authenticity 
 
“If you could strip from all poetry its music, rhythm, and meter, the residue would be nothing 
else but rhetoric.” 
 
Plato, Gorgias, 502c11  
 
“The fact is that the sophists are no longer dismissed or ignored in the histories of Western 
thought; and this fact must be the starting point of any contemporary study about them.” 
 
John Poulakos, Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical Greece, 2 
 
 
“It was as if the American people, just as they were poised to execute more social and political 
and economic innovation than ever before in their history, felt the need to take a long and 
affectionate look at their past before they bade much of a farewell, a need to inventory who they 
were and how they lived, to benchmark their country and their culture so as to measure the 
distance traveled into the future that Franklin Roosevelt was promising.” 
 
David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear, 256-257 
 
 
Introduction: History making, lore, and rhetorical utility 
 
I am your servant, composed this song;  
Please, Governor Neff, let me go back home 
I know my wife will jump and shout 
When de train roll up and I come steppin’ out. 
 
Please, Governor Neff, be good an’ kind, 
Have mercy on my great long time, 
I don’t see to save my soul;  
If I can’t get a pardon, try me in a parole […] 
 
Please Governor Neff, be good and kind, 
And if I can’t get a pardon, will you cut my time? 
If I had you, Governor Neff, like you got me,  
I would wake up in the mornin’ and set you free.  
And I’m going home to Mary—po’ Mary.  (“Murderous Minstrel” 50) 
 
In January of 1935, Time magazine ran a story in their music section titled “Murderous 
Minstrel.” Juxtaposed conspicuously alongside a more typical-to-form article about famed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Translation found in Poulakos (2007), 341. 
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composer Igor Stravinsky, “Murderous Minstrel” was accompanied by the above verses and a 
photograph of a middle-aged African-American man wearing worn overalls and strumming a 
patched 12-string guitar. The article begins in a racially charged and sensationalized vernacular 
common to the day: “In Texas a black buck known as Lead Belly murdered a man.” The 
statement, while crude and patronizing, was accurate in that Lead Belly was convicted of 
murdering a man. It referred to a 1918 incident that led to Lead Belly’s imprisonment in Sugar 
Land Texas penitentiary. The story continues, recounting a simplified version of the 
circumstances that led to his release from Sugar Land in 1925 but then back into prison by 1930: 
[Lead Belly] sang a petition to Governor Pat Neff and was granted a pardon. Back 
in the Louisiana swamplands, where he was born Huddie Ledbetter, his knife 
made more trouble. He was in State Prison at Angola when John A. Lomax, 
eminent ballad collector, stopped by last summer and asked the warden if he 
could please hear Lead Belly sing. 
John Lomax arrived in Manhattan last week to lecture on ballads and with 
him was Lead Belly, wild-eyed as ever. The Negro had been pardoned again 
because Mr. Lomax had made a phonograph record of a second petition and taken 
it to Louisiana’s Governor Allen. 
This and many other reports of Lead Belly’s second pardoning—a compelling but disputed detail 
related to the circumstances around his release from Angola prison—is part of a fascinating 
historical problem that, as both Lead Belly and Lomax’s biographers have acknowledged in 
different ways, remains “a central element of Lomax-Leadbelly lore” (Porterfield 331).12 Lomax 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Porterfield spells Huddie Ledbetter’s nickname as the single word, “Leadbelly” as do many others including later 
commercial releases of his music. I prefer the two-word rendering because that is how Ledbetter signed his name. It 
is also the way his name appears on his tombstone (http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-
bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GRid=6121635, retrieved February 12, 2014.) 
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himself writes about the event in he and son Alan’s published compilation of Lead Belly tunes 
titled Negro Folk Songs as Sung By Lead Belly (1936): “I met [Governor Allen’s] secretary, who 
took the aluminum record and promised to play it for his chief. On August 1, thirty days 
afterward, Lead Belly was across the Mississippi River and headed for Shreveport. In a paper 
bag he carried a carefully folded document. Governor Allen’s pardon had come” (33). What was 
actually on that paper, however, has become the subject of a popular historical dispute among 
folklorists, as this second pardoning likely never occurred.13 The most compelling evidence for 
this is a 1939 written response from Angola warden L. A. Jones to New York’s Probation 
Department, the latter of which had requested information about Lead Belly’s release: 
This man has been the recipient of wide publicity in various magazines of 
national circulation, the story usually being that he sang or wrote such moving 
appeals to the Governor that he was pardoned. Such statements have no 
foundation in fact. He received no clemency, and his discharge was a routine 
matter under the good time law which applies to all first and second offenders 
(Wolfe and Lornell 120). 
Untangling the timeline of what was known and what was not (and by whom) about the 
alleged pardon hasn’t been easy. In October 1934, several months before the Time article 
appeared, Lomax appears to believe that his trip to Baton Rouge with Lead Belly’s recorded 
request to the Governor was successful. In a handwritten letter to Oliver Strunk, Lomax’s 
supervisor and head of the music division at the Library of Congress, John reports on his recent 
experiences with Lead Belly: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Lomax does include a footnote to the above story stating simply, “General Manager Hymes has since written to 
me that Lead Belly’s Pardon was due to his ‘good time’” (Lomax, Lomax, & Herzog 36). Lomax still uses the word 
“pardon,” however, which, as shown below, doesn’t appear to be the reason for his release.  
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My driver and assistant […] is a Negro ex-convict, Leadbelly by name, who two 
months sang a petition for pardon on a record, addressed to Governor O.K. Allen. 
I carried the record back to Baton Rouge a hundred miles away. The Governor 
listened to it and then pardoned Leadbelly. He came on to Texas and attached 
himself to me. He says that I will never again have to tie my shoes if I “don’t 
want to.” When I come to Washington in January I’ll bring him along and give 
you and Mrs. Strunk a specimen of Negro music as interpreted by a real Negro. 
(Lomax to Strunk, October 1, 1934)  
This report, however, compresses the time between events and glosses the circumstances related 
to the supposed pardoning. For example and as he wrote in the above recollection, when he 
arrived in Baton Rouge, the governor was in a meeting and the disc was left with his secretary 
leaving one expert to conclude that “There is no evidence that ‘musical Governor Allen’ ever 
actually heard it” (Porterfield 331). If we take the other parts of the letter at face value (which, of 
course, we cannot), it is possible that Lomax thought Lead Belly had been pardoned because 
Lead Belly had told him it was so. Indeed, the origins of the lore around the second pardon may 
have very well come from Lead Belly. The musician may have jumped to conclusions about the 
circumstances of his release believing that Lomax had something to do with it, or he may have 
simply understood the utility of attaching himself to John Lomax, a man of influence and 
position whom had shown such a genuine interest in him, and made a compelling plea to Lomax 
for taking him on. The point is that we will never really know. 
These murky historical circumstances, pieced together using several primary sources and 
the best attempts of historians intent on understanding them, reveal the contours and limits of the 
historiographical process. This anecdote illustrates that the writing of history (and therefore 
	   31 
“history” itself) is messy and distributed rather than linear, logical, or complete-able. In fact, I 
have intentionally belabored the difficulty of uncovering the “truth” around a particular historical 
detail in order to perform, briefly, this process and to begin this chapter with the argument that 
the writing of history (whether as a part of a scholarly project or in the “writing” of our own 
histories—as Lomax and Lead Belly seem to be doing here) has multiple contingencies and 
therefore is frequently skewed and prejudiced (and to some degree fictional) but that history is 
also practical, useful, and rhetorical. Lead Belly singing himself to a second pardon is a fantastic 
story, after all, and one with a variety of potential uses.  
In short, discursive history is always, to one extent or another, lore. Lore abstracts, 
codifies, and gives circulation to the otherwise confounding nature of “true” history’s 
multiplicity and opacity. John Lomax most likely did not get Lead Belly out of jail, though he 
may have thought he did for a time. Either way, the story of how he did became a sort of “usable 
past”—a rendering of historical events crafted to have utility beyond the cold, discoverable facts. 
This artful, practical rendering of lived experience into a circulating dynamic artifact is central to 
this and the other chapters in this dissertation. In fact, the notion and paradoxical nature of lore 
undergirds and intersects the history, artifacts, and even the theory that support the arguments I 
work with throughout the dissertation. It follows that each chapter carries with it both explicit 
and implicit arguments for lore as a crucial, if often overlooked, component to understanding 
rhetoric’s relationship to and with history and history making. In my interest to contribute to an 
emergent body of scholarship working to theorize rhetoric in its sonic registers, my emphasis 
throughout will be on historical sound, particularly the “rhythmic rhetorics” of vernacular or folk 
music, but this idea of lore-as-history-as-rhetoric (and even as theory) presides over everything. 
In fact, the above rendering of the story of Leadbelly and John Lomax’s move into the public eye 
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is an attempt of my own to create a usable past. To craft representative anecdotes that gives 
exigency for this dissertation, I return again and again to this “cutting edge” of history making—
one where distinctions between our notions of history, rhetoric, and lore (in this case folklore)—
are made nearly indistinguishable from one another and can even be used interchangeably to 
describe, more or less, the same things. 	  
This chapter draws out and connects this presiding idea in three strands. Since this is 
primarily a historical project, I continue first, with the discussion begun above about the 
rhetorical nature of the historical process. I look to scholars of rhetoric and history as guides for 
navigating the various paradoxes, and difficulties involved in producing critical rhetorical 
history. Second, and also related to history, I begin to set the historical stage for the project. The 
1930s in the United States can be imagined as a complex drama of human activity respondent to 
a seemingly unprecedented array of economic, intellectual, artistic, political and other social 
upheavals. I touch briefly on several of these upheavals and their impact, focusing in on the 
experience of Kenneth Burke, a lodestar in the field of rhetoric. Burke’s experience and ideas in 
development during this time are resonant with both the classical sophistic ideal of dissoi logi as 
well as notions connecting history and history making with lore. Burke’s 1930s also connect us 
into developing ideas about art, poetics, and music in the decade’s popular, intellectual, political, 
and vernacular cultures and will help to make sense of where and how these ideas converged 
around a growing interest in folk artifacts and music. Third, in the midst of this drama and as a 
result of this convergence, an interest in a kind of mythic “authentic” American vernacular 
culture emerges. This interest, like the complex scene it emerges from, had a variety of 
exigencies (which I take up in subsequent chapters), but at the center of a particularly productive 
stream of activity were the folklorists John and Alan Lomax. I introduce them and outline their 
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contributions and relationship to the history of folksong collecting in the United States and also 
how they engaged with the authenticity trope that was so prevalent.  
The work I begin here and take up in case studies across the dissertation contributes to 
the development of a multi-channeled body of work around music and sound within rhetorical 
studies, a grouping that, taking a cue from the popular designation “visual rhetorics,” might be 
called, tidily, “sonic rhetorics.” Sounded rhetoric, however, is anything but tidy. Learning to 
“think with our ears,” requires developing our listening, learning to “think across sounds,” and to 
“think conjuncturally about sound and culture” (Sterne, Sound Studies Reader 3). I address, then, 
the intellectual spaces where these disciplines of listening are being developed and how sonic 
studies in rhetoric connects up with the goals of this much larger contingency of interdisciplinary 
scholarly project known as Sound Studies. Here and throughout, I begin answering an important 
and always pressing question: What is the promise of developing theories around the sonic 
within the field of rhetorical studies? What value will these theories hold for the field? 
Answering these questions adequately is a project far beyond the scope of a single dissertation, 
and so my emphasis—as has already been advanced—will take on three main topoi and are 
related to those I expand on below: Lore and historiography, rhythmic rhetorics and poetics, and 
the mythos (and politics) of authenticity, including the rhetorics of authentication.  
Part 1 
“Usable Pasts”: Sounding out Methodologies for Rhetorical Historiography  
“[An accurate understanding of the 1930s should be] less concerned with asserting the centrality 
of one [ideological] impulse than with thinking about the tensions within and between values, 
ambitions, ideas, and circumstances. The desire to move in more that one direction at once, to 
have it both ways, to live with or to resolve contradictions, appears during the 1930s in the most 
broadly public spheres as well as in narrower territories of individuals defining their beliefs and 
families and furnishing their homes.” 
 
Terry A. Cooney, Balancing Acts, xiv 
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 This dissertation is a historical project, but with an asterisk. It is set, more or less, within 
temporal parameters of the 1930s in the United States, which puts it in the same historical epoch 
as the Great Depression—but it is not a history of the Great Depression. Neither, as mentioned in 
the introduction, is it a detailed history of any of the major historical events that play out in the 
U.S. during that time, most notably Franklin D. Roosevelt’s presidency and policies, but also 
other significant geographical, political, artistic, and military upheavals: the calamitous “Dust 
Bowl” drought that stretched across Oklahoma and other plains states, the rise and decline of a 
prominent radical left in the United States, the height (and some would argue final gasp) of 
artistic “modernism,” and the slow but sure congealing of European and Asian military super-
powers that would eventually push the world back into war. Instead, this project cuts across these 
historical events. Its subject—the reemergence of musical folklore collecting as a viable 
scholarly, historiographical, and commercial practice—was made possible by these historical 
events and was a response to them, but also was part of a larger set of practices that made the 
upheavals manageable and coherent for many during that decade, and, it follows, part of what 
makes the 1930s discernable to us now. The dissertation, then, is an analysis of what it means to 
try to compose history by boiling it down to its “authentic” bones. It is a study of the many ways 
the collection of folk music contributed to the composition of a usable past and of this music’s 
movement from mere artifacts to rich rhetorics.  
The phrase “usable past” is attributed to Van Wyck Brooks and his essay “On Creating a 
Usable Past” published in The Dial in 1918. Brooks’s influential critique of United States art 
culture at the beginning of the 20th century encouraged American artists to move beyond 
European models for inspiration. Instead, artists (and writers in particular) should begin forging 
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their own artistic traditions drawn from a past curated from values distinct from European ideals. 
Said Brooks:  
The present is a void and the American writer floats in that void because the past 
that survives in the common mind of the present is a past without living value. 
But is this the only possible past? If we need another past so badly, is it 
inconceivable that we might discover one, that we might even invent one? (339)  
Discovering and presenting the “living value” of a usable past draws out the distinctly rhetorical 
elements of historiography. The term “usable” also underscores the mythos surrounding and 
intersecting rhetorical/historical narratives and their attendant artifacts and helps to lay plain the 
ways that history is not so much a fact-finding pursuit of the Truth as it is a curated collection of 
useful topoi that meet particular exigencies. Like the story above, usable pasts also contain the 
paradox of representation inherent to all historical work in that history’s authors, like folklorists, 
always subvert, codify, and gloss historical details and in so doing insert authorial tone, rhythmic 
logics of cause and effect, and other affecting elements through the pseudo-poetic process of 
composing cohesive narratives out of past events. In his influential meta-historical work, Hayden 
White comments on the conspicuous overlaps between history and poetics and how historical 
writing takes on many of the same tropes and cadences as literary fiction. The “facts” of history 
“do not speak for themselves,” after all (Tropics of Discourse 125) and writing history in a way 
that it “speaks” requires a skilled and artful hand: “[T]he historian speaks for [the facts], speaks 
on their behalf, and fashions the fragments of the past into a whole whose integrity is—in its 
representation—a purely discursive one” (125). White also comments on the representative 
nature of history calling historical narratives a “complex of symbols which gives us directions for 
finding an icon of the structure of those events in our literary tradition” (88, emphasis in 
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original). Rendering history in this way, however, creates tensions around the traditional binaries 
of fact and fiction, what is real and what is imagined, and erases any lingering illusion that 
history is, simply, a pseudo-scientific process of gathering objective data and putting it into 
chronological order.  
This anxiety about the difference between the real and the represented is, of course, 
similar to the Platonic anxiety about writing (as opposed to speech), which has reverberated 
continuously every time traditional media is challenged by the latest innovation or remediation. 
This dichotomy is present in the shifting view of historical writing as well, but the problem of 
narrative history not being perfectly representative has strong correlation to another (if related) 
Platonic anxiety as well, this one around poetry. Plato’s critique of poetry is, at its center, an 
anxiety about misrepresentation. In the last book of the Republic, Plato accuses poets of fostering 
a kind of theatre-mentality where audiences of dramatic renderings (or poetic speech qua 
rhetoric) of the various political and practical elements of life will begin to mistake the imitation 
for the actual due to a general civic malaise: “For the representation imitates a type that is alien 
to them” (10.605a). The poet is guilty then, of “fashioning phantoms far removed from reality” 
(10.605a). 
I bring Plato to the conversation because the utility of poetics plays an important role 
throughout the various arguments in this and subsequent chapters, but specifically here because 
his anxieties represent well the classic paradox of working within, through, and despite 
representation. Plato’s famous mistrust of writing and rhetoric, which included this skeptical 
stance on poetry, might be seen as a kind of reactionary, if realistic, response to the difficulties 
inherent within the ongoing march toward new modernities. Interestingly, while Plato can be 
understood as “pious”— devout to a metaphysical Truth and to certain time-tested, value-laden 
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ideals—his traditionalism wasn’t unreasonable. Part of his anxiety about poetry was that it 
encouraged adherence to a public pedagogical system, a cultural didacticism, which he saw as 
antiquated. As Eric Havelock (1986) argues, Plato attacked poets  
less for their poetry (one might say) than for the institution which it had been their 
accepted role to provide. They had been the teachers of Greece. Here was the 
clue. Greek literature had been poetic because the poetry had performed a social 
function, that of preserving the tradition by which the Greeks lived and instructing 
them in it. This could only mean a tradition which was orally taught and 
memorized. It was precisely this didactic function and the authority that went with 
it to which Plato objected. (8) 
Plato had new methods in mind. He sought with his prose (which was itself written, poetic, and 
rhetorical and therefore in seeming paradox to our understanding of his own ideologies) to 
displace the poetic tradition he was anxious about. In short, Plato was an innovator—a 
traditionalist perhaps, engaged in a gathering of “usable pasts” within that tradition, but only 
those that suited him.  
Plato himself, then, might be understood poetically as a representation within this pious 
archetype, working carefully (and not without intellect or great struggle) with the problems of a 
complex society. Plato’s antithetical adversaries, the sophists, came at similar problems, but from 
the other side. As Sharon Crowley asserts in her essay “A Plea for the Revival of Sophistry,” the 
sophists addressed the problems of modernity with a “skeptical epistemology” (instead of 
through metaphysical ideals). They recognized within poetic discourse a way of dealing with the 
paradoxes within modern life. They didn't seek to destroy truth so much as they sought methods 
of dealing with traditional "Rightness"—and getting what was needed out of a situation rather 
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than what was already predetermined. Similar to my archetypal characterization of Plato, 
Crowley sees the sophist Protagoras as a representative of the sophist’s alternative “impious” 
ideology of multiplicity and tolerance for contradiction. Protagoras taught that existence was an 
area of intense strife, where two opposing logoi (dissoi logoi), or possible accounts of reality, 
exist in every experience: “to every logos another logos is in competition.”14 The subjectivity of 
individual perception forever deprived humans the opportunity to know which of these 
competing versions of experience to be true. So, rather than imagining the Platonist and sophistic 
perspectives as binary or opposite, it is useful instead to understand them as prime examples of 
dissoi logoi—not in ideological opposition to one another, but rather, in competition. As such, 
both perspectives are important as they stimulate productive agōn (or contest) rather than 
conclusive (and dogmatic) ends or telos. As Debra Hawhee (2004) writes, this “agonism 
produces rhetoric as a gathering of forces—cultural, bodily, and discursive—thus complicating 
the easy portrayal of rhetoric as telos-driven persuasion […] or as a means to reach consensus” 
(16). Both Plato and the sophists were interested in “usable pasts” but chose to use history, 
tradition, and rhetoric in different ways. These differences and the agonism they create in the 
pursuit of scholarly representation are just as important (and likely have greater significance) as 
the conclusions that they help us to draw.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The “two-logoi” fragment is attributed to Protagoras by later Greek sources. Edward Schiappa highlights two 
common translations of the “two-logoi” portion of the fragment in his book Protagoras and Logos: A Study in 
Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric (2003). The first, called the “subjective interpretation” forwards a “two-sides to 
every argument” translation. “Such translations,” argues Schiappa, “reduce Protagoras’ statement to the proposition 
that a debate is possible on any topic” thus reducing “all sophistic teaching to [deliberative] rhetoric” (90) The other 
interpretation, called “Heraclitean,” acknowledges that the “sides” themselves “are created solely by the arguers 
rather than being aspects of an object of inquiry” (90). This is the interpretation, casts the logoi as not in opposition 
but in competition: “Of every thing, two contrary accounts can be given” (91).  
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Toward a Sophistic Historiography 
The rhetorical historian’s work, particularly those interested in—to borrow David 
Zarefsky’s (1998) distinction—“the rhetorical study of historical events,” can be understood as 
the pursuit of cataloging and representing the constant swell of societal upheaval, conflict, and 
change.15 Put succinctly, rhetorical history might be thought of as the tracing of agonism and its 
effects over time. This pursuit includes the careful curation of what Kenneth Burke called a 
“perspective by incongruity,” one attendant to divergent cultural ideologies, replete with 
tensions, with dissoi logoi, between “tradition” and “progression,” and performative of how 
power and privilege are at odds with justice and accountability. The work of rhetorical history 
should be a critical work, as “[g]ood criticism, like good history, is reflective; it offers reasons to 
sustain good judgment” (Zarefsky 21). Writing history with the understanding that it is “a series 
of rhetorical problems, situations that call for public persuasion to advance a cause or overcome 
an impasse […] and how well people invented and deployed messages in response to the 
situation” (30) is a good first step. In their essay, “Pan Historiography: The Challenge of Writing 
History across Time and Space,” Debra Hawhee and Christa Olson point out just how prevalent 
this kind of rhetorical history production has become over the last several years. They note that a 
move to large, century-spanning histories of rhetoric to histories that focus on a single short time 
period are evidence of a “rhetoric’s coming-of-age as a discipline” (91). But, perhaps of greater 
note is that these new histories have begun to make explicit the tools needed to aid those critical 
judgments, including Zarefsky’s, that the work of rhetorical criticism is tied to the theorizing of 
new ways of understanding rhetoric itself. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 David Zarefsky describes the work of rhetorical history as incorporating four areas (“useful not for boundary 
drawing but for understanding the richness of our field”): the “history of rhetoric, the rhetoric of history, historical 
studies of rhetorical practice, and rhetorical studies of historical events” (26). My work falls most neatly into the 
final distinction, but, as Zarefsky implies, cross-pollinates into the others.  
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Within this oeuvre of emerging histories is a growing body of work that provides just 
what I have been advocating: criticism and methodologies that encourage new theories of 
rhetoric derived from the study of rhetorical historiography. I reference several throughout this 
chapter. These methodologies have roots in established rhetorical theory that play on the radical 
nature of historiography as both an epistemological (knowledge making) and ontological (being 
or reality making) project (the dissoi logoi at the heart of the Sophistic/Platonic dichotomy). 
These possibilities underscore the ways in which history, as we imagine it, is not re-assembled 
through the light of clear and discoverable empirical evidences or a carefully lit stage of 
coherent, logical events, but is instead more like a hall of echoes: reverberant, cacophonous, and 
at times enveloping.  
Further, as a “usable” past, history can and should be understood as both representation 
and reality, as useful in the upholding of tradition and in imagining new futures, as both 
conservative (in the literal and political senses) and progressive. As invoked earlier, the writing 
of history can be understood as an ongoing project dealing in the management of dissoi logoi. 
Given the inherent paradox of history, Susan Jarratt’s (1991) development of a sophistic 
approach to understanding and composing history and historiography provides a useful 
methodology that I have already begun to employ here. This historiography, she argues, is based 
in a “comprehensive epistemic sense” (xx) of rhetoric that dislodges history from “philosophic” 
logics and relies instead on sophistic values as guiding principles of a rhetorical historiography. 
These values include “the primacy of human knowledge, possibilities for non-rational and 
emotional responses to the whole range of discourse types, a fundamental understanding of 
knowledge and values as historically contingent, a recognition of all discourses as ‘rhetorical,’ 
[and] an integral relationship between theory, practice, and the political sphere” (xviii-xix).  
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Jarratt is in conversation with a larger body of scholarship interested in recovering the 
ancient sophists from their relegated state and drawing on a sophistic value system to inform 
theories of rhetoric and writing studies as approaches to and attitudes toward history. Drawing on 
Eric Havelock, for example, Jarratt explains how sophistic ideals lend themselves particularly 
well to historiographic practices because a sophistic rhetoric is a radically practical rhetoric, one 
that lays bare the nature and contingency of ethics, knowledge-making, and the ways that “group 
values evolve out of custom or habit as ‘pragmatic solutions to temporal and historical needs’” 
(qtd. in Jarratt 10). This pragmatism, in turn, is well suited to examine rhetorical and historical 
nature of vernacular culture, with its distinctly epideictic structure as a site for virtue and value 
production and dissemination. Jarratt’s ground rules for “the practice of a sophistic 
historiography” underscore and give direction to the goals for this project. I list them below, 
pausing to comment and expand through conversation with another rhetorical historian, Carole 
Blair, and to begin to flesh out how a theory of sonic rhetorics might be conceived of within and 
through a sophistic framework.  
Jarratt’s first tenant toward the practice of a sophistic historiography is “a redefinition 
and consequent expansion of the materials and subject matters of rhetorical history, resulting in 
what today would be styled multidisciplinary—historical investigations on the margins of 
traditionally conceived disciplines” (Jarratt 264). Since 1991 when Rereading the Sophists was 
published, this call for enlarging the boundaries of what constitutes “legitimate” rhetorical 
history and its “materials and subject matters” has been sounded with increased frequency. In 
fact, in 2015, books and articles published in rhetorical studies that take up the multi-
disciplinary, multi-mediated, and expansive subjects (women, queer, disabled, of color) and 
subjectivities (affect, the body, the mind, the non-“American,” the non-human) of rhetoric may 
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exceed those in the more traditional scope (particularly the great white speeches of great white 
men genre). Indeed, the margins are beginning to be traversed and re-theorized.16  
Carole Blair has been influential in calling for rhetorical histories beyond their well-worn 
conceptions, along what she names their “influential/preservative” and “systematic/progressive” 
tracks and towards a more “critical” history of rhetoric (405). In her revisionist 1992 QJS article, 
“Contested Histories of Rhetoric: The Politics of Preservation, Progress, and Change” she 
deploys this approach in a way that works to undermine the privilege of classical authors and 
also to dispel the myth of “progress” attached to many contemporary theorists, because such 
“politics are fundamentally in conflict with any program that sanctions current or future 
theorizing” (418).17 This notion dovetails with Jarratt’s second key practice within a sophistic 
historiography: “the denial of progressive continuity” (12). This denial is “a conscious attempt to 
disrupt the metaphor of a complete and full chain of events [what Blair calls “influence”] with a 
telos in the revival of rhetoric in the twentieth century [Blair’s “system”]” (12). For both Jarratt 
and Blair, history is a radically rhetorical notion and Blair recommends rhetoricians working 
with history move beyond the telos model in favor of a critical historiography of rhetoric. This 
critical historiography resists fabricating monuments (or relics) out of histories, people, and 
theories and instead suggests that “historical rhetorics should be regarded as texts” which, 
“because they are written, […] have the same nuance and uniqueness of any text,” and therefore 
invite reflection on context and contingency to other texts/histories (all of which are 
constructions, corruptions, creations) (418). Which isn’t to say that such contingencies relieve 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In writing studies (and to name only a few recent influential texts), see Byron Hawk, A Counter-history of 
Composition (2007); Joddy Murray, Non-discursive Rhetoric (2009); Collin Brooke, Lingua Fracta (2009); Thomas 
Rickert, Ambient Rhetoric (2013), Christa Olson, Constitutive Visions (2014); and Jordynn Jack, Autism and Gender 
(2014). 
17 In their essay “Revisionist Historiography and Rhetorical Tradition(s),” Richard Graff and Michael Leff describe 
Blair’s essay as “the last major entry in the wave of revisionism that proceeds from Duhamel through Ehninger, and 
is also, within the field of speech communication, one of the earliest entries in the newer, poststructuralist approach 
to historiography” (16).   
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the historian of the need to seek out particular, practical circumstances from which history’s 
rhetorics emerge. “Critical history,” Blair argues, “would regard rhetoric’s past as a myriad of 
specific articulations of rhetoric, any of which might bear important insight, and all of which tell 
us something about the historical conditions in which they were articulated” (419). Critical 
history, which “opens the door to multiple rhetorics,” is not plural for plurality’s sake, and 
recognizes that all formulations are significant in some way” (419)—a notion that ties Jarratt’s 
first two recommendations together, with an implicit warning, perhaps, that a sophistic 
framework doesn’t give the rhetorician a pass to write irresponsible or incoherent history.  
Jarratt’s third and final recommended practice for a sophistic historiography is “the 
employment of two pre-logical language technai, antithesis and parataxis, creating narratives 
distinguished by multiple or open causality, the indeterminacies of which are then resolved 
through the self-conscious use of probable arguments” (12). This final methodological element 
is, perhaps, the most difficult to put into practice, but is also the most important. As Jarratt 
explicates, both antithesis and parataxis operate outside of the still-preeminent “Aristotelian logic 
of noncontradition” (21). Indeed, the sophist’s legacy as mendacious manipulators stems from 
these pre-logical or “non-rational” stylistic techniques for persuasion which often rely on affect 
for their effects: poetic genres (parable, encomium) and poetic stylistics (wordplay, rhythm, 
rhyme, sound, etc.), for example. For the sophist, while “fully capable of understanding a logic 
of non-contradiction” (22) the emotional, feeling body is on equal grounds with the logical mind. 
Much has been written to “recover” the body and its phenomenological strata and emotional 
“data” as a legitimate site for study within contemporary rhetorical studies.18 These elements are, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See Jack Selzer and Sharon Crowley (eds.), Rhetorical Bodies (1999); Debra Hawhee, Bodily Arts (2004) and 
Moving Bodies (2009); James C. Wilson and Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson, Embodied Rhetorics: Disability in 
Language and Culture (2001); Jay Timothy Dolmage, Disability Rhetoric (2014); Shannon Walters, Rhetorical 
Touch (2014).   
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no doubt, central to this project as well—particularly those related to sonics—but they also 
introduce the possibility of antithesis into the methodology as a viable, or even integral, aspect 
of the historiographic process. Antithesis is a literary device that “function[s] to overthrow a 
commonplace about a historical character” (24). The need for antithesis might be understood as a 
method for dealing with constant paradox—of encountering within the historical archive (and 
then seeking to represent) the presence of complex subjects (and their rhetorics) who experience 
constant double-mindedness, conflicting emotional multiplicities, and fractured and re-sutured 
ideologies, and therefore act in contradictory ways. It represents an acknowledgment of the 
uncertainty of historical causalities within disparate narrative assemblages rather than giving into 
the temptation constructing a teleological or deterministic history that elides these elements. It 
also means encountering these same inconsistencies within oneself during the historical writing 
process. But, antithesis “is not a spurious trick for clouding the minds of the listeners, but rather 
works to awaken in them an awareness of the multiplicity of possible truths” (22). Quoting 
Mario Untersteiner, Jarratt declares, “The sophistic historian will ‘not confine reality within a 
dogmatic scheme but allow it to rage in all its contradictions, in all its tragic intensity’” (qtd. in 
Jarratt 22).  
Under this formulation (or anti-formulation), the historian both seeks out texts with 
antithietical possibilities and performs/composes them herself. One of Jarratt’s key texts is 
Gorgias’s Encomium of Helen, which, given encomia’s mythic status has implications for the 
fictions inherent to literary renderings of history. Gorgias selects Helen as a historical subject not 
for the “establishing of irrefutable facts” but for the story’s “usefulness in the reconstruction and 
interpretation of culturally meaningful an instructive pasts” (16). Further, “The opportunities for 
speculation provided by the narrative situation […] supersedes the establishment of the ‘factual’ 
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status of the materials themselves as a goal for discourse” (16). This view of history supplants 
the traditional “fact” finding aim of historiography and accounts instead for “the inevitably 
literary or mythic quality of any historical reconstruction and its relevance to the present” (16). 
She also points out that the Encomium of Helen contains an argument without a conclusion. It 
“organizes probabilities toward the end of reinterpreting elements of mythic history” and is not 
overly concerned with a logical chain of causal relations (which traditionally lead to judgment, 
i.e. Helen’s guilt), but instead “on the interplay among causes” (22). Importantly, Gorgias’s 
refashioning is playful and in that play he reveals the indeterminate nature of causal language 
and challenges “the conventions of factual, continuous history, historical time, and simple 
cause/effect relations” (23). To sum up, “In Gorgias’s hands history becomes not a search for the 
true, but an opening up of questions: an enterprise not so much of reaching conclusions but of 
uncovering possible contradictions” (23). 
I’m nearly full circle to my earlier argument about lore as an important historiographic 
genre. Jarratt’s sophistic methodology underscores “history” as it is animated though careful 
historiographic assemblages and I forward that this bears a strong resemblance to lore. Indeed, 
Jarratt shows us the way that lore can help us to reimagine history as it embodies each of the 
above characterizations: it is generally extra-disciplinary to rhetoric or at least on the margins, 
lore denies and even undermines any sense progressive continuity, and in its radical semiotic 
openness, is easily rendered antithetical. The same folksong, for example, can be imbued with 
ideals from opposing ideological values. In her final suggestion towards enacting sophistic 
historiography and as a paring with the deconstructive potentials of this antithesis, Jarratt evokes 
parataxis as a mode for reconstruction: “antithesis creates an openness to the multiplicity of 
possible causal relations, then parataxis demands the employment of probable arguments in the 
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reconstruction of provisional historical narratives” (21). And further, “Antithesis allows for 
laying out options; parataxis their loose coordination in a narrative” (27). Parataxis is a rhetorical 
term that emphasizes the juxtaposition of coordinating clauses (rather than subordinate clauses, 
or hypotaxis) that create their intended meaning in juxtaposition rather than independently. 
Jarratt describes parataxis using a visual/aural analogy. A hypotactic approach to historiography 
“seems to exist as a complete two-dimensional visual construct […] whereas discourse structured 
paratactically creates the effect of evolving in time, through sound striking the ears, minds, 
bodies of its listeners in a temporal experience” (27). The former obscures its own existence as 
contingent by appearing “complete” while the latter exists despite or even because of its 
incompletion, taking meaning from each element along the temporal trajectory. As such, 
antithesis and parataxis function together in much the same way as “remix” or even “mash-up” 
for a musician: The historian/story-teller “plays with the material like Frankenstein with body 
parts” where “the point is not exposing or discovering the unknown, but rearranging the known” 
(28). This rearrangement is a revaluation. Sophistic history makes it explicit that values structure 
how a story is told—and takes advantage of that arrangement. As such, “In sophistic history the 
pretense to distanced objectivity is overshadowed by an open acknowledgement of value 
orientation: any realignment is made for a purpose” (28). Sophistic historiography, then, brings a 
study of value-formation itself to the forefront of the historical process as both events and their 
representations are subject to the agonistic competition between value-laden subjects and the 
events, places, and people that demand the performance of those values, a process that literally 
brings into being that which we can point to and call “history.”  
Carole Blair’s arguments toward developing a critical history within rhetorical studies 
concludes with a kind of resolution for the productive, sophistic, agonism between traditional 
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and progressive ideologies. Recognizing that tropes of historical preservation and progress are 
both mired in determinism and “entail preconceived valuations of history” that often become 
confused with “historical succession,” Blair recommends that history should instead be “a 
recognition and account of change” (419-20). Following Foucault’s Archeology, she argues that 
“Change is an ‘empty, abstract notion’ in itself [and] allows for multiple elaborations” (qtd. in 
Blair 420). This formulation has a distinctly sophistic bent—the same that I have been gesturing 
toward that places the historian/theorist/rhetorician within a both/and mode of discourse. With 
change comes a simple (but still open) generative purpose (if not telos). This call for a critical 
emphasis on change as well as the rather complex methodology I have assembled above are 
rather meaningless without a historical context within which to both implement and test them.  
I explore these ideas, then, within the context of a grouping of responses to the crises of 
the 1930s that can be traced across the spectrum of civic experience, from the lives of 
“everyday” people, through intellectual and artistic thought and activity, and into the ideological 
structures of political systems and their various propaganda. That something as simple as folk 
music could have such a dynamic reach in its influence is exigence enough for its study within 
rhetorical frameworks, but there is something about that elasticity that begs certain questions 
about the folk artifact as a rhetorical object. Jarratt gives us a starting point to begin answering 
these questions at the methodological level. This methodology reveals sweeping potentials for 
lore as both a rhetoric of history (as a site where careful and prolonged study will reveal 
“history” as a vast network of complexities and paradoxes) but also as a rhetorical tool for those 
actors and agents for whom that lore became an instrument. As an “empty, abstract notion” on 
which multiple elaborations can be cast, a folk song can be used in service of both social and 
cultural permanence and change. 
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Part 2:  
Permanence or Change? Poetics, Shifting Ideals, and Re-orientation in the 1930s 
“[R]adicalism is but one voice of the thirties, and it is not necessarily the loudest. Scholars have 
put forward a number of organizing themes for the culture history of the decade, each one of 
which tends to reduce the others to a supporting role at best. These themes include the cultivation 
of nationalism, the discovery of the concept of “culture,” the impact of “modern” media, the 
preoccupation with past or future, and the pursuit of an ideal commonality.”  
 
Terry A. Cooney, Balancing Acts, xiv 
 
In the reflective prologue to Permanence and Change, written in 1953, nearly twenty years after 
its initial publishing, Kenneth Burke makes the following observation about the book and the 
cultural and personal milieu from which it was written:  
This book […] was written in the early days of the Great Depression, at a time 
when a general feeling that our traditional ways were headed for a tremendous 
change, maybe even a permanent collapse. It is such a book as authors in those 
days sometimes put together, to keep from falling apart. Not knowing quite where 
he was, this particular author took notes on “orientation.” Not being sure how to 
read the signs, he took notes on “interpretation.” Finding himself divided, he took 
notes on division (or as he calls it in this book, “perspective by incongruity”). 
Looking for some device by which to reintegrate the muddle, he asked about the 
possibility of a “resimplification” that would not be an over-simplification. (xlvii) 
In spite of the keen specificity of this accounting of Burke’s particular situation in the 1930s, the 
anxieties he evokes about disorientation, division, and the desire for greater simplification—for 
new symbols to assist the navigation of the rapidly changing world—aptly represent a prevailing 
bitter wind experienced by many during those uncertain years in the early 1930s. This 
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disorientation was experienced in multiple ways across the gamut of American experience 
largely due to the massive tectonic economic shifting effecting a good portion of the nation’s 
“everyday” citizens, but also due to the (not unrelated) movement and upheaval within artistic, 
political, and even scientific spheres. Ideas about rhetoric were shifting as well. The Depression, 
along with the greater interwar period that encapsulated it, marked a time when, according to 
rhetorical historian James A. Herrick, “scientific thinking was […] ascendant, and the methods 
of reasoning and speaking about contingent matters that had traditionally been studied and taught 
under the name of rhetoric were derided as decidedly inferior to scientific method” (204). This 
attitude of logical positivism (which had earlier echoes in both Ramist and Enlightenment 
attitudes about rhetoric), however, failed to prevent financial collapse, devastating war, and 
dangerous political extremes.19 The “new” rhetorics of Burke, I. A. Richards, and later Richard 
Weaver (among others), that began to emerge in the 1930s can be seen as a small part of the 
response to a growing intellectual suspicion of cut-and-dry empiricism as containing the answers 
to the world’s social problems. Indeed, George Kennedy notes that this emergent work stood as 
“strong reactions to the circumstances of the 1930s and 1940s: economic depression, fascism, 
and the Second World War” (295).  
 Burke’s work and life in the 1930s has particular resonance to this project in that he 
seems, in his persistent attempts to understand and theorize the paradoxes prevalent to 1930s 
culture, to personify both the struggle (agon) and the production inherent to experiencing dissoi 
logoi. Burke was deeply engaged in the scrum of 1930s New York leftist culture and those years 
would be, as Ann George and Jack Selzer (2007) posit, “the decade of his most remarkable 
productivity” (xi). Permanence and Change, which Burke published early in 1935, was a work 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue (1958) and Conley, Rhetoric in the European Tradition 
(1990) for insights on Enlightenment rhetoric as well as its shifting into the 18th and 19th centuries.  
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of “cultural history”—a “largely discarded form” but one that had many antecedents at the 
time—each of which grapple with ways, as Burke reflected later, to keep from falling apart 
(133).20 Burke’s attempts to lionize art and poetics as a response to the economic, political, and 
artistic problems of the historical moment left us with a convenient list of theoretical terminology 
that can, without too much trouble, be adopted as a way of articulating what made a reorientation 
toward the aesthetics of vernacular culture so appealing during and after that decade. As I argue 
throughout the dissertation, vernacular culture was one of the many possible sites where the 
“possibility of a ‘resimplification’ that would not be an over-simplification” could be found 
(xlvii).  
 It should be acknowledged that adopting Burkean terms for a rhetorical project “without 
too much trouble” in the way I describe above can actually be a bit of a problematic norm for 
rhetoricians. Kenneth Burke’s terminology is perhaps too often used without much troubling and 
without an admission of the esoteric Burkean density from which the terms emerge. Permanence 
and Change is a challenging book—full of the complexity that we’ve come to expect (but 
sometimes ignore) from Burke. But when viewed as a cultural history of the 1930s, we can do 
something rhetoricians may not usually do with respect to Burke: put he and his ideas in context 
within a particular historical moment and use the terms he suggests to first better understand 
what they meant for him and then make arguments about how they illuminate other significant 
events, artifacts, and experiences in and around that moment. This theoretical approach avoids 
the lifting of terms and concepts wholesale from their foundry and instead identifies the terms 
themselves as historical constructions—as attempts to symbolize a trend, ideal, or norm into an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 George and Selzer have a list of nearly twenty books that meet their specifications for culture history, among 
them, Van Wyck Brooks’s Three Essays on America (1934), John Dewey’s The Public and its Problems (1927), 
I.A. Richards’s Science and Poetry (1926), and William Carlos Williams’s In the American Grain (1925). See pg. 
133 for their complete cultural history catalog.  
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easy package or “tool” that can be “used” to make the complex coherent. In this way, like 
history, theory (Burkean or otherwise) is also a process of lore making. 
 
Burkean thought in the modernist 1930s 
 The closest thing we have to a biography of Burke during the interwar period are two 
books, Jack Selzer’s Kenneth Burke in Greenwich Village (1996) and Ann George and Jack 
Selzer’s Kenneth Burke in the 1930s (2007). The books seek to revise the common picture of 
Burke during the 1920s and 1930s as the isolated and independent autodidact he’s often 
characterized as and situate him within the intellectual, political, and artistic milieu of New York 
of those decades where he was a very active participant. Selzer and George’s work reads not 
only as a close study of Burke’s developing ideas, but of the landscape of intellectual and artistic 
modernism in New York over these two decades. Selzer (1996) describes modernism in much 
the same way as he presents Burke: as a developing conversation, and as dialogic rather than 
monolithic (3, 18). Further, he characterizes the years leading up to the 1930s as years of shifting 
values—of reevaluation: 
In the final decades of the nineteenth century and particularly in the first two 
decades of the twentieth, modernism amounted to a dialogue on how people 
might appropriately respond to the civic and artistic stresses created when various 
nineteenth-century certitudes about nature and human nature eroded or collapsed. 
(4) 
These various endemic certainties were the residuum of post-Emersonian confidence in a God-
animated nature, Victorian ideals supporting a “stable, hierarchical civilization,” and 
“nineteenth-century absolutes about law, morality, conduct, and the workings of nature” which 
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were beginning to decay under the influence of Darwinian, Kantian, and post-Newtonian ideas 
about mortality, morality, and science (5). Modernist ideals emerged as a represented desire to 
disassociate with genteel society, and to imagine “radically novel, radically shifting” and 
“relentlessly experimental” alternatives. It follows that modernist ideology during the interwar 
period was plural by nature, and often in productive competition (7).  
 These various modernisms revealed themselves as new creative ideas in all fields were 
intersected by the constant dialogue of competing ideologies that played out in popular journals 
of the day. Publications such as The Masses (later The New Masses), The New Republic, The 
Dial, Broom, Smart Set, Aesthete, and Contact, functioned as both modernist arcade and political 
soapbox. These were the journals that published the poetry of T.S. Elliot and William Carlos 
Williams, the fiction of expat authors Gertrude Stein and Ernest Hemmingway, and the criticism 
of Malcolm Cowley and Kenneth Burke (as well as dozens if not hundreds of others)—many of 
whom “felt they could encourage a new and indigenous American culture that would combine 
radical politics with artistic experiment" (34). But these authors and artists were not all 
likeminded. Modernism flourished within the agon of arguments about the inherent value of art 
(such as those around formalism and the emergent “New Criticism”), artistic experimentation 
(such as Dadaism), and rich political diversity and dialogue. Much of the political discussion was 
between various left-leaning groups, each in its various shades, “liberal,” “socialist,” 
“communist,” but also “Marxist,” “Trotskyist,” and “Stalinist.” Various traditionalist stripes 
complicated this radical left as well. Selzer describes, for example, how political difference 
underscored the approaches of two groups, the New Humanists and the Literary Nationalists. On 
one hand, the New Humanists “shared the modernists' negative assessment of contemporary 
American art and society and strove to reinvigorate American culture; they criticized the 
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materialism, industrialism, and culture philistinism that in their eyes dominated the American 
scene” (39). The New Humanists were traditionalists who “opposed the moral and 
epistemological relativism of many of the moderns” and sought out “‘timeless’ moral and 
aesthetic values present in classical texts and cultures” (39) as a response to both the problems of 
capitalism and to European fascism. Literary Nationalists, on the other hand, responded to these 
same problems with a commitment to establish “a vigorous and coherent and anti-genteel 
American culture, supported by civil liberties and free speech” (35) and “sought to ameliorate 
American society through forward-looking artistic innovation” (39). Burke’s own political and 
artistic leanings might be understood as somewhere between these extremes, or more accurately, 
as attempt to reconcile both at the same time. Burke’s short fiction, poetry, and criticism in many 
of the publications mentioned above as well as his close association with The Dial where he was 
an editor and translator put him in position to be, as Selzer argues “one of the best informed 
students and practitioners of modernist art in the world” (57). Yet, for all his connectedness to 
the various cultural movements of modernity and his interest in the concept of the “common” 
(common ground, common sense, and the “common man”), Burke seldom comments directly on 
vernacular or folk culture—despite his stated desire for “simplification.”  
Burke remembered the 1930s, and particularly the administration of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, as “a time when, on every side, there was the feeling that, for better or worse, an 
earlier way of life had come abruptly, to an end” (lvi). That feeling of loss was reflected in 
anxieties about new, less-familiar ways of life which now included often dissonant realties 
formed in the wake of industrialization, materialism, mass culture, and other trends made 
prominent through rapid technological advance. The Depression began with a stock market 
“crash,” but that crash also sounded the tumble of key failures within the ideological systems 
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propped up to support these advances. “There was a general consensus among New York and 
New Republic intellectuals […] that radical change was needed, probably of a Marxist model, if 
the nation were to endure” (George and Selzer 18). Artists also struggled toward a consensus on 
the role of art in the midst of crisis. As George and Selzer succinctly summarize, Burke, like 
many of his contemporaries struggled with a variety of these questions: 
What exactly are the responsibilities of the artist to society? What should be the 
function of art, especially during times of political and social crisis? Should art 
reflect, create, or mold life—and in what proportions? To what degrees is a 
writer’s artistic rebellion also a political one? How should writers balance the 
claims of art and politics, the individual and the collective? (60) 
These questions were poignant indicators of the kinds of changes that the various crises of the 
1920s and ‘30s were inflicting upon both the creators and consumers of aesthetic culture. As 
alluded to above in the description of New Humanist values, adherents to philosophical aesthetic 
purity, which included such tenets as “a commitment to novelty and experimentation, 
individuality, and originality, impersonality and the autonomy of art,” and personal satisfaction 
as an artistic “motive […], rather than commercial or rhetorical success” (61-62), found 
themselves increasingly at odds with those who saw in art a potential for political propaganda 
and persuasion.  
For those in the latter group, the Great Depression was the kairos needed for socialist, 
proletariat revolution. The John Reed Club, for example, formed in October 1929 (the same 
month as the stock market crash) and with the motto “Art is a Class Weapon” fostered young 
writers and artists in the proletarian cause (20). John Reed Clubs across the country  
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exposed those young writers to industrial settings to add to the authenticity of 
their proletarian writing, organized and promoted art exhibits, supported little 
magazines, and held dances, concerts, and shows to enhance proletarian 
appreciation for art even as that art moved the masses toward revolution. (20)  
An attempt by the Soviet Communist Party to create less radicalized and more inclusive left-
leaning groups across the world would soon push JRC members to reform into “Popular Front” 
Programs, “an effort at a still broader, more inclusive and powerful leftist membership capable of 
aligning with other socialist and workers’ groups” (21) and from there sprang a group in 1935 
known as the League of American Writers.  
The League of American Writers, who boasted membership from a wide variety of well-
known authors, scholars, and critics, was formally organized at the first Congress of the League 
of American Writers held in in New York City from April 26-28, 1935. Kenneth Burke’s 
controversial address at that congress titled “Revolutionary Symbolism in America,” reflected 
his own ambivalence related to the conflict described above.21 According to the official call that 
appeared in the January 22, 1935 issue of New Masses, the Congress was formed to bring 
together those in “clear sympathy to the revolutionary cause […] who do not need to be 
convinced of the decay of capitalism, of the inevitability of revolution” (357). But while the 
Marxist ideal implied here was promoted religiously by such “revolutionaries,” Burke found 
“Marx’s account of economic determinism to be neither realistic nor logically compelling” 
(George and Selzer 75). Instead, and as explicated in his speech, Burke saw these ideals as 
“symbols” that helped to make up the larger myth (an important form of lore) surrounding the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The third biennial Congress of the League of American Writers, held in 1939, is of passing interest here in that 
along with Kenneth Burke, Alan Lomax—fresh from a performance at the White House (see chapter 4)—was also 
in attendance and was networking with keynote speaker Langston Hughes (Szwed 150). There is no evidence 
suggesting that Burke and Lomax met at the conference or at any other time.  
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developing movement. “‘Myths,’” he argued, “may be wrong, or they may be used to bad ends—
but they cannot be dispensed with [. . . . T]hey are our best psychological tool for working 
together”—for “cooperation” (267). Myths lose their potency, however, when their constitutive 
symbols begin to decay: “A symbol […] loses its vitality when the kinds of cooperation it 
promotes—and with which its destiny is united—have ceased to be serviceable” (268). For 
Burke, both radical Marxism and the “bourgeois nationalism” that it was competing with based 
themselves on unsustainable symbols. To revitalize the former (which was closer to his personal 
ideologies), Burke recommend a re-orientation of the communist symbolic propaganda, away 
from “the worker” trope and towards the alternative symbol of “the people” which he saw as 
rating “highest in our hierarchy of symbols” (269). The distinction he draws between the two 
provide a keen insight into the nature of successful myth making through symbolism, particularly 
related to the successful representation and propagation of American values. George and Selzer 
help to synthesize Burke’s nuancing of the two terms: “A term such as the worker tended to 
exclude the very elements that Communist propaganda hoped to recruit, whereas for Burke ‘the 
symbol of the people’ contained ‘connotations both of oppression and of unity’” (17). Said 
Burke, “In suggesting that ‘the people,’ rather than ‘the worker,’ rate highest in our hierarchy of 
symbols, I suppose I am suggesting fundamentally that one cannot extend the doctrine of 
revolutionary thought among the lower middle-class without using middle-class values” (17) 
These arguments are in service to Burke’s larger interest in freeing the writer/artist/poet from the 
narrow demands that his colleagues at the Congress were recommending:  
the proletarian novel has been oversimplified, leading to a negative symbol (that 
enlists our sympathies) rather than to a positive symbol (that incorporates our 
ideals). . . .By informing his work mainly from the standpoint of this positive 
	   57 
symbol, he would come to see, I believe, that a poet does not sufficiently glorify 
his political cause by pictures of suffering and revolt. Rather, a poet makes his 
soundest contributions in this wise: he shows himself alive to all the aspects of 
contemporary effort and thought . . . . The complete propagandist, it seems to me, 
would take an interest in as many imaginative, aesthetic, and speculative fields as 
he can handle—and into this breadth of his concerns he would interweave a 
general attitude of sympathy for the oppressed and antipathy towards our 
oppressive institutions. (270) 
These words, which reflect Popular Front ideals more than those promoted by John Reed Clubs, 
would cause a bit of a stir at the Congress. However, “By taking up the topic of symbolism, 
Burke signaled to the audience the importance of communication and rhetoric in broadening the 
appeal of communism among the American public” (Giamo para. 19).  
This call for broadening communism’s national appeal through the identification of 
common symbols was an echo of a theory Burke had already begun articulating in Permanence 
and Change, which was published just before the New York City Congress. Permanence and 
Change also “recommended a ‘poetic’ orientation as a gentle leaven to the hardcore Marxist 
interpretive slant” (George and Selzer 22). Burke saw the myth and symbol-making inherent to 
poetics as “creating a dynamic superstructure with the potential to transform society both 
culturally and economically” (89), one where a “better life” could be imagined and articulated 
symbolically/aesthetically by the writer, gleaned metaphorically by the reader, and then 
promoted and adhered to as an ideal by an identifying audience. This move from the symbolic 
language of poetics to the symbolic action of social value agreement is a roadmap for better 
understanding Burke’s championing of the poetic (and later dramatic) metaphor which “stresses 
	   58 
man’s nature as a moral-ethical animal and takes into account the drama of choice which the self 
necessarily experiences in its quest” (Rueckert 52). Burke’s interest throughout Permanence and 
Change revolves around the ways that human action is based in and around ethical constructs or 
a “scheme of values.” People are motivated towards the proverbial good life—and to understand 
those people, you should start by understanding the “goods” they are motivated by. The great 
financial crisis of the early 20th century was, as he sees it, a direct result of a misguided ethics 
developed from the pursuit of an unsustainable system of “goods”—commercial wealth drawn 
from a mechanized ethics and infrastructure. In the wake of the industrial revolution, new means 
of wealth production resulted from rapidly advancing mechanistic technologies and these new 
means brought with them new moral structures which, according to Burke, lacked distinct 
humanistic (and communistic) virtues (another form of wealth) derived from artful cooperation. 
"There is a fundamental relationship between wealth and virtue,” Burke pronounces in 
Permanence and Change, “which no ‘spiritual’ scheme must be allowed to deny by fiat. 
Property and propriety are not etymologically so close by mere accident. Morals and property 
are integrally related. They are obverse and reverse of the same coin. They both equip us for 
living.” (212). Burke would use the phrase “equipment for living” in a later essay to argue for 
literature or poetry (“any work of critical or imaginative cast”)—as “the adopting of various 
strategies for the encompassing of situations” (Philosophy of Literary Form 1). Or, in other 
words, poetry (or more broadly, poetics) contains within it an artful rendering of moralistic 
structures—rules for life. Property and material goods represent, in the same way poetry does, a 
different set of moral structures—rules for a different kind of life. The central argument in 
Permanence and Change revolves around Burke’s perception of the tension between varying 
systems of morality and how they construct and motivate an orientation towards a “good life” 
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with the widest potential human benefit. Burke believes that a poetic “terminology of motives” is 
“foremost.” 
 
Poetry and Piety: Making and Breaking Society’s Moral Grooves  
“Morals are fists,” Burke argues late in Permanence and Change. They motivate and 
punctuate both good and poor behavior. When the motives behind morals are understood, we can 
know “why people do as they do” and can therefore “know what to expect of them and of 
ourselves,” which “shape[s] our decisions and judgments and policies” (18). This “vocabulary of 
motives” is an “orientation,” which “includes a vocabulary of ought and ought-not, with 
attendant vocabulary of praiseworthy and blameworthy” (21). Burke’s “scheme of duties and 
virtues” as contained within moral structures of human motivation is akin to Aristotle’s 
epideictic theory of rhetoric. Both are containers for language that flesh out a “rationalization, a 
set of motives belonging to a specific orientation” (23). Burke’s notions of “piety,” or the 
differences between the pious and impious, is developed in Permanence and Change and is 
connected to his notions of “perspective by incongruity” and “orientation.” Above, I used the 
term piety to describe a kind of traditional adherence or orientation to time-honored values. This 
is drawn from Burke’s own definition of piety as an implicit “sense of how it ought to be” (71), 
or drawing on George Santayana, “loyalty to the sources of our being” (69). In this sense, piety 
can act as both groove and rut. It can guide “at times of weakness and doubt, when […] 
convictions are not enough to sustain [you]” and help to keep you “under discipline by the walls 
of [your] monastery (that is, by the ruts which his experience itself has worn)” (79 my emphasis).  
 This notion of rationalization, or that which is “rational” or pious within a given 
orientation, plays an important part in the Burkean understanding of world and value-making. 
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Burke views history as having moved through (and between) successive rationalization 
constructs: magical, religious, and scientific. Each rationalization is an ontological response and 
challenge to mystery in the human world and as such each works as a means of knowledge 
production and management within its system. Magic and positivistic science based their 
rationalization on assumptions that “nature operates through immutable laws” (59) which can be 
manipulated by savvy practitioners. Religion, on the other hand, is a kind of non-rational 
rationalization most useful for understanding and dealing with realities out of human control or 
on the outside of human understanding. Religious mysticism also provides a space wherein 
paradox—a construct not generally legible within magical or scientific rationalizations—can be 
managed not only successfully but also with significant meaning (and for good or ill).  
The distinctions outlined above are important for Burke insofar as these ontological 
systems of rationalization produce a viable ethics—an epideictic scheme of values—for both 
understanding and critiquing the human motives produced within those systems. Burke is most 
interested in promoting an ethics that responds to the deep complexity of human motivation, one 
at home with the non-rational elements that a religious rationalization provided, but also one that 
would provide a vocabulary for developing systems of meaning despite and even through those 
complexities—a “secular mysticism” (113). For Burke, the poetic or dramatic metaphor becomes 
the 
ultimate metaphor for discussing the universe and man’s relations to it. . . . In 
adopting such metaphor as key, we have a vocabulary of motives already at hand, 
evolved through the whole history of human thought. Indeed, beginning with such 
a word as composition to designate the architectonic nature of either a poem, a 
social construct, or a method of practical action, we can take over the whole 
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vocabulary of tropes (as formulated by the rhetoricians) to describe the specific 
patterns of human behavior. (263) 
He then does so, showing that onomatopoeia, synecdoche, and other rhetorical tropes are 
themselves methods for representing common human actions and their motives symbolically 
through language. “Symbolic action” is another phrase familiar to those who study Burke. 
Generally, Burke uses the phrase to describe how language mediates the complexities of human 
thought, action, and being. Poetry, then, with the rich rhetorical potentials named above (and 
many others), is well met for the job.  
 Beyond poetry’s ability to represent human emotional complexity, Burke is particularly 
interested in poetry’s symbolic potentials for discovering “new meanings”—particularly during 
crisis—as “the crumbling and conflict of values” (116) leads to the “breaking down [of] old 
schemes of orientation” (111) and the need to build new ones. The method he provides for this 
action is a kind nurturing of a prophetic ability to “see around the edges of orientation in which a 
poet or thinker lives” (117). He calls this sight “perspective by incongruity.” In Attitudes Toward 
History, the follow-up to Permanence and Change published in 1937, Burke defined it as “[a] 
method for gauging situations by verbal ‘atom cracking.’ That is, a word belongs by custom to a 
certain category—and by rational planning you wrench it loose and metaphorically apply it to a 
different category” (308). Burke uses two examples, one pious and one impious, to demonstrate 
that an incongruous perspective or the deliberate manipulation of perspective (“planned 
incongruity”) is functional as a means of cultural comment and critique. Humor, which is the 
first, plays on the pious adherence to systems of “order” and orthodoxy by highlighting natural 
incongruities and “introducing a kind of artificial blindness, a complete vacuity as their [a] new 
point of view” (111). Humor is pious because it relies on a normative orientation for its 
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effectiveness. It may, in Burke’s words, throw “a shoe among the wheels of our judgment” but it 
succeeds by leaving the “favored judgment completely in tact” and even “deliberately 
strengthening it.” The grotesque, Burke’s second example, redraws norms through the 
juxtaposition of rational but unrelated parts which, in their new coupling, produce new ways of 
seeing and new ways of thinking. Like the maker of medieval gargoyles, the use of a man’s head 
and a bird’s body “was offering combinations which were completely rational as judged by [the 
maker’s] logic of essences. In violating one order of classification, he [sic] was stressing 
another” (112). Burke then points to several places where perspective by incongruity is at play 
within the Modernist aesthetic: in Hemmingway’s exquisite depictions of the horrific (110), in 
Joyce’s “blasting apart the verbal atoms of meaning” (113) only to make new elements from the 
ruins, in the super-realism of The Persistence of Memory—Dali’s “dripping watch” painting 
(113), and even in the Freudian interpretation of dreams, gargoyles that “seek to connect events 
by a ‘deeper’ scheme of logic than prevails in our everyday rationale of utility” (113). Finally, 
perspective by incongruity is illustrative of how Burke wants us to view systems of orientation. 
A juxtaposition of the scientific orientation with the religious, for example, illuminates how each 
scheme draws on similar linguistic/poetic metaphors for its construction and circulation and 
thereby diminishes the primacy of whichever perspective is currently in vogue. Burke will later 
call these areas of overlap “modes of convertability between economic, religious, and esthetic 
vocabularies” (Attitudes Toward History 313–314). Scientists and prophets are, it seams, cut 
from the same linguistic cloth and each write holy books.  
Some synthesis here between several terms (which includes some of my own “modes of 
convertability” between rhetorical epochs) will help to bring the themes I have been exploring in 
this chapter together and give exigency to the work I engage in throughout the chapters ahead. 
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Burke’s Perspective by incongruity is, for all intents and purposes, another way of stating the 
general ideas behind the sophistic dissoi logoi. Both denote ways in which pious and impious 
attitudes and ideologies overlap or should be made to overlap in order to create new ways of 
understanding and avenues for cooperation with one another. Burke points to poetics as the 
“ultimate” metaphor for capturing and creating these symbols of human action and, as I have 
already expressed in the introduction, I see this insight as an expansion of what Aristotle termed 
epideictic rhetoric. And while Aristotle and other scholars have focused on epideictic’s 
constitutive, value sustaining qualities, Burke’s championing of the poetic register of rhetoric 
invites a reconsideration of epideictic rhetoric as value-making and even value-critiquing and 
revising. Rhetoric in the epideictic/poetic mode can be both pious and impious, and often both at 
once when planned incongruity is at play.  
This both/and, dissoi logoi, perspective by incongruity, sophistic historiography is 
precisely the frame that I would like to use to think through the resurgence of interest in folk 
traditions during the 1930s. Burke didn’t have much to say about folk music, but he was 
interested in the reasons people “[begin] to seek for fresh a fresh basis of simplification” related 
to conceived notions of human purpose (a powerful if conceptual motivating force) (Permanence 
and Change 172). This “purpose” is generally conceived of within either ethical (teleological) or 
logical (mechanistic) systems of orientation, a dichotomy that becomes “bewilderingly 
complex,” as positivistic accounts of causality revealed greater and greater “unknown 
unknowns.” Scientific certainty, it would seem, requires its own sort of faith. “Thinkers ‘went 
nudist’”—a practice common “at every point in history when an orientation has been radically 
brought into question” (172). “Nudism,” Burke continues, “represents an attempt to return to 
essentials, to get at the irreducible minimum of human certainty, to re-emphasize the humanistic 
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as the sound basis above which any scheme of values must be constructed” (173). When 
economic, scientific, and other “accepted terms of authority [have] fallen into disrepute, [people] 
seek in the cosmos or in the catacombs some undeniable body of criteria. They try to salvage 
whatever values, still intact, may serve as the basis of new exhortations and judgments” (173). In 
1930s America, the humanistic values of ordinary (and often rural) American people sprang to 
the forefront of the popular imaginary as a place to find renewed or persistent values. The 
seemingly authentic and essential humanism of vernacular poetic and artistic culture represented 
a kind of moral safe house among the turmoil of toppling superstructures of certainty. 
Burke’s contribution to this repeating historical cycle isn’t the demonstration that it 
exists, but rather his acknowledgement of the mutability of the poetic to “authenticate” the 
values of seemingly conflicting orientations. Folk culture—and folk music in particular—
became a vehicle for both conservative moral stabilizing but also would be useful in pushing 
towards revised and progressive value systems, particularly those around race. The fascinating 
aspect of this process of mutability is how fast it can revolve from recovered authentic history, to 
progressive value marker, to codified commercial product and back again. Authenticity as a 
trope is itself a dissoi logoi; it is a container of incongruous perspectives come together to 
motivate by making the mythic momentarily real. It persists as lore until the cultural imaginaries 
producing those exigencies expire and authenticity has expended its rhetorical utility and is let 
go, back into the mytho-historical wild: catch-and-release.  
 
Part 3:  
Depression Era Authenticity: Reviving and Re-forging the Past into a Tool for the Present  
“[T]he market crash and subsequent Depression engendered a new cynicism toward the 
institutions of Anglo-American culture. Instead of being viewed as a threat to civilization, the 
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primitive became its potential savior—the means by which a decadent West could restore its lost 
vibrancy. The threat was no longer primitive insurgency but the random cruelty of a whimsical 
marketplace and the government's inability to resolve a domestic crisis.”  
 
Paul McCann, Race, Music, and National Identity, 61 
 
 
Folklore collection, often understood (especially at the end of the 19th century and into 
the 20th) as the romantic preservation of an idyllic vernacular past—a kind of bottling up of 
residues from the “good ol’ days” for safe keeping—began in the 1930s to take on a different 
tenor. This shift from the “endangered relic” paradigm to one that recognized the living and 
vibrant utility of vernacular artifacts underscores the historiographical nature of material culture. 
As the Coen Brothers’ character Llewyn Davis quips in the recent film about the folk revival of 
the early 1960s, “If it was never new and never gets old, it’s a folk song.” That sentiment sums 
up the appeal of folk music—it is both old and new simultaneously. Folk music had utility in the 
1960s for the same reason that it did during the 1930s: It could be a container of expression for 
current and emergent ideologies, packaged within the ethos of “tradition.” Vernacular music 
traditions provide a kind of road map for genealogical and ideological exploration—a sonic 
keyhole to the past that can be pursued and then lived in as old folk traditions are adopted and 
incorporated into contemporary exigencies. I’m reminded, for example, of Kurt Cobain’s deft 
appropriation of the Lead Belly classic “Where Did You Sleep Last Night” for Nirvana’s 1994 
MTV Unplugged in New York. Cobain remade the song (titled “Black Girl” in the Lead Belly 
version) which became a reminder of the deep connectivity between succeeding generations of 
“alternative” music, in this case between traditional blues and 1990s “grunge.” The tune would 
also become Kurt Cobain’s swansong—the last recorded musical artifact before his suicide just 
five months after taping the Unplugged session. In this way, “Where Did You Sleep Last Night” 
took on new layers of signification and Lead Belly’s sonic thread can now be tied to the early 
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1990s and the tortured genius of Cobain and will certainly have a life beyond this. “Where Did 
You Sleep Last Night” is a song that was never new and never gets old.  
 Folk “revival,” then, is cyclical and generally emerges to meet the cyclically reoccurring 
necessity of renewal: the desire to find stability during or following a period of uncertainty, a 
search for a sense of permanence despite continued change. The renewed interest in vernacular 
music during the 1930s was part of a trend emergent during the period between World War I and 
II—especially in the midst of the Depression—to seek out the “real” or “authentic” aspects 
American culture during a moment of shared crisis. As Regina Bendix (2009) asserts, “The quest 
for authenticity is a peculiar longing, at once modern and antimodern” (8)—or, in line with my 
earlier argument, it is a dissoi logoi. “[Authenticity] is oriented,” she continues, “toward the 
recovery of an essence whose loss has been realized only through modernity, and whose 
recovery is feasible only through methods and sentiments created in modernity” (8).22 In the 
1930s, these “methods and sentiments” were tied to both the technological advances in the 
instruments of representation—photography, audio recording, and film—and to a popular 
sentiment fascinated with representations of emotional “human-ness.” William Stott (1986) 
argues that “The adjective ‘human’ recurs throughout the thirties literature as a synonym for 
emotional, or touching, or heartfelt” (6). He cites the example of a critic who praised Virgil 
Thomson's score to The River because it borrowed folk melodies and hence was “full of the 
emotional content inherent in anything essentially human” (6).23 Technological advances 
provided a larger population immediate and accessible ways to document or experience 
representations of the “everyday.” Stott references Warren Susman’s essay “The Thirties,” 
quoting this significant passage: “The whole idea of documentary [was that it makes possible]—	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See also Miles Orvell, The Real Thing: Imitation and Authenticity in American Culture, 1880-1940 (1989). 
23 See the footnote marked with a double-asterisk (**) on p. 6 for this reference. 
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not with words alone but with sight and sound—to see, know, and feel the details of life, to feel 
oneself part of some other's experience” (Susman in Stott 8). Authenticity might be described, 
then, as the complex phenomenology of identity-making that occurs through the imagined 
identification with either the people or ideals (or both) of a mythic past. In a like manner, Charles 
Taylor has written that authenticity maintains a kind of non-rational ethic of “what it means to be 
true and full human beings” (26). Whether this ethic circulates as part of the soul-enhancing 
paradigm of the “good” (Plato), as a road to God (Saint Augustine), or even a non-theistic (but 
romantic) assumptions of an earlier and higher moral plane, it serves the same purpose: “Our 
moral salvation comes from recovering authentic moral contact with ourselves” (27).  
These formulae begin to express authenticity’s potential for power as it is evoked through 
the competing representations of moral humanness and individuality that translate into workable 
“ethics.” This might also be understood as a kind of epideictic continuance or the survival and 
persistence of what constitutes the goods and ills within a society. Taylor rightly identifies the 
contemporary culture of authenticity as one engaged in rhetorics of difference. The authentic 
individual is “original”—wholly unique from others—and therefore “diversity” becomes a 
worthy ideal to seek after. Authenticity, however, can be both powerful and problematic. At 
worst, the search for both “self” and “other” motivated by an impulse for cultural gatekeeping 
and moral self-aggrandizement through the essentializing difference. Under this model the racist, 
classist, or sexist tropes of the past might merely be replaced with new tropes of equal or only 
slightly diminished inequity, refashioned and fit for the times.  
Like other interwar period folklorists, John and Alan Lomax were not innocent of these 
kinds of reductions, but their perspectives grew more nuanced over time. In particular, the 
Lomaxes came to understand folklore in general and vernacular music in particular not so much 
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as an endangered relic as a substance with living and vibrant utility, which elevated its status 
from artifacts to rhetorics. Said Alan Lomax in 1981, “I realized […] that the folklorist’s job was 
to link the people who were voiceless and who had no way to tell their story, with the big 
mainstream of world culture” (Lomax & Cohen 94-95). Getting a sense for the tension between 
the competing polarities I have been collecting (tradition/progression, individual/other, 
originality/diversity, relic/rhetoric) is vital to understanding the social and political function of 
institutions like Archive of Folk Song and their practitioners. Lomax and other New Deal 
folklorist/scholars promoted what historian Benjamin Filene (2000) summarizes as “new ideas 
about what constituted authentic folklore, how to preserve it, and what roll it should play in 
contemporary society” (137). These new ideas posited a functionalist view of the authentic that 
rejected the popular notion that modern(ist) society had evolved beyond the need for “primitive” 
mythopoetic cultural constructs to define itself.  
Burke’s notions of “substance” and “consubstantiality” (which, though unpublished in 
those terms, were in development in the 1930s alongside the ideas explored above) are useful 
here in parsing the ways that authenticity can be redrawn as a useful ideal rather than an 
essentializing one. Substance is understood as the recognition of that which “stands beneath or 
supports the person or thing” (Grammar of Motives 22) or the complex arithmetic between 
personal and cultural identity: one’s “roots.” On the other hand, “consubstantiality” is the 
identification between two or more substances with intent to create mutual understanding. For 
Burke, these ideas and ideals were at the heart of rhetoric. This also was the project of the 
Lomaxes. At their best, John and Alan Lomax sought out the “substances” of America through 
the collection of vernacular musical sounds in order to promote a national consubstantiality or a 
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more democratically rich understanding of U.S. national identity, particularly around the 
African-American male subject.  
 
In Search of the Authentic Vernacular Other: John and Alan Lomax in the 1930s  
 “During the late spring of 1932,” records John A. Lomax in his autobiography 
Adventures of a Ballad Hunter (1947), “at the nadir of the general financial collapse, my fortunes 
had reached their lowest ebb […] I was worth less than nothing; I was heavily in debt, I had no 
job” (106). He and his wife, Bess Brown Lomax, had also just suffered a terrible illness and, to 
his great distress, she had not survived it. Lomax’s experience was becoming more and more 
typical for Americans, as 1932 marked the beginning of the third full year of the Great 
Depression in the United States and would be one its most devastating. In 1932, the GNP would 
fall a record 13.4 percent and unemployment across the nation would rise to 23.6 percent—
thirty-four million people without an income and essentially no social safety net.24 John Lomax 
was (at that time) a banker, and everywhere banks were failing. Earlier in the narrative, he writes 
solemnly of the experience of dejected bond buyers confronting him at his desk in the bank 
where he worked, aghast because the bonds he had recommended were now worth nearly 
nothing. “I was forced to sit and take it,” he recalls. “The market in New York had gone mad. 
What could I say? Nothing. And I said nothing” (104).  
That spring, Lomax had a hopeful but somewhat desperate meeting in New York with H. 
S. Latham, president of the Macmillan Company. Having had success with a book published by 
Macmillan (Cowboy Songs and Frontier Ballads published in 1910), Lomax was hopeful that his 
proposal for a new project would be accepted and funded with an advance against the royalties 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See “Timelines of the Great Depression: 
http://www.hyperhistory.com/online_n2/connections_n2/great_depression.html 
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by the company. He shopped several ideas with Mr. Latham, the last of which caught the 
publisher’s attention, the story-ballad of “Ida Red,” an African-American song John had learned 
during research for his earlier book on the Texas Gulf Coast: 
  I went down town one day in a lope 
  Fooled around till I stole a coat,  
  Then I came back and did my best,  
  Fooled around till I got the vest— 
  Oh, weep, oh, my Ida,  
  For over that road I’se bound to go. 
 
  They had me tied with a ball and chain,  
  Waiting all ready for de east-bound train, 
  And every station we passed by,  
  Seemed like I hear little Ida cry,  
  Oh, weep, oh, my Ida,  
  For over that road I’se bound to go.  
 
  If I’d a-listened to what Ida said,  
  I’d a-been sleeping in Ida’s bed, 
  But I paid no mind to my Ida Red, 
  And now I’se sleepin’ in a convict’s bed. 
  Oh, weep, oh, my Ida,  
  For over that road I’se bound to go.  
 
  I wash my face an’ I comb my head 
  I’m a’mighty fool about Ida Red; 
  When I git out-a this old shack 
  Tell little Ida I’se a-comin’ back. 
  Oh, weep, oh my Ida 
  For over that road I’se bound to go. (Lomax & Lomax 110) 
 
According to Lomax’s autobiography, after hearing “Ida Rose,” Latham was amused and 
intrigued (109). He authorized Macmillan to contract the book that would later become American 
Ballads and Folksongs, published in 1934. The book had several close ancillaries in the market, 
but none that centrally emphasized folksongs like “Ida Red” from the African-American 
vernacular tradition. The book contract accompanied with a small advance would give sixty-five-
year-old John Lomax new hope and a fresh beginning in the career as a folklorist he’d always 
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hoped to have but could never quite launch. The project would bring about an association with 
and formal mission from the Library of Congress to collect songs and, subsequently, pave the 
way for his son Alan Lomax’s later employment there. For John Lomax, it was the opportunity 
of a lifetime.  
By May of 1933, both John and Alan Lomax were in route to what both considered the 
most likely place to find authentic African-American music the likes of “Ida Red”: Sothern 
penitentiaries, where they would find a literally captive audience for their project. Prisoners were 
cut off from the general public engaged in menial and often back-breaking farm labor and, if the 
Lomaxes’ hunch was right, possessors of generations of otherwise lost folk songs. John’s interest 
in “Negro music” wasn’t incidental to this particular project. Since at least 1904, three years 
before the publication of his popular first book Cowboy Songs, John’s enthusiasm for black 
vernacular music was noted in personal correspondence and in various publishing proposals and 
by 1910 he already had evidence that there was a rich storehouse of “authentic” African-
American music if one only knew the right places to look.25 John’s attitude and excitement were 
likely related to his mentor, George Kittredge’s belief “that black folksongs and folklore had 
never been collected by anyone with a genuine interest in preserving them in their native forms” 
(Porterfield 168). Black music had been collected and published before but was always corrupted 
either by white scholars who, in Lomax’s words “dressed them up for literary purposes,” 
(Porterfield 509n17) or by literate blacks who “sought to polish [the songs] in order to present 
their race in the best possible light” (168). Lomax maintains, however, that Negro folksong was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 In a 1904 letter to his wife Bess, John Lomax mentions his excitement related to the music he heard among black 
students during “inspection trips to the state college for blacks at Prairie View (Porterfield 168). In 1907, John’s 
original proposal for the book that would eventually become Cowboy Songs and Other Frontier Ballads was 
actually a book on “Negro songs”—which was rejected in favor of the Cowboy tune project (167). And in 1910, he 
had already collected at least one hundred examples of what he called “mating ballads” and was anxious to find a 
potential publisher for Negro music in its “native form” (167). 
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“the most natural and distinctive [music] of any America had produced” (168) and that scholars 
had yet to devote significant energy to it. Lomax’s biographer Nolan Porterfield points out that 
these three thematic elements, “the lack of serious attention to Negro music despite its important 
cultural significance,” the “corruption of ‘Negro ideas’ by whites for literary purposes,” and “the 
regrettable efforts of educated blacks to suppress or refine their race’s lively and authentic 
vernacular music” emerge again and again as significant to the work of John Lomax (168).  
In sum, Lomax’s interest in the black vernacular culture appears to be based on a 
legitimate scholarly exigence: a gap in knowledge. Lomax’s early concern with the quality of 
that scholarship—of the need for its guarded “authenticity” against both white “corruption” and 
black “polish” is, perhaps, the most persuasive evidence to this end. On the other hand, its 
Lomax’s research methods and relationships with the African-Americans who would begin 
contributing their voices to the Library of Congress’s archives that can create some ambivalence 
around the scholarly objectivity of his work. If nothing else, the juxtaposition of these two 
competing ideologies—that of the scholar and that of the “mossback” Southern gentleman—
present a complex figure in John A. Lomax as one worthy of careful investigation.  
In his book, Disturbing the Peace (2009), Bryan Wagner comments on these delicate 
relationships between racial codification, cultural representation, and other symbolic rhetorics of 
circulating vernacular music. He references a well-known story told by W.C. Handy (self-named 
“father of the blues”) of his career-changing encounter with a African American vagrant who 
was “loose-jointed,” “[whose] clothes were rags,” and “feet peeped out of his shoes” (26). The 
man, who was waiting for a train sang and played a song on the guitar about waiting for trains. 
“That was not unusual,” Handy writes. “Southern Negroes sang about everything. Trains, 
steamboats, steam whistles, sledge hammers, fast women, mean bosses, stubborn mules—all 
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became subjects for their songs” (Handy in Wagner, 26-27). Handy would go on to become one 
of the most successful composers in the United States and using the standard blues idiom 
gleaned from this nameless vagrant, would effectively introduce blues music (rendered for 
orchestra) to the wider United States.26 Wagner comments how the so-called black tradition was 
often collapsed and codified by collectors and enthusiasts like Handy through the musical 
renderings of a “folk soul” and racial “trueness” found most prominently in the music of 
“manual laborers, loafers, and near-criminals” (34). This music gave collectors access to what 
John Lomax called the “actual workaday experience of the Negro” and, listening closely, one 
could hear “a negro thinking out loud” (34). Wagner’s observation complicates the opinions of 
scholars such as Amiri Baraka (referenced above) about there being a direct conduit between 
received folk traditions and an easily constructed understanding of “blackness.” Yet, in the early 
twentieth century, this was precisely the approach:  
The best songs, it was said, were like a “folk-mirror.” As soon as this cross-
referencing is under way, nothing else has to happen for the black tradition to 
become a folk tradition. Based on the glow of natural alignment between the 
tradition and its speakers, ethnographers were free to follow their presumption 
that black culture came from a traditional world where expression was still 
indexed directly to its producers. The black tradition was a folk culture where 
singing and storytelling retained the stamp of its authors, a tradition unlike 
modern communications that lost their aura as they became standardized, market-
based, and mediated by mechanically reproduced image and sound. (Wagner 34-
35)  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Handy’s subsequent and controversial claim as “the inventor of jazz” and jazz pianist Jelly Roll Morton’s famous 
response is the subject of this dissertation’s third chapter.  
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The train-stop songster of Handy’s memory is significant to this paradigm in that he is 
(and remains) nameless in our public memory. He is only understood through his 
“unindividuated” symbolic representation as vagrant, which meets with expectations of authentic 
African-American representation. It should come as no surprise, then, that the Lomaxes selected 
the prison as the site with the greatest potential for accessing and transmitting black tradition into 
folk tradition where African-Americans existed (in their minds) in similar strokes of caricature. 
There is a significant difference, however, between Wagner’s and Baraka’s interpretations of 
significance of this process of transference. Wagner is interested in the indeterminate and radical 
complexity of blackness in the United States. Blackness indicates “existence without standing in 
the modern world system” and is a “situation in which you are anonymous to yourself [and is 
therefore a] kind of invisibility” (1). Being black can be defined “not as a common culture but 
instead as a species of statelessness” (23). In Wagner’s view, any attempt, musical or otherwise, 
to reduce blackness to a single tradition is suspect. Baraka, on the other hand, sees the potential 
of microcosmic unification of African-American tradition through a study of its blues tradition. 
The tension between these two perspectives underscores the rhetorical nature of the vernacular 
artifacts in question. They are contingent and therefore flexible. Vernacular rhetorics can be 
codified by rhetors into constitutive bundles of representative (and paradigmatic) meaning but 
can also be dispersed, fragmented, complicated, historicized, and undermined in order to 
understand and explore the lack of any real representative meaning.  
The acknowledgment of this paradox—one that recognizes the power of and potential for 
both paradigmatic and fragmented renderings of sonic vernacular cultural artifacts should be at 
the center of our understanding of the functions of sonic rhetorics. As described above, the 
paradox has certainly been at the core of various scholarly passes at (and uses of) archival music. 
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In the following chapter, I conduct an in depth analysis of eight songs the Lomaxes collected 
during their trips to Southern African American prisons. This case study activates, where 
possible, the methodologies introduced in this chapter and also works to explain and understand 
a current tension between rhetorical studies and sound studies related to the sonic archive. 
Careful listening to the subjects of the Lomax archive will reveal African-American music as a 
conduit for both shared cultural memory and a complex for necessarily-incomplete (and often 
mysterious) renderings of black racial formation in the United States. Wagner and Baraka 
highlight this paradox but it also found, as I have shown above, within the theories of sophistic 
historiographers, as well as in developing theories of rhetoric emergent in the 1930s, particularly 
Kenneth Burke’s. As approaches to folklore continued to develop in the early-to-mid twentieth 
century, the indeterminacy of “blackness” began to be represented with increased poignancy as 
vernacular music was collected and made legible, powerful, and eventually essential to a nation 
grappling with its own paradoxes during the interwar period.  
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Chapter Two 
Listening to the Sonic Archive: 
Rhetoric, Representation, and Race in the Lomax Prison Recordings 
 
“I must place that group of Negro “boys” who this summer, cheerfully and with such manifest 
friendliness, gave up for the time their crap and card games, their prayer meetings, their much 
needed Sunday and evening rest, in order to sing for Alan and me—that group whose real names 
we omit for no reason than to print the substituted picturesque nicknames. Those black “boys” of 
Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee by their singing removed any doubt we may have 
had that Negro folk songs are without a rival in the United States. To Iron Head, Clear Rock, 
Chin Scooter, Lead Belly, Mexico, Black Samson, Lightnin' Eyes, Double Head, Bull Face, Log 
Wagon, Creepin' Jesus, Long Distance, Burn Down, Steam Shovel, Rat, Black Rider, Barrel 
House, Spark Plug, to two "girls" Ding and Bat, and others who helped without giving their 
names, and to many another the thousands we saw, in happy memory tinged with sadness, I offer 
grateful thanks.”  
 
John Lomax, in the acknowledgements to American Ballads and Folksongs, xiii  
 
 
“[B]lackness indicates. . . .existence without standing in the modern world system. To be black is 
to exist in exchange without being a party to exchange. Being black is belonging to a state 
organized according to its ignorance of your perspective—a state that does not, that cannot, 
know your mind.”  
 
Bryan Wagner, Disturbing the Peace: Black Culture and the Police Power after Slavery, 1 
 
“The Lomaxes were in rebellion against what Zora Neale Hurston derided as ‘the spirituals 
dressed up in tuxedos’: black culture dressed up for national consumption in the pretentious garb 
of European high cultural forms. Rather than disguising or denying the folk roots of black music, 
the Lomaxes sought to present to the American public the results of their wanderings: an 
authentic black folk figure performing authentic black music. However, what exactly constituted 
this authenticity was determined and defined by the Lomaxes themselves.” 
 
Hazel V. Carby, Race Men, 102 
 
Introduction 
This chapter considers the rhetorical potential of sound and particularly the historicized 
sounds of the sonic archive. I argue for sound as both a material and theoretical mode useful in 
decentering traditional text and image-based rhetorical approaches to history—away from 
certainty and towards a model that embraces multiplicity, slippage, and paradox. To this end, I 
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curate eight songs from recordings made in 1933 and 1934 in Southern African-American 
prisons by John and Alan Lomax. This music, housed at and occasionally released by the Library 
of Congress, would became a means for both racial understanding during the 1930s and the 
problematic codification of historical African-American identity in the US. Listening to the 
voices on the records in a rhetorical key offers a way to understand more fully the multiplicities 
of meaning and the paradoxes inherent to racial representation. I argue that such a close listening 
not only provides a more nuanced understanding of the complications and politics of 
representation during this time but also reveals the complex nature of the individual, communal, 
and political agencies at play among the prisoners themselves. I begin, first, by outlining the 
exigence for a sonic approach to rhetorical history work, particularly in a field where visual 
representation has become a ubiquitous go-to medium when looking to expand rhetoric’s 
historiographical work beyond textual representations. 
 
From Seeing to Hearing: Decentering our Sense of Rhetorical History 
Over the last several decades, the study of the visual has become so enmeshed within 
rhetorical studies that “visual rhetoric” is no longer merely a subfield to which a few scholars of 
rhetoric lay claim but part of the very culture of the field. This current reality within rhetorical 
studies is, however, part of a much longer historical trajectory of what is often termed ocular-
centrism in Western culture, where “knowing and believing [are] grounded in seeing and the 
visualized,” perhaps as far back as Plato’s allegorical cave (Gronbeck xxii). The visual, it would 
appear, has had much to teach us about rhetorical practice, culture, and history and will continue 
to do so. But, what of sound?  
	   78 
In his recent Sonic Persuasion (2011), Greg Goodale traces the neglect of sound within 
the Western tradition in its preference for other visualist methods of knowledge making. This 
attitude ramifies across intellectual history with particularly cacophonous moments during the 
Enlightenment in the development of scientific method and observation (both visualist practices) 
and then again during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when print culture reached its apex. 
“Our captivation by visual culture,” Goodale concedes, “has produced a legacy that will take 
decades if not centuries to overcome” (5). From a rhetorical perspective the neglect of “ear 
culture” as Marshall McLuhan termed it, along with the growing preponderance of electronic 
sources for publishing, present a kairotic juxtaposition of circumstance and recognized need 
around the development of a sound-based rhetorical study and outlets for such work. There has 
been a definite shift within rhetorical studies in the direction of greater openness toward what is 
sometimes called “multimodality,” or the notion—most notable in multimedia—that discourse is 
not of a single mode. So what is the use, then, is a rejoinder for sound? Especially amidst 
critiques that a focus on multimodality is still one of “parts” rather than their sum and casts a 
discriminating shadow over the reality of our experiences within the complex ambience of the 
sensorium (Rickert 142). The simple answer is that even as we begin to explore the benefits of 
ambient and multi-sensory approaches, sound itself remains under-theorized. Given the 
prolonged emphasis on the visual, a sustained scrutinizing of the sonic will lead to a more 
nuanced understanding of the multiplicities of rhetorical practice itself. Sound’s multiple layers, 
affects, and voices provide an opportunity think carefully about the sensorium and re-theorize the 
“multi-” as present across and within all modes, especially those still understood and theorized 
as discrete. As will prove to be thematic throughout this chapter (and as explored in Chapter 1), 
the study of the sonic is keyed to a both/and approach.  
	   79 
This model has several advantages, but most important to this chapter will be sound’s 
promise within rhetoric for complicating and expanding the reach of historical work in post-
modernity when so much of our understanding has swung (productively) away from certainty 
and toward the constant slippage of multiplicity, simultaneity, and dissonance. Unlike many 
visualist paradigms, sound is also always multiple, simultaneous, and (outside of our ear-buds) 
dissonant and therefore replete with new constructs with which to build new theoretical models 
within rhetoric—open models where uncertainty is the celebrated paradigm and the scholarly 
search is as important as what might be found.  
Stepping away from the search for certainty as a guiding principle in our work, allows us, 
in Christa Olson’s words, to “learn, not teach, about the rhetorical histories we describe” (82). 
Olson answers the difficulty of working in a post-certainty age by inviting us to make that 
decentering part of our approach—to “build our histories on shifting sand yet find ways to make 
them stand” (82). Echoing the methodology for sophistic historiography forwarded by Susan 
Jarratt, Olson invites us to seek out and build “theories to slip” and to choose “conceptual frames 
that call tensions to the foreground” (96). This shift toward tension, slippage, learning, and 
dissonance is where I begin. Sound has not yet had a significant impact on the field, and the 
problem, perhaps is that we have not yet learned to listen for dissonance with a rhetorical ear. 
To address this state of critical affairs, recent scholarship in rhetorical studies enjoins us 
towards a new scholarly “ethic of listening” (Gunn et al. 477). This slowly growing movement to 
bridge sound studies with rhetoric (which I take up in more detail in the next chapter) 
emphasizes the importance of scholars of rhetoric to draw deeply from the sound studies 
literature already in circulation. Still, a new ethic requires more than just a well-informed body 
of participants; it also must include disciplining the physical body itself toward various listening 
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practices. Compared to the traditional scholarly environment where academic practices have 
evolved and become engrained within visual practices (reading, skimming, and, of course, 
looking at the pictures), listening can be a different and demanding experience insofar as it 
requires of rhetoric scholars more time and patience (you can’t skim audio artifacts) in shaping 
potentially new sonic literacies.  
Historical work, Olson suggests, offers an indispensible arena where we may begin 
working through the processes of a decentered approach to rhetoric. Historical work on recorded 
sound, and particularly historical music, provides a conspicuous and auspicious place to begin 
the practice of listening rhetorically. Many of us are already equipped with some history-based 
musical listening skills or literacies, even if they have come as a result of casual listening. Such 
listeners are generally attuned, for example, to music as belonging to the popular culture of a 
particular epoch and/or genre: ’50s doo-wop, ’70s disco, or ’90s grunge. Causal listening yields 
enough experience with the sonic to warrant listening critically, but more developed and nuanced 
sonic literacies present a variety of new scholarly opportunities for rhetoricians. The ready 
collections of archival music housed in archives such as the American Folklife Center at the 
Library Congress (not to mention the growing number of online collections such as the 
Association for Cultural Equity) paired with the current ease in which sonic artifacts can be 
obtained, shared, and circulated presents a compelling case for the rhetorical study of such music. 
For decades, archival music was tied to its geographical location and circulation depended upon 
a complex network of institutional decisions, funding availability, and audience demand. Now, 
given the current technological affordances, this is simply no longer the case.  
In what follows, I study a shift in cultural history when technological development made 
a variety of sounds (and particularly music) more accessible to the public, thereby influencing 
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how sonic material culture could circulate and have influence. The emphasis here will be on 
sonic artifacts—prison recordings—housed at the Library of Congress.27 I examine the historical 
circumstances of production of those recordings—the people who sing on them, as well as the 
field workers behind the recording machines—in order to understand better how sound as 
rhetoric decenters traditional approaches to and understandings of cultural history and 
historiography. Four case studies provide the bulwark for this study and will be supported by a 
theoretical framework reliant upon notions of rhetorical sound and voice provided by Eric King 
Watts and others. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of how historical sonic artifacts such 
as those in my study productively complicate our understanding of racial formation and the 
ongoing racial project of reifying notions of racial otherness in the US.  
Most importantly, this chapter invites rhetorical historians to stop reading history for a 
moment and listen to it. Listen to the archived voices and music of the prisoners and thus 
participate within and contribute to the ethic of listening described above.  
 
Prison Moan 
<<Listen: Audio Track 1. The Angels Drooped their Wings and Gone on to Heaven>>28 
Sponsored by the Library of Congress, John A. Lomax and his son Alan traveled to 
eleven Southern African-American prisons during the summer of 1933 to record the “folksongs 
of the Negro[es]” incarcerated there. This music, John later wrote, was “in musical phrasing and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Many, if not all, of the recordings I present in this chapter have been released in a variety of places, some 
sanctioned by the Library of Congress, others not. My selection of recordings, which are not yet a part of the public 
domain, have been graciously curated and sanctioned by the Library of Congress with the help of Todd Harvey, 
collections specialist and curator of the Alan Lomax Collection. Harvey’s first response to me when I asked about 
publishing the songs was on the ethics of the process: “a good faith effort [should be made] to contact the rights 
holders.” Unfortunately, no contact information is currently available for the estates of John Gibson, Mose Platt, or 
James Baker.  
28 A detailed Library of Congress citation for each song in this chapter is included in the Appendix in order of their 
appearance in this dissertation. (The exception is audio file 5, which was recorded by the author.) Each song 
accompanies this draft as a supplemental electronic file and should be listened to when referenced.  
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in poetic content . . . most unlike those of the white race [and the] least contaminated by white 
influence or by modern Negro jazz” (J. Lomax 112) Both he and Alan understood the vernacular 
music of the isolated African American as a protected and preserved remnant of slave and, by 
extension, black culture—a mysterious world that, for most white citizens in the US, seventy 
years after Emancipation, was only just beginning to receive sustained scholarly attention. Their 
work that summer would produce over one hundred aluminum discs of recorded material, most 
of which the Library of Congress preserves, and now and then releases commercially.  
Many of the recordings from the prison trip, along with dozens of others collected from 
other sources, were carefully transcribed and published in the Lomaxes’ American Ballads and 
Folk Songs (1934) which was introduced briefly in the preceding chapter. Such publications 
were once relatively common and followed a similar production formula: a professionally trained 
musician worked with a vernacular musician to painstakingly transcribe a tune that would then 
be re-presented visually as sheet music within the text. American Ballads was among the first 
folk collections to be so compiled, using recordings instead of live performance as the source 
material. Re-presented in various stage-performances organized by the Lomaxes over the course 
of that decade, and then released in the early 1940s by the Library of Congress, the field 
recordings would eventually change how American vernacular music could be experienced, 
studied, and emulated by an expanding audience of both scholars and citizens. In its various 
phonographic releases, US vernacular music could be experienced beyond mere transcribed 
textual representation. The voices of the convicts, farmers, preachers, and those of many others, 
could at last be heard. 
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<< Listen: Audio Track 2. Black Samson - “Levee Camp Holler”>> 
One voice was John Gibson’s. When he first met John and Alan Lomax, Gibson had just 
begun serving a twenty-year sentence in the State Penitentiary in Nashville, Tennessee. Upon 
that meeting, Gibson (also known as “Black Samson”) asked the Lomaxes to help facilitate his 
release (Lomax and Lomax 151). Perhaps that was why, despite his uneasiness, Gibson relented 
and allowed himself to be recorded for the Library of Congress archive. In December 1934, a 
little more than a year later, this report about John Gibson and the song “Levee Camp Holler” 
was published American Ballads: 
This song is the workaday of the Negro behind a team of mules. . . . Black Samson, 
whom we found breaking rocks in the Nashville State Penitentiary, admitted that he knew the 
song and had once sung it; but since he had joined the church and had turned away from the 
world, he no longer dared sing it. All our arguments were in vain. The prison chaplain protested 
that he would make it all right with the Lord. But Black Samson replied that he was a Hard-shell 
Baptist and that, according to their way of thinking, he would be in danger of hell-fire if he sang 
such a song. At last, however, when the warden had especially urged him to sing, he stepped in 
front of our microphone and, much to our surprise, when he had made sure that his words were 
being recorded, said: “It’s sho hard lines dat a nigger’s got to sing a worl’ly song, when he’s 
tryin’ to be sancrified; but de warden’s ast me, so I guess I’ll have to.” And he did. But he 
registered his protest before the Lord on an aluminum plate, now filed in the Library of Congress 
at Washington (49).  
John Lomax’s frankness about Alan’s and his involvement in persuading Gibson is 
astounding, but the added detail of their having exerted pressure from ecclesiastical and 
institutional authority is dumbfounding. Obviously, such machinations were once tolerated, but 
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there can be little doubt that the Lomaxes exploited John Gibson’s desire for freedom by 
exhorting him, despite his pronounced and explicit reluctance to sing, an act of inducement that 
80 years later we can readily call coercion.  
A close listen of the field recording reveals more of interest in “Levee Camp Holler.” The 
track begins with an introduction from John Lomax followed by a short protest Gibson: “Lord, 
this levee camp song is mighty bad to sing….” It is unclear why Gibson’s words do not match up 
better with Lomax’s published rendering. The track is also uncertain; there are starts and stops 
during the recording and another muted voice can be heard prompting Gibson with forgotten 
lyrics. He doesn’t seem to know the song that well or acts as if he doesn’t. Also, “Levee Camp 
Holler” cuts out abruptly during the middle of the ninth stanza—this compared to the 28 stanzas 
that appear in American Ballads and Folk Songs. The aluminum recording discs were cut in real 
time with a diamond-tipped needle and could only fit about fifteen minutes per side. Recordings 
frequently ended mid-song the way that “Levee Camp Holler” does, but those songs would 
usually be rerecorded on a fresh disc. Perhaps Gibson couldn’t be persuaded into a second take.29  
Though the dialectic is captivating, there is more to listen for on the recordings than the 
drama between present and muted voices. It is impossible not to notice the sound of the 
recording materials themselves—the scratch and glitch of technology’s age and decay as well as 
the buttressing residues of preservation. There is the revolving swoosh of the original aluminum 
disc decipherable in an ebb and flow of static and a needle skip, caught and cut off quickly at the 
end. There is also evidence of the transfer by Library of Congress technicians, decades ago, from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 West Virginia University Press recently released “Levee Camp Holler” on Jail House Bound a collection of songs 
culled from the Lomaxes’ 1933 prison trip. In the liner notes, they observe correctly that John Lomax often “altered 
the sequence of stanzas, changed words, or even compiled a version from several sources” for American Ballads and 
Folk Songs. He justified this from the standpoint of a curator. His goal was a comprehensive understanding of a 
song’s variety, not the capture of a single performance, or a statement about a particular performer (even when one 
is implied).  
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disc to magnetic tape. One can hear a hiccup in the audio—a faint echo of Gibson’s voice as 
magnetic tape folds over onto itself momentarily in the mix. Finally, though much more difficult 
to detect, the song was transferred into the binary code of a compact disc where all previous 
imperfections codify forever in the digital version. Here, compressed again as an mp3 and stored 
in a university database, “Levee Camp Holler” is available in ubiquity streaming on the Web 
(from iTunes to YouTube)—this song John Gibson never wanted to sing in the first place.  
Gibson’s travails were not atypical. Recording for the Lomaxes offered a unique 
opportunity, but one with spiritual and ethical consequences for both the subjects and Lomaxes 
themselves. These prison performances and the subsequent records offered a new if complicated 
rhetorical agency to a few of the musically talented convicts and also yielded lasting effects on 
how African-American culture circulated within the US. Portals to a remote, unfamiliar 
subculture, many of the songs that the Lomaxes archived would eventually contribute to African-
American vernacular culture receiving a mainstream (largely-white) public reception that it 
hadn’t yet enjoyed. Yet a tension emerges out of the knowledge that scholarly work arising out 
of the Lomax archive is scaffolded upon early 1930s social realities, realities that included a 
fascination with racial difference as well as concomitant objectification of the black 
subject/prisoner as historical material. Prejudice’s power is, in this way, a paradox; it both 
motivates and constrains our ability and capacity for understanding and identification. The 
Lomaxes and other white scholars interested in cultural preservation shaped the reception of that 
history in profound, often problematic ways. The recordings thus remain a rich yet thorny 
resource for scholarly and popular inquiry to the extent that they indexed both black experience 
and the ongoing production of whiteness in the US.30 We receive the Lomaxes’ project, then, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 According to folklorist Patrick B. Mullen (2008), it was John Lomax’s southern paternalism that made the “idea 
that the white man was the hope of freedom for the black convict” so resonant within his worldview. In contrast, the 
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within the dissonant complexity of both prejudice and progress. They understood themselves as 
part of a progressive initiative far ahead of their time. That time has long passed, however, and a 
contemporary point of view makes moral demands on the Lomaxes that may well have been 
incomprehensible to them. This, of course, is the paradox of progressive thought: it will be 
regressive soon enough.  
In acknowledging this paradox, I hope to sidestep some of the potential pitfalls of 
working with this kind of archival material—it is flawed from the beginning and cannot be 
otherwise. To be certain, the Lomaxes’ collection of prison recordings assembles important 
historical sonic artifacts and listening carefully to them can be a harrowing experience. The 
sounds of the prisoners’ toil, sorrow, and longing are preserved as vocal specters on the records. 
They are thus easily fetishized, as they were by the Lomaxes, as somehow “authentic” or 
exemplary of some essential component of African-American life or experience. As I listen to 
the men singing in the recordings from the prison archive, I get caught somewhere in the 
historian’s dilemma mentioned above. I’m faced with the choice of which narrative to focus on. 
At one moment I am grateful to the Lomaxes whose recorded work is nothing short of national 
treasure. In the next, I recognize their piracy and see that their treasure is ill gotten, despite what 
they thought of as worthy means. I hear unmistakable humanity in the disembodied voices of the 
men on the recordings, some of whom died in prison nearly 75 years ago. And it is in that 
experience—one impossible without the agonism at the center of these two conflicting 
narratives—that a kind of resolution emerges. More an anti-resolution, actually (at least in the 
harmonic sense) as the descriptor most apt in describing this experience is “dissonance.” I’m 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
growing leftist sentiment among the rising educated generation shaped Alan’s ideals and contributed to his sense of 
“pity and desire to help” the African-American men and women he began to meet during his first field recording 
trip. Both Lomaxes “had their whiteness reinforced by contact with blackness and their own sense of freedom 
intensified by the lack of freedom of the prisoners they were recording” (84). 
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familiar with dissonance as a musical experience of notes-in-tension, and so it is apropos that 
dissonance becomes the rhetorical frame that best represents the historical tensions of the prison 
recordings in the Folklife Archive.  
The dissonances particular to the early 1933 and 1934 prison recordings are made more 
comprehensible through conceptual framings that lend themselves well to managing ambiguity. 
The first is a guiding principle of revisionist historiography—one cued to the both/and-ness of 
historical “fact” and music’s power to capture the layers of that dissonance. Along with this 
notion of a conflicted representative historiography, another instructive dissonance reverberates 
instructively across the prison recordings: that of rhetorical voice. Voice as a theoretical concept 
already enjoys a rich literature within rhetorical and sound studies, which I contextualize and 
expand upon below. I trace three coalescing agencies of personal, communal, and political voice 
and describe how traditional subject/object representative relationships within and among these 
agencies in the archive blend together within the sonic. Interested as I am in the agency of the 
prisoners—particularly the new agency that a chance to perform for the archive afforded a few of 
the most talented among them, I also wish to complicate the notion of agency to understand its 
inherently discordant contradictions.  
Thomas Rickert has recently invoked the term “ambient rhetoric” to describe the 
“attunements” among these complex interrelationships and I draw on his insights as well as 
several others whose work in race, material rhetorics, and rhetorical agency guide the task of 
deeper rhetorical listening. “Rhetorical listening,” invoking Krista Radcliffe’s widely recognized 
work on the subject, particularly the idea that in practiced rhetorical listening there is “a stance of 
openness that a person may choose to assume in relation to any person, text, or culture” even (or 
especially) when those relations are troubled. (her emphasis, 17). Since I too am interested in the 
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ways that listening draws out opportunities for empathetic identification between and across 
political, cultural, and racial difference, I deploy rhetorical listening in this sense across two 
undergirding planes. First, the prison recordings do bring about a more nuanced understanding of 
African-American experience in the US in the 1930s. Yet, the number of those who heard the 
recordings before their release in the early 1940s was limited to those with access to the Library 
of Congress, and even then, interest in them was likely limited to scholars and, later, musicians 
looking for ideas and inspiration. John and Alan Lomax were, in a sense, the delegated listeners 
for the country and because of their positions of national power, their limited capacity for 
rhetorical listening turned out to be particularly influential. Our historical understanding of the 
archive is thus filtered through the Lomaxian identification rendered historically in the 
recordings and books they produced. In this sense, dissonance, and not the more comfortable 
“harmony” that “understanding” (identification’s ideal) often evokes, is the theoretical ideal to 
reach towards through sonic rhetorical analysis. 
 
Interlude: Listening Closely 
We can begin to get a sense for the dissonance I mention above by listening carefully 
now to several field recordings from the prison archive. While the casual listening skills I have 
described above are a good place to start, deeper understanding of the music requires a more 
attentive ear. I have modeled what might be termed a “close listen” of the song “Levee Camp 
Holler” in the above “Overture,” though there is a good deal more to say about the potential draw 
of such a listen. For example, I have mentioned sonic and non-musical clues of the material and 
historical conditions present during the recording (and after), but I have not yet addressed more 
traditional sonic components such as lyrics, tone, and melody (which are, perhaps, more 
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intuitive). For now, permit me to emphasize the simple practices of care and attention. For 
example, it took several listens before I realized that someone was supplying John Gibson with 
the lyrics to “Levee Camp Holler.” Sentient listening to this particular grouping of archival 
music can often be an affecting experience, but some recordings are more difficult to listen to. 
Their challenge results from the material conditions present at the time of the recording as well 
as the way that the wear and tear of technology’s decay obscures their clarity. More poignantly, 
perhaps the most exacting difficulty in listening lies in the content of the recordings themselves. 
The prison recordings echo a despicable past of de jure segregation—resounding of evidence of 
oppressive injustice, systematic cruelty, and omnipresent prejudice. Each of these listening 
observations and experiences are important and lend themselves to a more nuanced 
understanding of sound’s rhetorical impact.  
 
Dissonant Voices 
<< Listen: Audio Track 3. “Good God Amighty”>> 
After being refused admission to the Texas State Penitentiary in Huntsville and rebuffed 
by a negative experience at Prairie View state school for blacks (Now Prairie View A&M 
University), John and Alan Lomax made their first real headway in recording African-American 
prisoners when they visited the Central State Prison Farm in Sugar Land, Texas. At “Sugarland,” 
the Lomaxes encountered two aging men who would become central to the prison archive. The 
first was seventy-one-year-old Mose “Clear Rock” Platt, who had been jailed for forty-seven 
years on a murder charge. The other, James “Iron Head” Baker was sixty-four and knew so many 
songs that John Lomax would later refer to him as a “black Homer.” Platt, on the other hand, was 
a master improviser and could sing the same song with seemingly infinite variations and, just as 
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easily, could make up new ones on the spot, making him, as John Szwed has written, “a 
folklorist’s dream” (41). John Lomax recalls first meeting Platt and Baker in the hospital 
building on the complex while recording a convalescing man named Mexico in one of the large 
bedrooms there. Baker was watching the recording session with interest and said (in John’s 
rendering), “I’se Iron Head, I’se a trusty. I know lots of jumped-up, sinful songs—more than any 
of these niggers” (Lomax 165). He recorded with the Lomaxes for the rest of that night and 
throughout the next day, taking turns singing with his “pardner,” Platt. The Lomaxes observed 
that the songs produced at Sugarland were of immense diversity. There were “rhythmic, surging 
songs of labor; cotton-picking songs; songs of the jailbird” as well as “songs of loneliness and 
the dismal monotony of life in the penitentiary; songs of pathetic longing for his ‘doney,’ his 
woman” (166). Above all, the Lomaxes averred the “words, the music, the rhythm, were simple” 
and the result of the “natural emotional outpouring of the black man in confinement” (166). 
 
Listening and Voice: Mose Platt 
In the following case studies, I move within the narratives that the Lomaxes collaborated 
on with Platt, Baker, and other prisoners to demonstrate sound’s relationship to the oral/aural 
process of personal, communal, and institutional/political agency and remembering. Such 
processes can be understood as useful nuances of rhetorical voice. While voice as a theoretical 
concept has been employed to various (and sometimes disparate) ends, Eric King Watts usefully 
frames a way of understanding the theoretical potential of voice within the sonic mode.31 Watts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 In his recent edited collection The Sound Studies Reader (2012), Jonathan Sterne curates a productive list of 
scholarship on the voice as the subject relates to the nascent field of sound studies. Among those whose work is 
important to the discussion of voice are Ferdinand de Saussure and his Course in General Linguistics, which situates 
the voice “as a fundamental modality of social enunciation”; Marshall McLuhan and Walter Ong, who “based an 
entire psychological theory of orality around ideas of the voice as presence”; as well as Jacques Derrida’s critique of 
these positions as a misguided “metaphysics of presence” (491-2). Sterne’s own positioning on voice is resonant 
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distinguishes a “middle road,” between the “ontic and symbolic” potentials of voice, drawing out 
the tensions between “speech as a sensual, personal, and ‘authentic’ phenomenon and language 
as an abstract impersonal symbolic system” (180). These tensions are ever-present in the prison 
recordings and show up in the relationships and rhetorics at play at each level of the rhetorical 
situation. An example of such a tension can be heard in James Baker’s singing voice, which, in 
concert with the material clues on the recording and the Lomax book excerpt, is a powerful 
reminder of his humanity and the reality of his subjugation. On the other hand, “Levee Camp 
Holler” was interesting to the Lomaxes as a symbol expressing African-American prison life and 
by extension an even more abstracted symbolic slave culture. Within such a paradigm, John 
Gibson himself is unimportant. For the rhetorical listener, the seemingly distinct ontic (or that 
concerned with being—in this case human being) and symbolic components of the recording 
merge. One cannot exist without the other, and indeed, the presence of a listener (us) opens up 
other possible meaning relationships between the recordings, the voices on them, and the 
institution that produced and distributed them.  
In this way agency is both contingent to and emergent from the rhetorical situation that 
produced the recordings and has various meaning dependent upon which relationship is 
emphasized. Getting at this kind of rhetorical nuance was very much the point of Kenneth 
Burke’s pentad, but I also find a recent framing from Thomas Rickert useful here. Following the 
work of Jenny Edbauer Rice and others, Rickert encourages an “ecologic” approach to rhetoric 
that embraces these complexities where “the interactions of numerous agents mutually form and 
condition a chaotically dynamic system” (xiv). For Rickert, rhetoric is ambient, and does its 
work “responding to and put forth through affective, symbolic, and material means, so as to . . . 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
with Derrida and his collection draws together several other works that complicate and expand upon traditional 
conceptions of voice.  
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reattune or otherwise transform how others inhabit the world . . .” (162). Music performs this 
ambience well, particularly how its affective, symbolic, and material aspects reveal tensions and 
dissonances within the rhetorical process which, in turn, requires an understanding of rhetoric in 
its complexity rather than as a tool for clear or incisive determinate persuasion.  
An example of these various tensions and dissonances can be found in the voice of Mose 
Platt who, unlike Gibson, willingly participated in the field recordings. His voice can be heard on 
at least twelve distinct recordings, which include several solo performances as well as a number 
of collaborations with other prisoners, including Baker, his friend. Platt has a deep, distinctive 
baritone singing voice. His seemingly effortless vocal and pitch control indicate years of practice 
and performance. When other men join in singing with Platt, their ease and enthusiasm reveals 
participatory singing as part of a deeply embedded culture, not just a shared casual pastime 
among the prisoners.  
 
<< Listen: Audio Track 4. Mose Platt – “Run Nigger Run” >> 
I have selected two of Mose Platt’s recordings for a close listen, both about slave escape 
and capture. The first, a song with the dubious title “Run Nigger Run,” is presented here in 
preface to the second. “Run Nigger Run” evokes the long tradition of slave escape. In fact, a 
song with a nearly identical refrain can be connected to Nat Turner’s slave rebellion in 
Southampton County, Virginia in 1831 (Lomax and Lomax 228). But listening to Mose Platt 
sing his version, it is difficult to mistake the enthusiasm in his voice as he performed it proudly 
for the Lomaxes, the warden, and an audience of his peers. Halfway through the recording (43), 
we even hear several voices encouraging Platt to keep singing. Clearly, a song about escape had 
meaning similar as well as particular to the tune’s historical context. In a sense as much 
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transgressive as comic, there is dissonance between these two renderings, one historical and 
symbolic, the other kairotic and salient to the moment. Platt had a dark sense of humor.  
We see this dark humor again in another escape slave-escape song, called “Ol’ Rattler.” 
“Ol’ Rattler” is a song named for its subject, a mythic prison watchdog. The dog’s job was to 
chase and maul any escaping prisoner, a job presumably tied to a longer tradition of slave 
capture. For this example, I’m interested in making the humanistic/symbolic dichotomy explicit 
by comparing recorded sound in varying shades of abstraction, from recorded vocal singing to its 
abstract visual/textual rendering. To make my point I work backward—from most abstract to 
least. At the far end of that trajectory is Mose Platt and other voices on the recording which 
present a striking, unmistakably human contrast to the other representations. But in this most 
“present” and least abstracted space, I pause to complicate the move toward championing the 
salience of the voice or its ability to access or understand deep humanity. A voice on an archival 
recording is still an abstraction and there is still an insurmountable distance between that 
recording and the people who made it.  
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Fig. 1, Lomax and Lomax 66 (scanned page) 
In the above excerpt (fig. 1) from American Ballads and Folk Songs, consider how race is 
represented discursively in the text of the sheet music through lingual dialect and in the short 
excerpted quote at the top from Mose Platt. Consider also how both textual and musical elements 
of this discursive artifact might have racialized the interpretation of the content. Lyrics rendered 
as dialect and grace notes in four of the five opening measures are each attempts to represent the 
sound of Mose Platt’s voice, one approximating his vocal style; the other, seizing on the vocal 
nuances of his sung musical intervals. The lyrics to the song, printed on the opposite page, also 
approximate (and do not always match) with the recorded version. They do, nevertheless, depict 
a bleak reality of African-American prison life, one defined by its invisible and insurmountable 
rural borders. Ol’ Rattler didn’t simply keep prisoners from escaping, for those who made the 
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attempt would not survive his attack: “If I trip this time” one lyric relates, “I’ll trip no more.” A 
close reading of the lyrical texts reveals several other elements, which, when paired with an 
analysis of other songs in the collection, reveal a complex association of fear, oppression, back-
breaking labor, and the constant threat of death and violence—punctuated here and there with a 
cathartic line of comedy or bawdy tale of sexual conquest. The Lomaxes’ meticulous inclusion 
of the lyrics allow for this careful analysis and, even in dialect, allow the interested reader an 
opportunity to reflect on the experience of captivity and the terror of attempted escape:  
Now I run till I’m almos’ blin’ 
I’m on my way to de long-leaf pine.  
I didn’ have no time to make no thimpathee 
My nighes’ route was up a tree.  
The various visual, musical, and textual renderings of the transcription, however, contain several 
significant elisions. They tell us very little about Mose Platt. (We’re fortunate to have his name 
at all given that many of the recordings are attributed merely to “unknown prisoner.”) Platt is 
caricatured in the sheet music, with only his blackness, criminal status, eagerness to escape, and 
inability to do so represented in the song. Each of these subjectivities can then be re-inscribed 
and mythologized as representation stands in, ominously, for historical reality.  
<< Listen: Audio Track 5. “Ol’ Rattler” – Piano rendering >> 
In the above audio clip, I recorded a pianist’s rendering of “Ol’ Rattler” from the sheet 
music in American Ballads and Folk Songs. While the simple melody is also an abstraction of 
the actual vocal performance, it at least provides interested and musically literate readers with an 
approximated version of what the song sounds like. Scholars might use this melodic rendering in 
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comparison to other folk melodies or it might even be appropriated by a jazz or blues musician 
and riffed upon in their own work.  
<< Listen: Audio Track 6. Mose Platt - Ol’ Rattler>> 
Now, compare both the sheet music and the simple piano melody of “Ol’ Rattler” with 
the Lomax recording. The differences jump out. Platt’s voice is rich and expressive compared to 
the piano’s monotones. Variations on the melody are noticeably present on the recording, even 
within the few verses captured. Platt’s phrases sometimes garble together; it’s difficult to 
understand his every word—just like they might in an everyday encounter. Also, his singing 
companions emerge as important pieces of the song’s arrangement while these parts go 
unmentioned in the text. In contradistinction to a prescriptive understanding of rhetoric as logical 
clarity in persuasion, the most powerful aspect of voice rendered here or anywhere else isn’t the 
clarity of its communicative potential, but its variety, nuance, and multiplicity.  
Another powerful aspect of an “ontic” listen of recordings like “Ol’ Rattler” is that it 
momentarily diverts attention away from the heroic white-savior narrative so prominent in 
Western culture and demands that attention be granted to the person’s voice on the recording. 
Symbolic meaning is lain aside for a moment and we are reminded of Roland Barthes’ 
characterization of the voice’s uncanny ability to connect us with the human. For Barthes this 
human essence is the “grain of the voice,” —or language “in its very materiality” (506). If, as 
John Durham Peters reminds us, “the voice is a metaphor of power,” tied distinctly to the 
experience of embodied identity, then “[e]ach person’s voice is a creature of the shape of one’s 
skull, sinuses, vocal tract, lungs, and general physique. Age, geography, gender, education, 
health, ethnicity, class, and mood all resound in our voices” (“The Voice and Modern Media” 
n.p.). We hear each of these things in the recorded voice of Mose Platt—evidence of his distinct 
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humanity, and even though incarcerated, his power and agency. However, and in line with 
Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence,32 the humanistic qualities of Platt can only 
reach out so far. Eventually his voice gets lost in the mix of the earlier representations, and, 
under scrutiny, the recording also cannot bear the weight of a true present-ation of the subject. 
The recording—which has a grain all its own—reminds us of the disconnection and temporal 
distance between his human body and mechanized historical reproduction. And suddenly, Mose 
Platt becomes a ghost. 
 
Iron Head Blues: Secular and Spiritual Communion  
Platt’s singing companion James Baker (“Alias: Iron Head,” as he was wont to say on the 
recordings) had lived and worked as a prisoner in the Central Imperial Prisoner near Sugar Land 
Texas. Tall and quiet, he had a reputation among fellow-inmates as having a large repertoire of 
songs. Over several years of acquaintance, John Lomax got to know him well and would devote 
a whole chapter in his autobiography to Baker. As mentioned before, Lomax called Baker a 
“black Homer” because he knew hundreds songs of all varieties and his abilities for 
improvisation and on-the-fly composition may well have matched the genius of ancient epic 
poets. This comparison is more apt than even Lomax would have imagined. Baker’s rhythmic 
facility contributed to his popularity with and also to his respect among fellow inmates. Baker 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Joshua Gunn’s work on speech, the voice, and, by extension, Derridian presence is instructive for further reading 
on the various material and theoretical tensions between sound and presence. See his 2011 essay “On Recording 
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said he got his nickname while on the Ramsey State Farm, a work prison in Angleton, Texas 
while cutting wood. A felled oak tree fell nearby and “Some of the limbs hit my head, an’ it 
broke ‘em off; didn’t knock me down, an’ it didn’t stop me from working.” So he became known 
as Iron Head.  
On the other hand, Baker referred to himself as “De roughest nigger what ever walked de 
streets of Dallas. In de pen off an’ on fo’ thirty-fo’ years” (J. Lomax 166). Calling himself, after 
six convictions, an “H.B.C.—habitual criminal, you know” (166). Lomax comments, however, 
that he didn’t really look the part. His dignity and tenderness far outshone any residual evidence 
of hardness in his face. By Lomax’s description, Baker seemed a solemn and honest figure, one 
whom “unlike the other Negro convict[s] […] confessed that he was guilty of other crimes than 
those that had put him in prison”: “Mos’ of de times dey didn’t catch me” (168), he was said to 
say. Indeed, if anything, Baker had a familial relationship with other inmates. One night while he 
was recording for the Lomaxes, his colleagues crowded the room and shouted requests. One of 
those requests, Lomax writes, did cause a bit of a rise out of Baker. They urged him to sing 
“Shorty George” a song about “the short passenger train that ran from Houston to the farm once 
a month on a Sunday, bringing visiting wives and sweethearts” (168). They begged until Iron 
Head had to shout at them: “You niggers know dat song always tears me to pieces. I won’t sing 
it,” after which he walked away and stood in the corner shadows and motioned for Lomax. “I’ll 
sing dat song low for you”: 
 Shorty George, you ain’t no fren’ of mine 
 Take all de wimmens, leave de mens behin’ 
<< Listen: Audio Track 7. James Baker - “Shorty George” >> 
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“It makes me restless to see my woman,” he confided in Lomax. “I’se a trusty an’ I has a easy 
job. I could run down one o’ dem corn rows an’ git away, any day. But when de law caught me, 
dey would put me back in de line wid de fiel’ han’s. I’se too ol’ for dat hard work” (167). 
 In the spring of 1936 and after corresponding with Baker a few times, Lomax returned to 
Sugarland and arranged for Baker’s parole. The conditions of his release were that he would 
work for Lomax as a chauffeur and as an ambassador in the prisons, “acting as a go-between 
with black musicians and demonstrating the kinds of songs Lomax was looking for” (Porterfield 
375). After the recording trip concluded—and if Baker cooperated—Lomax would help him set 
up a business doing the work he had done in prison. Lomax tried unsuccessfully to teach him to 
drive, but Baker was more successful in his second role. “Feels sorta like home,” he remarked 
after a stop at Parchman prison (Lomax 172). While they drove, Iron Head would often sing his 
favorite song, “Go Down Old Hannah,” which was “one of the best known of the slow drag work 
songs sung by Negro prisoners in South Texas” (Botkin 5). Baker claimed to have first sung it in 
prison in 1908 “on long hot summer day when about three o’clock in the afternoon the sun (Old 
Hannah) seemed to stop and ‘just hang’ in the sky” (5). Unlike earlier examples, I have provided 
all of the lyrics for “Go Down Old Hanna” in order to call attention to the juxtapositioning of the 
sacred and secular represented there (which will be the focus of the next section).  
<< Listen: Audio Track 8. James Baker – “Go Down, Old Hannah” >> 
Chorus:   
 
Go down, old Hannah,  
Won't you rise no more?  
Go down, old Hannah,  
Won't you rise no more?  
 
Lawd, if you rise,  
Bring judgment on. 
Lawd, if you rise,  
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Bring judgment on. 
 
Oh, did you hear  
What the captain said?  
Oh, did you hear  
What the captain said?  
 
That if you work  
He'll treat you well,  
And if you don't  




Oh, long-time man,  
Hold up your head.  
Well, you may get a pardon  
And you may drop dead.  
 
Lord there’s nobody feels sorry  
For the life-time man.  
Nobody feels sorry  
For the life-time man. (Marable, Frazier, and McMillian 453) 
 
The inmates generally considered songs like “Go Down, Old Hannah” and “Shorty 
George” “sinful” and, like John Gibson, many refused or had to be persuaded to sing them. This, 
however, didn’t seem to be the case for Mose Platt or James Baker who sung them often and 
without much prompting, as often the anecdote above reveals, as part of the daily experience of 
living. “Sinful” songs are part of a rich tradition of secular African-American songs that, unlike 
the “negro spiritual,” were sung for pragmatic rather than religious purposes. As a product of an 
antebellum African-American consciousness, Lawrence Levine writes, such African-American 
secular music was “occasional music” and “as varied, as narrow, as fleeting as life itself” (19). 
Spirituals, he argues, were the best source for understanding the black world-view during slavery 
because “slaves used it to articulate their deepest and most enduring feelings and certainties” 
(19). Despite these differences, Levine concedes that the two styles of music had unmistakable 
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similarities: “In both the temple and the field, black song was for the most part communal song” 
(217).  
This is the sense one gets listening to James Baker’s songs in the Lomax archive. He was 
a master of both the secular and the sacred, and—in his case—the two styles often merge. It can 
be difficult to tell if a song is meant for working or worshiping. “Go Down, Old Hannah” is a 
prime example here. The song was a “slow drag work song” used in the field for laborious work 
with a hoe or other ground tilling implement. Listening to the song, the slow but intense rhythm 
of that work is manifest, but so also is the depth of the tune as an emotional petition to the sun, 
Hannah, to “rise no more.” The song, despite its seemed secular content, is sung in a distinctly 
spiritual style and in the traditional call-and-response, or antiphonal, structure of sacred songs. 
This antiphony was intentionally communal and, as Levine and others have shown, residual of 
African life and sociality (33). In the case of “Go Down, Old Hannah,” both the secular and the 
sacred are present. For Baker and his fellows, Hannah (the sun) is a source of both suffering and 
light. Her persistent rising and falling is a reminder of the rhythms of prison life, hard work, and 
the lack of hope for the “life-time man.” Death-as-escape is welcomed and characterized here in 
the petitioning of the sun to “raise no more.” However, the line “Lord if you rise, bring judgment 
on” could as easily be part of a hymnal. And the connections to the sacred may go even deeper 
than just style. Christians often see Hannah, the Old Testament mother of the prophet Samuel, as 
a type and shadow of Mary, mother of Jesus (see 1 Samuel 2). Like Jesus’, Samuel’s birth was 
miraculous; the rising and setting “sun” Baker sings of—one explicitly connected to judgment in 
“Go Down, Hannah”—is reminiscent of the other, homophonic, “son.” In this case, the song has 
both a functional, practical communal purpose for the inmates as well as what sounds to be a 
more implicit, symbolic one. Still, the rhetorical complexity of the song makes it hard to classify 
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as either secular or sacred. Instead, we can understand “Go Down, Hannah” as an amalgam of 
enmeshed rhetorical components, material, practical, spiritual, historical, and, for Baker, even 
sentimental. 
 
Lead Belly and the Sonic Politics of a Pardon 
We have thus far explored the ontic and symbolic meshing of sound-as-voice as well as 
the rhetorical implications of such a meshing for personal and communal meaning making for 
incarcerated men in Southern Jim Crow prisons. We have seen—or heard— multi-vocal nuances 
within those two modes and I have sought to parse the ways that voice-in-song cuts across easily 
classifiable rhetorical ideals. Instead, those ideals are always in tension, always dissonant, and 
always decentered. So, even as voice is significant to personal identity, Gibson’s, Platt’s, and 
Baker’s individual identities are easily subsumed by the symbolic in even the most carefully 
drawn attempt to focus in on ontological individuality. An intentionally symbolic understanding 
of voice, while a more familiar rhetorical positioning, is also complicated by this multi-vocality. 
Songs can be abstracted from their original voices and be given new meanings by external 
parties for specific institutional, nationalistic, or racial purposes, but the same music can also be 
richly symbolic for its originating users. Institutionalized or nationalistic symbolism codifies 
African-American experience (and race itself) into a reduced and simplistic monotone. To use a 
sonic metaphor from earlier in the chapter, the institutionalization of the prison recordings has 
the same effect as their digitization: compression, distortion, and the codification of various 
imperfections. On the other hand, the sonic symbols at play within the vernacular context of the 
song itself—represented nicely in the antiphony of call-and-response—is that of community, 
sympathy, and shared struggle. The former symbolization is reductive, the latter productive.  
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In this final case study, I wish to discuss the political voice, which along with the 
personal and communal rounds out three agencies or rhetorical modes sonically discernable in 
the prison recordings. As I have asserted, the differences between these modes do not necessarily 
differ in the ways that they sound, rather they work together in concert and, depending on 
context, reach out to meet one rhetorical need or another, depending on what the moment offers 
up. This, perhaps, is one of the most exciting and frustrating elements of studying music 
rhetorically: it is rife with significance. Any one voicing can have a multitude of rhetorical 
implications. John Lomax understood this and used the music from the prisons (as well as the 
prisoners themselves when he could) to further his career. This was a part of the political 
environment of the prisons while the Lomaxes were on site making records. They weren’t just 
there to gather recordings, philanthropically for the greater good of the country. Occasionally, 
however, prisoners also recognized the political possibilities of their involvement with the 
Lomaxes and others from whom they could leverage privilege, and also took advantage. 
In the above example, I mentioned that John Lomax helped to arrange James Baker’s 
parole. Lomax then employed Baker as a traveling companion until their relationship and 
tolerance for one another dissolved and they parted company (see the postlude below for a brief 
exposition of this episode). Lomax encountered Baker a few years later in the Ramsey State 
Convict Farm where Baker was working on the garden squad. “I should have left him at 
Sugarland to weave from corn shucks horse collars and rugs for Captain Gotch and Captain 
Flanagan,” Lomax later wrote (177). As much as Lomax laments the ultimate results, Baker’s 
release was a significant political triumph for both. Recall that John Gibson also hoped that his 
interaction with the Lomaxes would lead to his release. In a rhetorical situation where privilege 
is so unevenly distributed, the political agency of the incarcerated would be limited to the few 
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things that might set them apart, like good behavior and cooperation. In Baker’s case, when the 
Lomaxes arrived, his talent as a singer gave him sufficient agency to negotiate release—even 
though his freedom would not last long.  
Baker’s story is reminiscent, however, of the much more famous example of Huddie 
“Lead Belly” Ledbetter’s releases from both Sugarland penitentiary in Texas in 1925 and Angola 
prison after an encounter with John and Alan and their recording machine in 1934 (see Chapter 
One, introduction). Recall that both John Lomax and Lead Belly would claim that Lead Belly’s 
second release occurred due to a pardon from the state governor. Recall also that the second 
pardoning was a likely fiction—it never actually occurred, but Lomax and Lead Belly would 
both use the tale to advance their commercial and professional success.  
The first pardon, however, is a fact of record. It is also a remarkable example of how 
music was one of the few political tools afforded prisoners serving in the Southern African-
American prison contexts at the beginning of the twentieth century. “Governor Pat Neff (Sweet 
Mary)” was the name of Lead Belly’s sung petition. For it, Lead Belly drew on a number of 
rhetorical tactics to accomplish his goal of release. For example, Lead Belly knew Governor Neff 
was a Baptist and wished to appeal to his religious sensibilities. His girlfriend’s name was Mary, 
but calling Mary his “wife” in the song was conflated powerfully with the symbolic Mary of 
scripture: “I put Mary in it, Jesus’s mother, you know. I took a verse from the bible, around 
about the twenty second chapter of Proverbs, around the fourteenth verse: if you will forgive a 
man his trespasses, the heavenly father will also forgive your trespasses” (86). This 
compositional choice was part of a larger, more carefully composed process for Lead Belly. He 
didn’t usually write down his compositions, but in this case he wanted to be precise. One of the 
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better lines from the song, “If I had you like you have me, I’d wake up in the morning and set 
you free,” is a good example of this precision.  
I resist the temptation to complete a point-by-point analysis here—to do so would be to 
suppose that there is a determinable equation within the song that led to Lead Belly’s release. 
Surely his musical talent, his persistence, his correct assessment of audience, his timing, and his 
lyrics were all contributing factors, but one cannot point casually to any one combination of 
those factors leading to his pardon by Governor Neff. This indeterminacy is part of the larger 
rhetorical decentering that occurs within a sonic rhetoric. A close listen paired with a carful 
historical analysis reveals several resonant and contributing details that point toward causality, 
but they also raise several unanswerable questions. Indeed, what is unknown about the release of 
Lead Belly from Sugarland in 1925 is as interesting as what is known. One question that looms 
large for this study, for example, is to what extent did Lead Belly pardon lore resonate within 
John Gibson, a captive of that same Sugarland complex in 1933, the year the Lomaxes arrived. 
We’ll never know, but listening to Gibson again knowing he was very likely acquainted with 
Lead Belly—the man who had sung his way to freedom—may very well have influenced his 
decision to engage with John and Alan Lomax.  
 
Conclusion: Toward a Sonic Rhetoric of African-American Vernacular Culture  
To speak of “vernacular culture” is to consider how highly particularized experiences of 
quotidian folklife are everyday represented and codified both within that culture as a shared 
cultural identity and also as a means of presenting and differentiating that identity from other, 
sometimes competing, vernaculars. For Margaret Lantis, a more complete rendering of the idea 
might be the “vernacular aspect or portion of the total culture” which expresses the notions of 
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“‘native to . . .’ or common of a locality, region, or, by extension, of a trade or other group: the 
commonly used or spoken as distinct from the written” (203). Vernacular culture, then, is more 
readily found in the currency of everyday experience (speech, and by extension song, but also in 
the “handmade” and material). The residue of tradition is represented within these practices, but 
the traditional need not mean antiquated. Indeed, Lantis’s entomological analysis of the word 
reveals that the “Latin does not seem to suggest traditional or primitive but rather ‘of one’s 
house,’ of the place. This is the connotation we want: the culture-as-it-is-lived appropriate to 
well-defined places and situations” (203). “Since speech is not only essential,” she continues, 
“but an important essential of situationally structured behavior, it is quite all right if ‘vernacular 
culture’ suggests first speech, then an extension to other behavior” (203).  
Though the Lomaxes were not necessarily of the first investigators drawn to African-
American study, their interest in collecting the musical vernacular artifacts of African-American 
prisoners is distinguished by their pioneering attempt to understand and give structure to an 
obscure, distinctly racial history of slave and postbellum culture through the study of recorded, 
speech-based vernacular artifacts in the study of African-American culture. Though the Lomaxes 
saw their work as one of cultural preservation—of locating and preserving a distinct and 
authentic African-American musical past—we can understand it as one exploring both racial 
difference and also racial formation through the collection and distribution of African-American 
vernacular music. The proto-blues music that the Lomaxes and others recorded in the South 
carried with it vernacular evidence of what was taken by some to be a “new race” forged in the 
blending of African extraction and American emancipation/reconstruction. Amiri Baraka 
underscores this point by using this phrase in his influential study Blues People, arguing that the 
“African cultures, the retention of some parts of these cultures in America, and the weight of the 
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stepculture produced the American Negro. A new race” (7, his emphasis). Baraka makes music 
the “persistent reference” of his study because “the development and transmutation of African 
music to American Negro music (a new music) represents . . . this whole process in microcosm” 
(7-8). The Lomaxes’ work, then, might be understood in terms of what Michael Omi and 
Howard Winant call a “racial project,” which is “simultaneously an interpretation, representation, 
or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along 
particular racial lines” (56). Furthermore, “racial projects connect what race means in a 
particularly discursive practice and the ways in which both social structures and everyday 
experiences are racially organized, based upon that meaning” (56, their emphasis). Thus do Omi 
and Winant call attention to the linkage between social structure and representation in the 
processes of racial formation. These two elements can be understood in the same terms as the 
contrasting-but-linked elements discussed above related to voice where both internal/social and 
external/representative rhetorics are in circulation.  
In the prison recordings the vernacular genres of African-American life on the 
sharecropping farms of the Jim Crow South help to understand distinct types of behaviors within 
African-American experience during that era and likely, as the Lomaxes suspected, much earlier 
eras as well. They also provide a keystone in our understanding of African-American music’s 
progression from the 19th to 20th century. As well as presenting the rhythm of work life in the 
prisons in 1933, work songs such as “Levee Camp Holler” or “Pick a Bale O’Cotton” can be 
understood accurately enough as “the immediate predecessors of blues” (Baraka 18). Spirituals, 
as I have sought to show, characterize the merging of American and African superstitious/ 
religious traditions; and secular or “sinful” songs like “Ol’ Rattler” or “Run Nigger Run” were 
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expressions of sorrow, rebellion, sexuality, and playful levity. Each of these genres carry with 
them what Henry Louis Gates, Jr. has famously named “Signifyin(g)” elements.  
Though dated, Gates’s theory remains a poignant descriptor for African-American artistic, 
rhythmic, and poetic culture. Signifyin(g) is the “black trope of tropes, the figure for black 
rhetorical figures” (75) and can be found in the African-American linguistic stylings of (among 
others) trickery, half-truth, innuendo, boasting, and playful circularity. The manipulation of these 
“classic black figures of Signification” created African-American agency—the opportunity for 
“the black person to move freely between two discursive universes” (76) and help to understand 
Lead Belly’s political petition. His music successfully Signified both African-American 
suffering and virtuosic creativity—a kind of masterful pairing of everyday black experience and 
white genre expectations. This both-and sonic rhetorical appeal allowed both he and James Baker 
to secure freedom from prison. Even when release wasn’t the end result, all of the examples I 
have discussed above showcase vernacular African-American music’s rhetorical power. We’ve 
heard this power in the voices of convicts engaged in everyday (and often personal) activities 
and emotions, in the symbolic cadence of community, and also as decontextualized 
representation of African-American culture appropriated by the powerful voice of institutional 
authority. Though we now see the cracks in the Lomaxes’ methods and ideologies, their 
recordings would, for a time, have significant progressive impact on scholars’ and later a (largely 
white) middle-class by nuancing previously held views of both racial difference through an 
increased understanding African-American experience during and in the decades immediately 
following slavery.  
As a racial project, then, the Lomaxes’ work within African-American prisons had two 
significant opposing ideological consequences, one expansive, the other, reductive. First, the 
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sounds of toiling, worshiping, and otherwise Signifyin(g) prisoners would help to redraw the 
racially coded parameters of African-American vernacular culture for white audiences 
comfortable with paradigms drawn from other long-held black cultural representations.33 
Theorists within critical race studies call this process “rearticulation.”34 On the other hand, these 
representations would themselves become tropes of typical African-American life in the South 
—codified as the “African-American tradition”— and therefore limit and even re-essentialize 
public understanding of the complexities and always-evolving nature of African-American 
culture in the United States.  
These ideas voice the ways that the study of vernacular music as rhetoric offers various 
possibilities for understanding cultural formation and difference. This is especially so when the 
vernacular is part of a racial project because of vernacular music’s ability as a discursive practice 
to express multiplicity concisely. As I expressed in the introduction of this chapter, the seeming 
paradox of concision/multiplicity should be a heralding attribute of a sonic rhetorical approach. 
In the prison recordings we listen to what seem to be a simple expressions of lived experience. 
But, as I have explored above, deeper listening reveals interpretation, representation, and 
historical explanation of racial experience in their various complexities, complexities inherent to 
racial dynamics in the US (Omi and Winant 56). Rhetorical meaning here is derived not through 
so-called persuasion, but from the difficult, often painful dynamics of working through and 
against difference—of both working towards a sustainable understanding of otherness and of 
working from the other side out of obscurity, discrimination, and subjugation and toward 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 These representations include (but are not limited to) the highly influential and distinctly racist blackface minstrel 
show which permeated American culture from 1840-1940 and beyond, popular “race records” of “classic” city blues 
singers like Bessie Smith and others, and an increasingly whitewashed but popular jazz music of the day. 
34 As Omi and Winant write, “Rearticulation is a practice of discursive reorganization or reinterpretation of 
ideological themes and interests already present in the subjects’ consciousness, such that these elements obtain new 
meanings or coherence. This practice is ordinarily the work of “intellectuals.” Those whose role is to interpret the 
social world for given subjects—religious leaders, entertainers, schoolteachers, etc.—may on this account be 
“intellectuals.” (195) 
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equality. In the 1930s, African-American vernacular music was beginning to be understood as 
more than a body of artifacts to be collected and indexed for the archive, but as a discourse 
engaged in changing understanding of race and racial difference itself. Indeed, during the 
interwar period, some began to realize, as Baraka argues, that African-American music was not 
just representative of black cultural experience “from slave to citizenship” but instead could be 
understood as being symbolic of American culture itself. 
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Historical Interlude 
Oral History’s Exigence: 
John Lomax and Narrative Rhetoric in the Federal Writers Project 
 
With the 150 field recordings that John and Alan Lomax had collected during their 1934 
Southern journeys (including the precious prison recordings), the holdings of the Music Division 
at the Library of Congress nearly doubled. However, bureaucratic ills, loss of an important 
Carnegie Corporation grant, and dealings with an ornery and conspiring supervisor Oliver Strunk 
would work together to make Lomax feel undervalued in his work and on the brink of quitting 
his honorary position as curator of the Archive of American Folk Song (Porterfield 384). Lomax 
was worried that if he didn’t quit, Strunk would find a way to push him out for what the former 
was reporting (cruelly) as a “relatively small accumulation to date of your two years' efforts” 
(Porterfield 536n3). In reality, the archive was thriving. During those two years (1934-1935), it 
would grow by over 500 recordings almost solely due to the Lomaxes’ fieldwork. 
Fortunately, John Lomax was well connected. Through the influence of his friends on 
Capital hill—particularly Texan senators Morris Sheppard and Tom Connally—he was able to 
forcefully and persuasively plead his case before the Head Librarian and, as a result, was given 
the opportunity to renegotiate the grant that funded his and Alan’s field trips, and was able to 
secure new recording equipment. He was also provided with traveling expenses, a secretary, and 
a new vehicle for travel (Porterfield 385). John was also named the head of the archive, which, 
though finally adding some authority and prestige to his position, still had only a $1 yearly salary.  
The good fortune continued when John was offered two new opportunities with the 
government that would dovetail with his work in the archive. These new jobs were both with 
New Deal/WPA initiatives: one with the Historical Records Survey (HRS) and the other with the 
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Federal Writers' Project (FWP). John’s new work indicates that the fieldwork the Lomaxes and 
other folklorists were engaged in was not only growing in popularity but was beginning to be 
seen as having powerful cultural and, perhaps more significantly, national capital. John's work 
with the Historical Records Survey, under another fellow Texan Luther Evans, was to oversee 
and advise a project then underway “involving a national survey of historical records in county 
courthouses and the collection of interviews with several thousand ex-slaves” (Porterfield 386). 
During his first few weeks working with the Writer’s Project and as National Advisor of 
Folklore and Folkways, John worked to expand existing research on the subject of slave life. He 
was given the task of writing instructions for the HRS fieldworkers who were interviewing 
former slaves, and he issued them a list of “detailed and homely questions” designed to “get the 
Negro thinking and talking about the days of slavery” (Mangione 263). Given his years of 
experience talking to people about their lives and recording their stories, John had the right 
qualifications. As Porterfield notes, “With his lifetime interest in blacks and their way of life, 
Lomax was well prepared for the task and came up with a set of questions that elicited valuable 
information” (388). These questions were aimed at developing a more comprehensive 
understanding of African-American life before emancipation by asking for minute details on 
everything from clothing, food, living accommodations, and even childhood games and 
traditions. Lomax also encouraged interviewers to inquire after information that might aid future 
readers in understanding living conditions, relationships with plantation and other slave owners, 
and “the manner in which [the slave] was informed of his freedom” (388).35 The project would 
produce “more than two thousand vivid and comprehensive narratives that provide an invaluable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 These slave-narratives were revelatory to a still-large grouping of the American population largely ignorant to the 
realities of slave life. This collection would work to debunk prevalent “plantations myths” including the “Sambo” or 
happy, contented slave, and other prominent stereotypes that had been doing untold damage to African American 
people and culture for decades.  
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eyewitness account of slavery and its terrible ramifications” (388). The interviews would 
eventually become a large anthology, Lay My Burden Down: A Folk History of Slavery (1945), 
compiled and edited by Lomax’s colleague and fellow folklorist Benjamin Botkin. 
John Lomax's detail-oriented interviewing method, paired with his second wife Ruby 
Terrill Lomax’s deft skill with language, transcription, and record keeping,36 would inform 
another widely acclaimed collection of folk history: the 1939 publication These are Our Lives.37 
Like the slave narrative collection, the editors of this text were charged with recording the stories 
of average citizens in the American South: on the farm, in textile mills and factories, in service 
occupations—business, dentistry, law enforcement, etc.—and those engaged in WPA relief work. 
“The idea,” wrote the project director W. T. Couch, “is to get life histories which are readable 
and faithful representations of living persons, and which, taken together, will give a fair picture 
of the structure and working of society” (ix). This belief in the importance of offering a “faithful” 
and “fair” representation of otherwise underrepresented America embodied not just the work of 
the ex-slave and Lives project, but also a sentiment that ran through the entire Federal Writer’s 
Project, which had its source in the headwaters of the executive office. “So far as I know,” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Lomax married Ruby Terrill in 1934 after several months of correspondence. She was employed by the University 
of Texas at Austin as a dean of women and associate professor of classical languages. As a professional 
administrator and language expert, Terrill was a valuable asset to the Lomaxes’ various projects. Once Alan became 
busy with school and other projects, Terrill was companion and assistant to John on field recording trips, where she 
was, in John’s words, “chauffeur, valet, buffer, machine operator, disk-jockey, body-guard, doctor and nurse, wife 
and companion” (Porterfield 402). In a letter to his supervisor at the Library, Harold Spivacke, Lomax described 
Terrill’s contribution to his now-famous 1939 “Southern States Recording Trip” thusly: “In nearly every instance 
Miss Terrill is including typed copies of the words contained on each record; also the slang of the song and the 
singers. This will be a big saving for the Library. Writing down the words from the record playing is a long, tedious 
job.”  
37 These are Our Lives includes in its appendix the interview instructions given to the relief workers compiling the 
life-stories. Titled simply, “Instructions to Writers” these instructions may very well have been written or at least 
overseen by John Lomax and include an outline on how life-stories might be encouraged from interview subjects. 
Collecting an “authentic” story is stressed as the interviewer is instructed to do her or his best to “discover the real 
feeling of the person consulted and must record this feeling regardless of his own attitude toward it” (418). The 
listing includes instruction on what kinds of stories contain the highest degree of potential human interest, the 
importance of knowing when to veer from the outline in order to allow fruitful side-stories to emerge. Throughout 
all, there is built into the instructions encouragement for the interviewers to be sensitive: to keep personal opinions 
and feelings in check and to refrain, for example, from acknowledging distain related to poor living conditions or 
other undesirable circumstances that interviewers might come across.  
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Couch continues, “this method of portraying the quality of life of a people, of revealing the real 
workings of institutions, customs, habits, has never been used for the people of any region or 
country” (ix). And, for the most part, it hadn’t—not in the ways being developed by the WPA. 
As noted in the previous chapters, while the “soundness” of some of Lomax’s methods have 
received scrutiny over the years, the expertise and experience that he brought to the Writer's 
Project had a significant impact upon not just the greater project and mission of the WPA 
through the projects mentioned above, but in oral or “life-history” and ethnographic practices in 
general.  
Couch touches briefly on these developments in his introduction by pointing to several 
advantages of oral history, but also by implicitly acknowledging a shift in the exigency related to 
an emerging public understanding of the usefulness of these practices. Life histories, Couch 
argues, offer a different perspective—“certain possibilities and advantages”—to traditional 
histories or historical but fictive portraits of vernacular America (Crouch x). A history of the 
people, the “folk,” in their own words, avoids the composite and homogenized character present 
in popular fiction (perhaps implicitly acknowledging works of fiction like Steinbeck’s acclaimed 
Grapes of Wrath, which was published in April of 1939—the same year as Lives) and also 
retains a sense of individual humanity—something often lost in the social-scientific case study 
model, which, in order to access the roots of specific social problems, “treat[ed] human beings as 
a abstractions” robbing subjects of the nuances of personal identity (x). This was particularly true 
for minority voices, which is one reason John and Alan Lomaxes’ pioneering work in the 
Southern States (especially their work in the prisons), the slave narrative project, and then this 
work overseen by Couch, were so revolutionary. Theirs were not the only projects of their kind, 
but they pointed toward a slightly revised historiographical methodology that was open and 
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inclusive rather than reductive and/or empirical. This work, when combined with the 
technological advantages of new audio recording methods, revolutionized how Americans might 
hear and by extension understand themselves and, perhaps more importantly, how they might 
understand others. On this point, Couch’s serious sentiment is instructive still: “This is no trivial 
matter. The People, all the people, must be known, they must be heard. Somehow they must be 
given representation, somehow they must be given voice and allowed to speak, in their essential 
character […] Here, then, are real, living people” (xiii-xiv).  
 
Oral/Aural History:  
The Democratization of History through First-Person Rhetorical Narrative  
By and large, the life stories collected by the field workers in the Federal Writers’ Project 
were done through interview and transcription. And while efforts to represent subjects’ unique 
voices through the careful alphabetic rendering of dialect (in the way that literary renderings of 
African American Vernacular English often appeared), Lomax’s predecessor Sterling Brown 
urged, “truth to idiom be paramount and exacting truth to pronunciation secondary” (qtd. in 
Mangione 263). Textual renderings of spoken interviews, be they idiomatic or in dialect, 
represent a remediation that, while rendering the discursive “data” more easily transferred, also 
repurpose the audience’s experience of the words as well as extract them from the 
phenomenological sphere created by a speaker’s voice. Such renderings reduce the aural 
cadences and rhythm of spoken dialect and transform voices into text, which can then be taken 
up and redistributed as data for any number of scholarly, commercial, scientific, or personal uses. 
The benefits of this type of rendering, in the case of the New Deal projects, are undeniable. Print 
is more easily reproducible, more easily circulated, and generally then, more accessible. With 
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relative ease, a large audience had access to the life-stories of a widely diverse group of fellow 
Americans—some, like the former slaves, who never had an audience before. In this way and 
others, textuality (through print technology) efficiently met perceived demands of a consumer 
public in the process of discovering their interest in themselves as a people. But what of the 
voices left behind? What might have been the reception of These Are Our Lives had it been 
produced as a series of phonograph recordings and then sold or produced for a national radio 
broadcast?  
While music had always been their primary goal, John and Alan Lomax had by this time 
recorded several spoken stories, sermons, personal histories, and yarns. But these oral histories 
were rarely heard by the public and most remain in the ephemera between the more carefully 
cataloged element of the recordings, the songs. For the Lomaxes, the non-musical recordings 
were likely deemed less marketable than the music that typically would accompany them. A 
carefully edited book collecting the most striking and sensational stories would likely be more 
interesting to the commercial market. The aural nature of recorded history may also be less 
accessible to a general public because of the difficulty and effort involved in listening. These 
difficulties range from the actual sound of the recording—its affective materiality—to the 
difficulty of understanding accent and dialect of both rural whites and blacks. Both of these 
listening practices represent consumer work less present in textual renderings, especially if that 
text has been heavily edited, normalized, and codified for a large public audience.  
The advantages and potentials for attention to oral/aural histories in rhetorical criticism is 
a subject only just beginning to receive explicit attention and often in the work of digital 
rhetoricians working with found or re-appropriated aural artifacts.38 This emerging work 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See, for example, Erin Anderson’s “The Olive Project: An Oral History Composition in Multiple Modes” (2011) 
and Jody Shipka’s “To Preserve, Digitize and Project” (2012).  
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underscores how listening to oral/aural history enhances our understanding of historical 
individuals but also emphasizes oral history as a “co-constructed process of narrative 
composition” (Anderson, “Background” para.1) This co-construction is made explicit in the 
transformation of oral history from audio recordings into cohesive narrative artifacts, as was the 
case in the above examples. Attention to oral history as it is rendered from aural to textual 
artifacts requires attention to the ways that movement within modalities shifts both meaning and 
experience. This process also calls attention to how mediation transforms the message and 
reforms the rhetorical situation.  
These practices will be crucial to understanding jazz musician Jelly Roll Morton’s oral 
musical history (which is central to the next chapter). In the below section, and leading up to 
Morton and Lomax’s dialectical oral history making, I discuss briefly how oral/aural history 
making and especially the stories and narratives central to them, has been taken up in rhetorical 
studies and related disciplines. The goal here is to highlight that oral/aural historiographical 
practice is indeed rhetorical, and according to some scholars, centrally so. This discussion works 
as an important interlude between the more general history above of the WPA, FWP, and John 
Lomax’s work as an oral historian in the early 1930s and the more specific discussion of John’s 
son and predecessor Alan in the American Folklife Archive near the end of that decade. Alan’s 
oral-history recording sessions with Jelly Roll Morton and the variety of mediated artifacts 
resulting from those sessions represent a compelling example of sound recording’s paradox as a 
medium in “seeming abstraction from the social world even as it [is] manifested more 
dynamically within it” (Sterne, Audible Past 6). 
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Constitutive Rhetoric and the Narrative Paradigm within Rhetorical Criticism 
Generally speaking, history, including biography and autobiography, is represented and 
mediated through and within a narrative structure. Wayne Booth recognized his work as a 
literary critic and rhetorician as dealing directly with narratives as they are represented through 
the “presentation of time-ordered or time-related experience that in any way supplements, re-
orders, enhances, or interprets unnarrated life” (Booth 14). Booth recognized that this “re-
ordering” extended even to self-making and that making sense of ourselves as actors within the 
paradox of lived experience—its simultaneous chaos and monotony—was an act of story making. 
Part of the appeal of oral history to a study interested in sonic rhetorics is related first to this 
grand tradition of narrative creation I have been exploring but also of the nature of storytelling as 
an oral/aural practice. Oral history—especially when recorded using audio technology—retains 
both its narrative and its aural characteristics and allows the researcher to consider what the 
presence of a sonic component contributes to the rhetoric of message being related.  
It is true that much of our storytelling has moved into literate, multi-mediated, and even 
digital spaces, but the act of story making has remained a practice with goals of dialogic 
resonance and of identification through shared experience. Unsurprisingly, narrative as a 
rhetorical practice has been the subject of scholarly inquiry and debate since classical times. In 
his Poetics, Aristotle emphasized the importance of plot in his discussion of the elements of 
tragic narrative (the others being spectacle or setting, character, thought, diction, and melody). 
The tragic dramas that Aristotle was interested in theorizing were important to the culture not as 
depictions of actual events, but still “real” or imitative renderings of various types of value-laden 
potential—experiences that audiences would have found compelling. As such, plot was 
important both as a way of setting up the chronology of events, but also as creating a structure of 
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meaning around the events depicted in a way that presented this mimetic or imitative “reality” as 
something from which general causality and reason/rationality might be extracted. In other 
words, plot created a narrative structure for understanding the important morals and ethics of a 
community, "what [they] consider[ed] important, trivial, fortunate, tragic, good, evil, and what 
impel[ed] movement from one to another" (Martin 87). Modern and ancient storytelling, be they 
in Aesop's fables (which predates Aristotle by several centuries), Greek and later Shakespearean 
drama, or in radio, television or film draws on the epideictic power of mimetic narrative as a 
means value sustaining and constituency. As Jasinski (2001) relates, during the 19th century's 
turn toward Romanticism, the utility and primacy of the imitation paradigm in rhetorical 
narrative would find a rival in a growing interest in personal expression as the most important 
function of artistic narrative production. “The Aristotelian-Romantic tension—the question of 
whether literary art (and all discursive practice, for that matter) functions primarily to imitate or 
reflect the world or to express or evoke the inner world of the author—remains a topic in 
aesthetic an discursive theory” (392).39  
Recent study of narrative as a rhetorical device or mode addresses this tension in the way 
that it draws together and creates meaning around the effects of rhetoric, be they 
aesthetic/visceral, instrumental, or constitutive. When a narrative works rhetorically “it functions 
aesthetically to create a vivid, memorable, and compelling world” (Jasinski 393). This world can 
be inhabited or presented or both. As a world-making agent, narrative functions constitutively 
and within this mode, narrative-as-rhetoric can “shape and transform how a community 
understands its world” (393) through a process that Maurice Charland (1987) argues happens 
before persuasion. Constitutive rhetoric contributes to “the production of ideology” or “the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 These two sometimes-competing paradigms are rounded out holistically by musical discourse, especially 
vernacular and, more widely, “popular” music – pop music, combines both mimetic literary/narrative elements and 
attempts to imitate the emotional tenor of the moment depicted through musical tropes. 
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constitution of the subject” (213). “Narratives ‘make real’ coherent subjects”; indeed, “this 
making real is a part of the ontological function of narratives” (221). The “real,” however, is an 
illusion. Ideology is, necessarily, a useful illusion of “a unified and unproblematic subjectivity” 
(221). Further, “Subjectivity is always social, constituted in language, and exists in a delicate 
balance of contradictory drives and impulses” (222). Constitutive rhetoric, then, is a part of the 
larger discourse of epideictic rhetoric. It is value-laden and used to create and sustain values 
within a worldview. Constitutive narratives are built to provide structures for characters to dwell, 
and, once lived in for long enough, have the potential of becoming part of the rhythmic fabric of 
a culture’s discursive body. In this way, narratives achieve the status of “reality” and “beyond 
the realm of rational or even free choice, beyond the realm of persuasion” (214) where choices 
related to social identity, religion, faith, and even sexuality can seem predetermined and 
embedded within the meaning, making myths of ‘the way things are and always have been.’ 
On the other hand, narratives also work instrumentally to persuade internal and external 
audiences. In these cases, the goal is to prove or maintain a belief in the efficacy of the internal 
logic of a certain understanding/opinion of the way things are or should be. Within Walter 
Fisher’s theory of narrative paradigms each narrative structure relies on an internal rationality 
constructed by the rhetor as part of a functional understanding of the world. Potential conflicts 
arise when competing ideological narratives come into contact with each other. Narrative is used 
instrumentally in order to respond to the exigencies created by a conflict, to negotiate the 
contours of those conflicts through appeals to the audience’s internal logics, and—where 
possible—to find common ground, common values, common stories. Fisher argues “prevailing 
theories of human communication and logic—ancient, modern, and contemporary—do not 
answer these questions adequately” and that human values have gone largely ignored as a 
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resource for understanding the “constitution of knowledge, truth, or reality” (xi). The results of 
this misstep has been the “unquestioned superiority” of technical discourse over the rhetorical 
and poetic leading to gross social and political misunderstandings from both internal and 
historical perspectives. 
To address this problem, Fisher argues for a reconceptualization of humans as, primarily, 
storytellers (or Homo narrans). This perspective leads to an understanding of human 
communication as primarily one of story-making—as “symbolic interpretations of aspects of the 
world occurring in time and shaped by history, culture, and character”—and of “good reasons” 
(xi). Reason and by extension rationality within this narrative paradigm is a contextual construct 
with internal logics that reflect “values or value-laden warrants for believing or acting in certain 
ways” (xi). This logic doesn't depend on scientific rationality, but it instead depends upon the 
fidelity of the story to existent narrative structures within a cultural or sub-cultural rendering and 
a story’s resonant fidelity within those constructs. Rhetoric, from this perspective, can be a way 
of subverting the violence and/or subjugation that occurs when opposing paradigms come into 
contact and conflict with one another. Consider, for example, that various projects of empiricism 
and colonialism operate under the assumption of the superiority of one system of narrative logic 
over another. Also, contemporary critiques of anthropologic and ethnographic practices have 
centered largely on the acknowledgment that levying external scientific logics or judgments of 
“rationality” about the internal “realities” of a subject’s culture or discourse community can be 
damaging to the population or individuals studied. Narrative logics might be understood as 
producing  
rationality … determined by the nature of persons as narrative beings—their 
inherent awareness of narrative probability, what constitutes a coherent story, and 
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their constant habit of testing narrative fidelity, whether or not the stories they 
experience ring true with the stories they know to be true in their lives. (65) 
 The existence of external or competing story sets (along with their competing logics) does not 
go unacknowledged within the narrative paradigm, rather these stories “must be chosen among in 
order for us to live life in a process of continual re-creation” (65). 
This way of thinking about rationality undermines the idea that some forms of 
communication are superior to others, or that “true knowledge” exists universally outside of the 
constructs of culture. From this rhetorical perspective, “truth” can exist within cultures in 
complete opposition to outside logics or empirical/scientific renderings of what constitutes true 
knowledge. What matters is coherence and fidelity within the internal logic of the systemic story 
structure that undergirds the society. The stakes for an application of this kind of open, non-
rational epistemology for truth may seem untenable—particularly in courts of law, scientific labs, 
or other knowledge paradigms where truth is determined logically or with carefully established 
empirical methods. Historical rationality, however (and harkening back to White) is always 
already fiction but that does not mean we should jettison truth as an ideal altogether. Instead, 
historical inquiry requires a different, more porous understanding of and patience with truth—
particularly considering the ways individual truths about the past contradict as often as they 
coalesce.  
As I now address Jelly Roll Morton’s story, several notes from the above discussion 
should hang sustained in the air in relative harmony. First, that his oral history—his version of 
the story—is “true.” Also, that Morton’s tale is itself constitutive of history and furthermore that 
constitution is most powerful when it is also most musical. Morton’s take is “true,” then, in the 
sense that it is presented as a part of a relatively coherent narrative with an internal logic that 
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reveals Morton to the listener as the mythic prophet in his version of the jazz narrative/mythos. 
As a myth maker, Morton asserts certain assumptions, truisms, and conflations of the historical 
ground he covers, but throughout, his argument rings true: “[I am the] originator of jazz, stomps 
and swing.”  
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Chapter Three 
 
Jazz Aretē:  
Jelly Roll Morton and the Sonic Rhetorics of Virtuosic Musical Performance 
 
“When the settled Creole folks first heard this jazz, they passed the opinion that it sounded like 
the rough Negro element. In other words, they had the same kind of feeling that some white 
people have who don't understand jazz and don't want to understand it. But, after they heard it so 
long, they began to creep right close to it and enjoy it. That's why I think this jazz music helps to 
get this misunderstanding between the races straightened out. You creep in close to hear the 
music and, automatically, you creep close to the other people. You know?”  
 
Dr. Leonard Bechet, in Lomax, Mister Jelly Roll, 120-121 
 
"Jazz was the hybrid of hybrids and so it appealed to a nation of lonely immigrants. In a divided 
world struggling blindly toward unity, it became a cosmopolitan musical argot. This new musical 
language owes its emotional power to the human triumph accomplished at the moment of its 
origin in New Orleans—a moment of cultural ecstasy.”   
 
Alan Lomax, Mister Jelly Roll, 122 
 
“We had all nations in New Orleans.”   
 




This chapter considers the rhetorics of virtuosic musical performance, arguing that a 
critical reconsideration of the rhythmic potentials of aretē and mythos expand recent 
developments in epideictic rhetorical theory and contribute to current conversations within 
rhetoric and sound studies. This expansion allows sociocultural musical performance, skill, and 
artifacts to be understood as robust sonic rhetorics that have power to influence beliefs, racial 
experience, and historical understanding. To demonstrate these processes, the chapter examines 
jazz pianist and composer Jelly Roll Morton’s sessions recorded with archivist Alan Lomax at 
the Library of Congress in 1938. Morton hoped his virtuosic performance on the recordings 
would authenticate his connection to jazz’s nativity and thus revise jazz canonical history. Using 
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Morton’s distinctive sonic rhetorics during the sessions as evidence, I argue for a renewed 
interest in histories of rhythmic rhetorical practice and for its connection to claims of historic and 
cultural authenticity.  
In the introduction to his recent edited collection, The Sound Studies Reader, leading 
sound scholar Jonathan Sterne entreats us to develop our “sonic imaginations” (5) by learning to 
“think sonically” (3). In Sterne’s rendering, “Sonic imaginations are necessarily plural, recursive, 
reflexive, driven to represent, refigure and redescribe” (5). They are “driven to fashion some new 
intellectual facility to make sense of some part of the sonic world” (5). This developmental 
process involves the critical pairing (or “conjuncture”) of sound and culture in order to “ask big 
questions about [our] cultural moments and the crises and problems of [our] time” (3). The 
challenge for those working within sound studies is, Sterne argues, “to think across sounds, to 
consider sonic phenomena in relationship to one another—as types of sonic phenomena rather 
than as things-in-themselves—whether they be music, voices, listening, media, buildings, 
performances, or another path into sonic life” (3). It is within the meaningful articulation of these 
various sonic phenomena that rhetoric scholars are equipped to offer contributions and critique to 
sound studies. Rhetoric as the study of influence (as persuasion, affect, cooperation, and culture) 
invites “big questions” about sound’s potential for influence but also about how sound is 
designed, shaped, and disciplined to have influence and meaning as an extension of the sonic 
imagination. Thinking with a rhetorical ear, then, is to think not just about a sound’s particular or 
peculiar materialities but about how relationships between sonic phenomena reveal distinct sonic 
rhetorics: sonic rhetorical practices, artifacts, embodiments, and histories (to name just a few). 
I now set Morton’s historical stage and will then circle back to the rhetorical tools and my 
own big questions about the crises and problems within Morton’s particular cultural moment. In 
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this chapter, I question the interrelationships between embodied and historical sonic phenomena 
and their rhetorical effects within specific sociocultural contexts— their “cultural moments.” My 
focus is on musical performance and on embodied musical excellence, or virtuosity, as an agency 
for rhetorical influence, change, and reconstitution. Specifically, I describe the experience and 
sonic rhetorics of Jelly Roll Morton, a pianist who in 1938 was anxious to insert himself into the 
history of jazz on the power and authority of his capacity for virtuosic jazz performance. 
Drawing together various classical rhetorical terms, particularly those related to value 
performance (mythos, aretē, epideictic), I give an ear to the ways that virtuosic performance has 
the rhetorical potential to authenticate, or prove genuine, in a demonstration of that excellence. 
In this way, I argue for musical virtuosity as a sonic rhetoric of embodied, probable evidence. 
Related to and with precedent from ancient formulations of rhetoric’s soundness (in both senses), 
I argue that performed excellence has power to create and revise historical narratives as cultural 
mythos that in turn translate into potent imaginaries (or reconstitutions) of national, cultural, and 
racial identity. 
 
Jelly Roll Morton’s Musical Mythos: “[I am the] Originator of Jazz, Stomps, and Swing!” 
 
In May 1938, New Orleans jazz pianist and composer Ferdinand “Jelly Roll” Morton 
arrived at the Library of Congress, anxious to speak to Alan Lomax, “Assistant in Charge” of the 
Archive of Folk Song, about the origins of jazz. Morton, who was managing a small nightclub in 
Washington D.C., was out of money and in poor health but interested in correcting the emergent 
published history of what was often referred to as “hot” music—or jazz. Morton felt he was 
being unjustly written out of that history. “[I am the] originator of jazz, stomps and swing,” he 
claimed, echoing a letter to Robert Ripley (of “Ripley’s Believe It or Not”) that had been 
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published in both Baltimore African-American and Downbeat magazine few months earlier: “It 
is evidently known, beyond contradiction that New Orleans is the cradle of jazz, and I, myself, 
happened to be the creator in the year 1902 […]” (Morton, Downbeat).  
 Morton was a pianist of incredible skill—a jazz virtuoso. He is now recognized 
alongside Buddy Bolden, Sidney Bechet, and Freddie Keppard as one of several key musicians 
tied to the emergence of New Orleans jazz at the beginning of the twentieth century.40 Morton 
came of age during the first decade of the 20th century and during what might be considered the 
final cacophonous refrain of Old New Orleans—the city’s blistering coda. At the turn to the 
twentieth century, New Orleans was a contradiction of progressive and conservative mores. It 
had an open and diverse public society but also had terrifying and often deadly ethnic, racial, and 
class conflict. African Americans were rarely restricted from labor unions, enjoyed decent 
schools for their children, but suffered bitterly under corrupt police and government clashes. The 
city was the stage for multiple riots, Jim Crow segregation, and damning disenfranchisement 
under Plessy v. Ferguson in 1898. Music, however, was everywhere. On St. Peter street in the 
French Quarter, from Jackson to Congo Square, and inside public parlors and busy churches, one 
might hear the hollers, shouts, tambourines, and hand-claps of parishioners and performers. The 
sounds of old opera and new ragtime, stride-piano, brass bands, string bands, blues bands, and 
the famous New Orleans funeral processions and parades came together in the coastal city as a 
great cacophony of sound. And nowhere was that juxtaposition of turbulence and jubilee more 
pronounced than it was in the world-famous red-light district of New Orleans, Storyville. The 
Storyville District was one of the first places where folks like Buddy Bolden, Papa Tio, and 
Frankie Dunson were playing music that seemed to draw from all these styles, music that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40See chapter two of Burton W. Peretti’s The Creation of Jazz for a succinct history of early New Orleans jazz as 
well as the development of jazz in other regions during the early twentieth century.  
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wouldn’t be recorded and named until many years later, but music we would certainly recognize 
today as jazz.  
It was during this early part of the 20th century that Morton, Bolden, and others in New 
Orleans began to turn up the proverbial temperature in the music scene. Hunched over makeshift 
Storyville bandstands, these players, in raucous rhapsody, began to stitch parts and pieces of the 
musical culture together and, in so doing, declared a new and potent reconstruction of musical 
values. And wherever the music played, those values spread.  
By the end of the first decade, however, the musical climate in New Orleans had began to 
change. In 1907, Bolden suffered a nervous breakdown and never played there again, and 
Morton had already been gone for years. He left New Orleans in 1905 to seek his fame and 
fortune—not as a pianist, at first, but as a pool shark, hustler, and pimp. His hot piano playing 
would follow him anyway. Soon he was playing in many of the hottest clubs and pubs in greater 
America, from Los Angeles to Chicago to New York. In those clubs, he found many poor and 
lack-luster players, but he also began to curate a group of musicians who shared his values and 
who were in conversation with a music that wouldn’t find semi-formal acknowledgement as 
“jazz” until 1915. And surely, Morton wouldn’t have given such formalities a second thought or 
wouldn’t until many years later. 
Like many musicians of the time, Morton rarely published or copyrighted his music. In 
an era when artists rarely saw royalties for their published work, Morton didn’t see the sense in 
selling a song to a publisher for fifteen or twenty dollars when he could often make more than a 
hundred dollars a day playing in the busy clubs and “sporting houses” of the city (Morton, Jelly 
Roll Morton 7). This oversight would later prove problematic for Morton. For example, one of 
the songs he recorded in 1938 during the sessions at the Library of Congress with Lomax was the 
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classic jazz tune, “Tiger Rag.” Although it would not actually be published and recorded until 
1917 by the Original Dixieland Jass Band, Morton asserts that "Tiger Rag” was his composition, 
written early in the first decade of the 20th century. The 1917 “Jass Band” recording sold a 
million copies and would become one of the most recognizable jazz standards of all time: Duke 
Ellington, Louis Armstrong, Benny Goodman—and later even Frank Sinatra—made it a part of 
their repertoire. Yet in 1938, “Tiger Rag” and a host of other household-name standards that 
Morton likely composed or arranged, and which would tie him inextricably to the early history of 
jazz, brought the pianist neither enduring fame nor fortune. 
Given this significant obstruction to Morton’s public and historical recognition, claiming 
himself the inventor of jazz required validation of a different kind: skilled performance 
embedded within a concert of embodied rhetorical activity. While Morton’s motive to 
authenticate himself as one of jazz’s creators was not without hubris, he required the national 
ethos of Lomax and the Library of Congress to meet his goal. By 1938, Alan Lomax had gained 
a national reputation for his work as a field recorder, archivist, and occasional performer and 
had, along with his father John A. Lomax, been responsible for the discovery and recovery of a 
wide variety of folk musicians and their music. Like the many others he recorded that decade and 
over the course of his long career, Lomax would come to see Morton as a rich source for 
understanding the connection between musical traditions and vernacular culture in the United 
States, which included the development of jazz as a unique “American” creation. 
Searching for “uniqueness” during this period in the United States was part of the 
response to the national traumas of the Great Depression which had shattered the glitzy façade of 
Progressive Era ideals and left the nation searching for a new wholeness and for a truer, more 
authentic identity. As Cara Finnegan (2006) notes, “During the 1930s, people sought evidence of 
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an ‘American way of life,’ relying on a developing cultural belief that with proper investigation 
one could locate a uniquely American culture and history ‘out there’ if one only looked hard 
enough” (“Photography” 119). This search is epitomized by President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt’s New Deal, which, in addition to funding projects building infrastructure, also 
initiated thousands of Works Progress/Projects Administration (WPA) programs dedicated to 
searching out, re-presenting, and celebrating “the people” of the United States through works of 
art, theater, photography, and music.41 As has been well-documented by Finnegan’s historical 
work in her monograph Picturing Poverty, photographic representations of poverty, especially in 
the Dust Bowl region of the Midwest, resonated deeply with the American people, many of 
whom were facing challenging financial situations themselves and empathized with iconic 
representations of rural poverty. Similarly, new national perspectives during the interwar period 
brought about a slight plot-shift in the continuously evolving drama of race and the racial divide 
in America. Cultural and racial appropriation in the United States, especially of African-
American artistic traditions, had long been a part of American popular culture. The blackface 
minstrel show was, for example, the most popular form of entertainment in America for nearly a 
hundred years (1830-1930) and still echoes residually in contemporary national popular 
imaginaries.42 The rise in popularity of jazz during 1920s, however, marked a shift away from 
the appropriation of racist grotesque/comic representations of African American identity and 
culture toward the appropriation of African American genius as white musicians began to 
compose and perform in jazz and blues vernaculars. Ironically, but true to history, white 
audiences persisted in their affinity for black culture even as they remained wary of black faces.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41See Jonathan Harris, Federal Art and National Culture: The Politics of Identity in New Deal America for a rich 
discussion of the New Deal as a cultural project toward the construction of a distinct “Americaness.”  
42See Eric Lott, Love and Theft: Blackface Minstrelsy and the American Working Class.  
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Part of the cultural re-assemblage of the following decade championed by Roosevelt, 
Lomax, and others included the search for a more complete understanding of American identity, 
one that included people of color in its constitution. The relationship between Lomax and 
Morton, then, is part of this larger rhetorical ecology of constitutive meaning making within the 
United States during this time. Lomax understood Morton (and Morton presented himself) as 
possessing archetypal qualities of the vernacular jazz musician. Morton’s knowledge and 
performance of his musical abilities could be evidence to the library (and, by extension, to the 
nation) of not just his place within jazz history, but of the sound of jazz itself as an important 
thread within the tapestry of an American “people” suddenly interested in knowing themselves in 
greater nuance. 
 
Mythos, Virtuosity, and the Roots of Epideictic Rhetoric 
Jelly Roll Morton’s unique exigency to provide proof of authenticity through musical 
virtuosity raises larger questions about the depths of rhetorical practice itself: How do cultural 
traditions (musical or otherwise) begin and how do they then take root? What are the discursive 
and non-discursive means for those beginnings? And, important to students of sound in 
particular, what do rhythmic practices have to do with these processes? I turn now to a 
consideration of mythos, virtue/value production, and epideictic rhetoric to begin to answer these 
questions and to demonstrate virtuosic musical performance’s potential for symbolic 
(re)constitution—for history making.  
In addition to providing a pseudo-historical “reality” from which to build cultural 
meaning, myth, “is always an account of a ‘creation;’ it relates how something was produced, 
[how it] began to be” (Eliade 6). By extension, as Christopher Johnstone (2009) writes, “In its 
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primal meaning mythos comprehends the idea of telling a story, of presenting a narrative that 
enables a people—a tribe, a clan, a culture—to make sense of the mysterious” (16). Further, 
myth “expresses, enhances, and codifies belief; it safeguards and enforces morality; it vouches 
for the efficiency of ritual and contains practical rules for the guidance of men” (Bronislaw qtd. 
in Johnstone 17). In short, mythos sets the parameters of the values, virtues, and shared ideals 
within a cultural construct. The processes by which these ideals or virtues are practiced, 
performed, and embodied as a way of demonstrating and circulating community wisdom are 
what Aristotle might have called “epideictic” (or demonstrative) rhetorical processes. Epideictic 
activity involves the distribution of judgments about community values through the public 
performance of ritual and rite, which, not incidentally, were often couched in rhythmic language 
or accompanied by music. If epideictic activates shared ideals and virtues, the epideictic 
rhetorician is most effective when she embodies the ideals in perceptible ways and inhabits a 
social position of relative power and influence. Shared notions of virtue and value circulate 
through social agreement on the praiseworthy quality of a virtuosic performance, which in turn 
perpetuates a desire to both emulate the performance and exalt the performer. 
Jelly Roll Morton’s claims of authenticity were made through careful storytelling and 
rhapsody, which, in the classical sense, is the stitching together of value-laden narrative in 
rhythmic virtuosity.43 Generally speaking, the Ancient Greeks understood virtuosity, or aretē, as 
a standard of excellence applicable to any activity.44 When applied to knowledge or 
performance, however, aretē takes on the virtuosic “quality” that Robert Pirsig (1974) has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43In ancient Greek, rhapsode or rhapsōidós (ὁµηριστής) means “stitcher of songs.”  
44Aretē and, more generally, the circulation and performance of public virtue is a more rich and expansive topic than 
there is room here to cover adequately. For a variety of resources on the subject see Michael Gagarin and Paul 
Woodruff’s “Protagoras,” in Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists; chapter four of Robert 
Hariman’s Political Style, and Mark Garrett Longaker, Rhetoric and the Republic: Politics, Civic Discourse, and 
Education in Early America. 
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described in connection to deft, improvisational rhetorical practice: literally the almost-reflexive 
situational response that occurs for the rhetor who has become, through careful cultural and 
pedagogical training, excellent in eloquence. As advanced in the introduction, I argue again for 
an understanding of aretē as shared, embodied knowledge (rather than a stable, abstract body of 
knowledge). Aretē is the social agreement and performance about what constitutes “quality” 
excellence within a culture. Virtuosity, in this sense, is the internalization of external cultural 
norms learned in the act of the public and private practice or performance of those norms. In this 
way, excellence is eventually habituated—as Debra Hawhee has written—as both a 
“repeated/repeatable style of living [. . . and as a] performative, bodily phenomenon [. . .] 
produced through observation [and] imitation” (187). Recall also, from the earlier section on 
ancient rhetoric that Aristotle explicitly draws aretē together with epideictic rhetoric: aretē sets 
the parameters of epideictic and activates the virtues and vices commonly held within a 
community or culture by making them subject to (and the subjects of) performances of praise 
and blame. In this way, epideictic rhetoric is a kind of performed excellence or virtue that both 
produces and perpetuates codes of value and belief. 
I evoke these terms in reference to Jelly Roll Morton’s argument for his place in jazz 
history because of the nature of his task: First, he had to make a claim to and demonstration of 
his knowledge of the “basic codes of value and belief” within jazz culture and society. Those 
codes are presented for the Library of Congress as an epideictic narrative that included rich 
descriptions of race, space, place, and people all of which evoke a particular quality of life in the 
Storyville district of New Orleans (including detailed accounting for the lifestyle of a jazz 
musician). Second, this process of authentication required the performance of specific and 
embedded jazz values as they existed as part of the matrix of musicianship, mentality, and 
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sociopolitical realities of the day, including performances of racial identity. These values are 
communicated in Morton’s deep repertoire knowledge (well over forty tunes and melodies are 
represented in the sessions), but also in his performance of a central jazz value: “hot” playing. 
Third, and most important, Morton had to prove his excellence—his embodied aretē—through 
not only pristine virtuosic jazz performance within that matrix, but also a careful explanation and 
conceptualization of those virtuosic elements. These three elements—rich epideictic narrative, 
virtuosic performance, and technical demonstration—well performed and positively received, 
work in concert to constitute the necessary ingredients for rhetorical inception. They would give 
Morton the tools to revise the creation myth of jazz and insert himself as an “authentic” 
contributor in the tradition’s origins. In the process, they would also produce a rhetoric of jazz: a 
set skills that could be practiced, perfected, and then applied to any tune. Before he could do so, 
however, a professional relationship with Alan Lomax needed to be established and maintained. 
I briefly discuss the circumstances around that relationship before moving to a more detailed 
analysis of the elements that would constitute Morton’s rhetoric of jazz in the remainder of the 
essay. 
 
Rendering an Epideictic Mythos: Jelly Roll Morton at the Library of Congress 
“I realized that Jelly was telling me the history of jazz, because jazz was a neighborhood project. 
Only a few individuals in this small, sleepy town were involved in evoking the music of jazz out 
of the broad basis of American Negro folk song. The Downtown Creoles could play their notes, 
but the Uptown boys had much to teach them. As Papa Big-Eye Nelson told me: ‘You had to put 
your cryin’ into your clarinet’”  
Alan Lomax, in Szwed 137 
 
In 1938, Alan Lomax also had some concerns about jazz’s place in United States culture 
and history. Alan and his mentor and father John A. Lomax had always steered clear of New 
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Orleans, a town they considered well past its musical prime by the time they were gathering 
songs in the 1920s and 30s. Alan Lomax subsequently avoided recording jazz musicians because 
he was weary of how jazz as a commercial juggernaut dominated the airwaves and especially 
that white performers had for years appropriated and changed the genre to make it more 
accessible to white audiences. Jelly Roll Morton’s appearance at his office in the Library of 
Congress marked a turning point for Lomax in his attitude toward the study of jazz roots. Lomax 
had been across town to the Jungle Inn, Morton’s dilapidated jazz club in Washington D.C., 
where he heard the man play. He was compelled, then, when the aging musician—one clearly 
from the old guard of the jazz tradition—came to the library hoping to partner with Lomax in the 
recasting of jazz history and in so doing wrest it away from competing voices and from the 
colonizing forces of the American corporate recording industry. Something about Jelly Roll 
Morton’s audacity was persuasive for Lomax. He recalled Morton’s dress, in particular: an aging 
but sharp hundred-dollar suit, beautiful hand-painted silk tie with matching shirt, socks and 
handkerchief, gold rings and the famous half-carat diamond in his front incisor: “I looked at him 
with considerable suspicion. But I thought, I’d take this cat on, and . . . see how much folk music 
a jazz musician knows” (Szwed 9). 
The Library of Congress sessions that followed this first meeting weren’t originally 
planned to be very lengthy. However, Lomax was immediately enthralled by Morton’s cool 
demeanor, his genius behind the piano, and his detailed recollection of the music scene in turn-
of-the-century New Orleans. Having a keyboard under his fingers allowed Morton to punctuate 
his history with chords and melodies giving those stories a multi-modal richness not possible in a 
typical interview. As such, not only were the Morton sessions unique as musical output, but they 
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were also the first recorded oral history in jazz.45 To boot, Lomax saw Morton as a resource in 
his ongoing project: to find and record folk or “vernacular” music, to preserve it, but also to 
share it with the country in an effort toward an updated national mythos—one that included a 
reconstituted notion of who “the people” were.  
By 1938, and though only twenty-three years old, Alan Lomax had emerged as a well-
known author, folklorist, and national public figure. His field recording work collecting folk 
songs had commenced in 1933 with his father, John in a trek through Southern African-
American penitentiaries. By the time of his sessions with Jelly Roll Morton, he had traveled all 
over North America, including trips to the Bahamas and an extended recording trip to Haiti with 
author and folklorist Zora Neale Hurston. In the analysis of the Morton sessions below, it should 
be remembered that while Lomax’s vocal presence on the session recordings waxes and wanes, 
he is present throughout: questioning, encouraging, prodding, and occasionally (as critics of 
Lomax’s methods have pointed out) supplying Morton with whiskey, as he sometimes would to 
lower his subjects’ inhibitions.46 To be sure, Morton and Lomax’s partnership on the project is 
marked with the paradoxes of competing rhetorical agendas and complicated further by the clear 
asymmetry of both racial and institutional power between them. Yet, co-creation occurs amidst 
and through these imbalances. And unlike polished alphabetic biographies, in a sonic rendering 
of this dialectic, we can listen for ourselves to Lomax’s interruptions or hear Morton’s voice 
begin to slur when he has had sufficient drink. Whatever power Lomax hordes as gatekeeper of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 In September 2005, the Library of Congress released The Complete Library of Congress Recordings through 
Rounder Records. This expansive box set marks the first time that the complete, unedited, Jelly Roll Morton 
sessions were made available commercially. The release includes eight compact discs of interview and musical 
content presented in the order that Morton related it. The CDs are packaged with book-length liner notes and 
electronic documents which include a transcription of the interview, a biography of Morton by John Szwed, and 
photographs of archival materials, among other content.  
46 For one of the more incisive critiques of Alan Lomax’s methods during the Morton sessions, see Howard Reich 
and William Gaines, Jelly’s Blues: The Life, Music, and Redemption of Jelly Roll Morton. 
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the project, it is tempered for the listener by the persistence of Morton’s musical tale, an eight 
hour epic from beginning to end.  
Historian Philip Pastras compares Jelly Roll Morton’s narrative style and ethos in the 
sessions to the mythopoetic ode of an ancient epic poet. The story, he says, is, “An American 
odyssey, with its particularly American brand of near misses, and narrow escapes, of Sirens, 
Circes, and monsters, of far-flung travels and homecomings” (Pastras 3) but also full of the 
“verbal one-upmanship” and “braggadocio” essential to black language practices (16). Much of 
Morton’s tale revolves around his status as a Creole and the various class hierarchies found in 
New Orleans and Storyville including the diverse African American community there. In one 
segment on the first day of recording, Jelly Roll describes the scene where musicians would 
gather, and especially the various class mixing among the clientele of the music clubs:  
At that time, uh, that was the year of nineteen-two. I was about seventeen years 
old. I happened to go to Villere and Bienville, at that time one of the most famous 
nightspots after everything was closed. It was only a backroom, where all the 
greatest pianists frequented after they got off from work. All the pianists got off 
from work in the sporting houses at around four or after unless they had plenty 
money involved. And they would go to this Frenchman’s (that was the name of 
the place) saloon, and there would be everything in the line of hilarity there. They 
would have even millionaires that come to listen to the different great pianists, 
what would no doubt be their favorites maybe among ‘em. (Morton 12). 
 A bit later, he elaborates on the scene at Frenchman’s and other establishments in the district: 
[Spoken as Morton plays slowly modulating chords on the piano] Of course, it 
was a free and easy place. Everybody got along just the same. And, uh— and 
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that’s the way it was. There wasn’t no certain neighborhood for nobody to live in, 
only with the St. Charles Avenue district, which is considered the millionaire 
district. In fact it was. And that’s how it was. Why, everybody just went anyplace 
that they wanted. Many times you would see some of those St. Charles Avenue 
bunch right in one of those honky tonks. They was around—they called 
theirselves slumming, I guess, but they was there, just the same. Nudging elbows 
with all the big bums. (19)	  
He goes on to describe less “free and easy” times including a deadly race riot in 1900, his 
exploits as a pool shark, and even some of the more bawdy and sexually explicit tunes that he 
and others would play in the honkytonks and brothels of era.  
 From time to time, Morton lets his prejudices show, by commenting on the ugliness or 
“thick lips” of the darker African Americans that he was associated with. Morton guarded his 
liminal status as a Creole and while he credits many of his African American colleagues as 
sharing in his authorship of jazz, he is often quick to point out their otherness. The performance 
of race was important to Morton. He was born into a middle-class French-European family of 
African decent and was part of a racial group generally designated “Creole of color.” The lighter-
skinned Creoles in New Orleans had, by 1904, been part of a long, complicated, and increasingly 
bitter struggle for social status in an increasingly Black and/or White racial public sphere. Jazz 
historian Burton Peretti remarks that “Creoles of color […], caught between a growing 
‘American Negro’ population and increasingly intolerant whites, developed an intense caste 
consciousness in these years”—one where “downtown creoles” looked down their noses at 
“uptown Negros”—and this view was reinforced by the starkly racialized social arrangement 
(24-25). The larger mythos of jazz, then, was knit to the history of struggle between competing 
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classist and racial ideologies. Morton’s epideictic rhetorics are evidence of the ways an active 
participant within that sociocultural context embodied that struggle. The rhetorics also then 
reinscribe and reinstantiate the politics of that struggle for the wider audience of the Library. 
Morton’s frequent references to the sometimes-symbiotic/sometimes-not relationship between 
African American and Creole American musicians in New Orleans around the turn of the 
twentieth century indicates that the sessions with Lomax were important to Morton in forwarding 
Creole-ness as one of the “essential” elements of jazz’s genesis. 
  
Virtuosity and “Hotness” 
“Two neighborhoods, disjoined by all the sordid fears of our time, were forced to make a 
common cause. This musical union demanded that there be not merely acceptance and 
understanding, but respect and love on both sides. In this moment of ecstasy an interracial 
marriage was consummated, and the child of this union still jumps for joy wherever jazz is hot.”  
 
Alan Lomax, Mister Jelly Roll, 122 
 
The racial tension within the adjacent districts of New Orleans had a peculiar effect on 
the developing musical landscape and created one of the early synonyms for jazz music: “hot” 
playing. Hot playing was a way of acknowledging a certain kind of virtuosic performance—one 
tied to extraordinary skill but also to racial identity and, by extension, the tenuous race relations 
mentioned above in turn-of-the-century New Orleans. In 1949, and as part of his work 
researching the book that would become Mr. Jelly Roll: The Fortunes of Jelly Roll Morton, New 
Orleans Creole and “Inventor of Jazz” (1950), Alan Lomax recorded an interview with Dr. 
Leonard Bechet (brother of the legendary saxophonist and clarinetist Sidney Bechet) and asked 
him to describe this moment in New Orleans history and jazz mythology. Bechet’s response 
helps to understand the connection between racial identity and musical style:  
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You have to play with all varieties of people. Some of the Creole musicians didn’t 
like the idea of mixing up with the—well, the rougher class, and so they never 
went too far. You see, [Alphonse] Picou—Picou’s a very good clarinet, but he 
ain’t hot. That’s because he wouldn’t mix so much.  
You have to play real hard when you play for Negroes. You got to go 
some, if you want to avoid their criticism. You got to come up to their mark, you 
understand? If you do, you get that drive. Bolden had it. Bunk had it. Manuel 
Perez, the best ragtime Creole trumpet, he didn't have it. 
See, these hot people they play like they killing themselves, you 
understand? That's the kind of effort that Louis Armstrong and Freddy Keppard 
put in there. If you want to hit the high notes those boys hit, brother, you got to 
work for that. (Lomax 98). 
Hot playing was a style—a kind of intensity applied to the music—and was generally the product 
of the alchemy of a culturally-mixed and racially-diverse influence. Hot playing modified the 
standard melody through deconstruction, modification, improvisation, and reconstitution. For 
most, these modifications weren’t easy to classify technically—knowing “hotness” was in the 
performance, not the definition. Bechet has trouble defining hotness as anything other than 
something that the greats either had or didn’t. It wasn’t technical but you could feel it. Hot 
players played hard, were driving and were working so hard at being hot that it sounded like it 
was “killing” them. Also, hotness was also a kind of racial gatekeeper. From Bechet’s 
description, it appears that hotness was a quality generally only performed by the best African 
American players and one’s ability to match that intensity was part of the sociopolitical 
requirements for successful interaction and collaboration between races.  
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“Hotness,” then, stands in as an early notch on the thermostat of jazz’s complex creation 
myth—as an aural epideictic designator of a certain kind of shared praiseworthy virtuosity. 
Hotness was part of jazz’s aretē. If you were a hot player (or knew how to recognize what “hot” 
was), you were keyed into a certain standard of excellence that was marked as valuable in an 
emergent community. Those values were centered most prominently in the music, but might also 
understood as reflective, resonant, or respondent to the tumult and general upheaval of the civic 
value system that had been mounting for years within the city of New Orleans and others like it. 
Morton shows off this hotness in his song “Tiger Rag.” He also begins to explain the ways that 
jazz as a creative process combining embodied experience and specific virtuosic skills works. 
  
“Tiger Rag”: Jazz is style “you can apply to any type tune.” 
Late in the sessions, Morton moves to a demonstration of his composition methods for 
the song “Tiger Rag.” In so doing he begins to nuance his claim as “inventor” of jazz. This 
begins in his assertion that jazz is not necessarily a genre or type of music separate from other 
genres, but rather something more accurately defined as a style that “you can apply to any type 
tune . . . depend[ing] on your ability for transformation” (Morton 36). Like many of the songs 
Morton played for the Library of Congress archive, the origins and authorship of the song “Tiger 
Rag” are contested. The Original Dixieland Jass Band first recorded it in 1917.47 They recorded 
it again the next year and the record sold a million copies. “Tiger Rag” would subsequently go 
on to become a jazz standard and by 1938 when Morton claimed authorship, it would have been 
as well known in the popular American landscape as any song on an “oldies” radio station might 
be now. Morton demonstrated his claim to authorship in an interesting way. He did not actually 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Incidentally, it was around this time that the common spelling would change to “jazz” and the Original Dixieland 
Jazz Band would follow suit.  
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make a strong claim for composition of the piece, but rather for his “ability for transformation” 
(36) of “an old quadrille” (31) that it was based upon. The quadrille was an historic form of 
music dating to 18th century France composed to accompany a “mulitsectioned, multithemed” 
French dance for couples into what would come to be known as the “Tiger Rag.” This 
transformation is performed over several tracks in the archival material. Morton begins by 
introducing the tune by way of the quadrille form and tying it to the beginnings of jazz:  
Now jazz started in New Orleans. And this, uh, “Tiger Rag” happened to be 
transformed from an old quadrille that was in many different tempos. And I’ll, no 
doubt, give you an idea how it went. This was the introduction, meaning that 
everyone was supposed to get their partners. [Plays introduction.] “Get your 
partners, everybody, get your partners!” And people would be rushing around the 
hall getting their partners. And maybe—have maybe five minutes lapsed between 
that time—and, of course, they’d start it over again and that was the first part of it. 
(Morton 31) 
Morton’s biographer John Szwed points out that ex-slaves interviewed for a WPA project 
said that the “dances most often remembered from slavery days were contra dances (or 
“contredanses”), square dances, the cotillion, the waltz, and the quadrille” (Morton 37). The 
quadrille as a form exemplifies Morton’s contention that jazz used ideas drawn from operas, 
symphonies, and overtures. Said Morton: “There is nothing finer than jazz music … because it 
comes from everything of the finest class music” (36). So too did the quadrille. Jazz historian 
Thornton Hagert teaches that “Quadrilles [were made up of] music [from] bits of popular songs 
or snatches from opera arias” (41). Borrowing, improvising, and stitching together was the norm 
for jazz as Morton begins to theorize it, but the musical curator would also need a set of 
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practiced skills to apply to those tunes in order to bring the disparate parts and melodies into a 
single stylized whole. After he plays the fifth strain of the quadrille, the strain carrying the 
melody he claims Tiger Rag is drawn from, Morton says: 
Now I will show you how it was transformed. It happened to be transformed by 
your performer [meaning himself] at this particular time. “Tiger Rag,” for your 
approval. 
Alan Lomax: Who named it the “Tiger Rag”? 
Jelly Roll Morton: I also named it. Came from the way that I played it by making 
the “tiger” on my elbow. […] A— a person said once, “It sounds like a tiger 
hollerin’.” I said, “Fine.” To myself, I said, “That’s the name.” So, I’ll play it for 
you. (Morton 32) 
The transformation is marked mainly by Morton’s flourishes and a slight uptick in the tempo of 
the piece. The underlying melody is still there but the song takes on a different character with 
extensions and exaggerations of the melody here, improvisations there, and movement between 
riffs and figures each of which represented forms that, according to Morton, might be applied to 
any tune, from any tradition, dependent on the virtuosity of the players in the band. Again, 
Morton claimed, jazz was a style that could be applied to any type of tune. 
As such, he definitively declares that he made this transformation “many years before the 
[Original] Dixieland [Jass Band] had ever started” (Morton 32) using his music and technique as 
evidence for his claim. In this case his argument rests mainly on the melody he constructs in the 
fifth strain of the unnamed “old” quadrille. If Morton is indeed the author, it makes sense that 
that fifth strain would bare resemblance to the song, “Tiger Rag,” developed from it. If he is not 
the author, the fifth strain would have to be backward engineered into a pared down version. 
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Morton was capable of both, of course and so, again, the implicit argument has more to do with 
his technique and style than it does some kind of indisputable piece of evidence. Though it is 
somewhat paradoxical to his claims for invention, note also that it is his assertion of the 
transformation taking place from the fifth strain to what he names “Tiger Rag” that seems most 
important to him in this description. This slight semantic change marks a shift in the sessions. 
While Morton’s argument thus far had been centered on the idea of invention and creation, he 
moves now to the more conservative (and more persuasive) assertion that jazz wasn’t, in fact, 
something one could invent. As Szwed posits, “[Morton] never truly claimed to have invented 
jazz, only to have transformed music into jazz” (Jelly Roll Morton 33). The recording of his 
transformation of “Tiger Rag” offers compelling evidence for that claim. Morton is never that 
interested in arguing for the originality of a song only that he was the one who developed tools 
for jazz transformation. He is always, therefore, anxious to show off how a tune would or should 
be played in the jazz vernacular and in performing the elements within the song that tie it to turn-
of-the-century New Orleans. For example, the section of the song that Morton describes as 
“making the ‘tiger’ on my elbow” is compelling. He is referring to a section in the song where 
each first beat in the measure is played in the low notes on the piano with his left arm and elbow. 
The effect is not unlike the sound of a large cat growling or grunting. This stylistic flourish is a 
bit of a trademark for Morton but also appears in nearly every version of the song that follows 
when it is picked up as a jazz standard. 
  
(Re)constituting the Jazz Mythos: Elements of Virtuosity 
Soon after the “Tiger Rag” section, Morton continues to flesh out his rhetoric of jazz. 
“Every musician in America had the wrong understanding about jazz music,” he says 
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hyperbolically (Morton 36). “[S]omehow or another it got into the dictionary that jazz was 
considered a lot of blatant noise and discordant tones” (36). High tempo playing was a parlor 
trick of many ragtime pianists and it was easier to fake good musicianship when you fudged the 
details because of speed. But high tempo playing was the paragon of swing-era jazz. Louis 
Armstrong’s orchestras were known for their break-neck speeds. Morton admired Armstrong but 
was critical of the ways that tempo was placed before style during the various evolutions of jazz 
up until the Lomax sessions. Speed didn’t necessarily add up to “jazz,” but rather, a collection of 
virtuosic skills and intuitive affectations did. Again, Morton insists that jazz is something “you 
can apply to any type tune” depending on your “ability for transformation” and not on your 
ability to play quick and loud:  
Jazz music is to be played sweet, soft, plenty rhythm. When you have your plenty 
rhythm with your plenty swing, it becomes beautiful. To start with, you can’t 
make crescendos and diminuendos when one is playing triple forte. You’ve got to 
be able to come down in order to go up. If a glass of water is full, you can’t fill it 
any more. But if you have a half a glass you have an opportunity to put more 
water in it. And jazz music is based on the same principles. (36) 
He then plays a tune in order to demonstrate these qualities. The song is an improvisation and, 
when asked by Lomax for a name, he doesn’t have one. Instead it’s “just a number that I thought 
I’d play awhile here, just to give a person a good idea.” (36-37). He modulates the song into 
double-time and then utilizes the moment to demonstrate one of the elements he’d earlier tried to 
explain to Lomax: the riff. “A riff is what you would call a foundation, as, like— you would 
walk on. Something that’s standard” (35). A jazz tune might modulate through several of these 
“standard” riffs. As Morton demonstrates a riff, it becomes clear that he’s speaking of a sort of 
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musical trope or figure—a way of “jazzing up” the melody—that can be applied to a section of a 
tune. Like a rhetorical trope or figure, riffs are standardized in a way that makes them tool-like. 
They can be moved from tune to tune and when applied, they enhance a melody. Morton’s 
decision to compose a melody on the spot to demonstrate this is interesting, though it might have 
been more instructional if he had chosen a well-known, non-jazz melody and then showed how 
that song could be “jazzed.”  
For Jelly Roll Morton, jazz was a flavor, a seasoning “tinge.” Later in the sessions he 
refers to another important jazz element and one that, for him, advances his thesis that New 
Orleans was the “cradle” of jazz. Before playing the song “New Orleans Blues,” Morton 
encourages the listener to pay attention to what he calls the “Spanish tinge.” “New Orleans 
Blues” was transformed into a “playable composition” in about 1902 and “All the black bands in 
the city of New Orleans” played it (Morton 104). “This has much to do with the typical jazz 
idea” he says, “If one can’t manage a way to put the tinges of Spanish in these tunes, they’ll 
never be able to get the right “season,” I may call it, for jazz music” (104). By acknowledging 
these “tinges” Morton “was calling attention to what some call the habanera, and others call the 
tango bass line” (Szwed, “Doctor Jazz” 33). There is some controversy around the place of these 
elements in jazz music as some critics saw them as merely a passing fad, but, as Szwed argues, 
“Those who ignored him erected a false evolutionary perspective that emphasized jazz as a 
radical break from the musical past, and by excluding the whole range of folk, ritual, and foreign 
musics from jazz history, all of the music of the United States was grossly oversimplified” (33). 
There were many other names for this way of playing. Including those mentioned above, some 
called tunes played in this style “slow drags” or “sashays” and often with a beat pattern that 
differentiated from a straightforward 4/4 European rhythm. Instead, the rhythmic patterns would 
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have syncopation or different emphases in their eight-beat cycles. And while Morton designated 
this style of polyrhythmic playing as Spanish, the “Spanish” part was likely a misnomer “since 
this rhythm figure does not appear to be specifically Spanish or even Latin” (33). Instead, this 
type of playing is a characteristic of much of sub-Saharan African music and could be found in 
Brazil, Jamaica, Haiti, and other traditions that had come to influence African-American musical 
traditions, especially in New Orleans. Morton recognizes this rhythmic flavor in jazz because it 
had circulated within African American music for decades. You could hear it in the offbeat 
accents and syncopations of ragtime and early jazz but also in the rhythms of rural Black 
religious songs and early blues. Whereas “riffs” were generally musical in nature, the “tinge” 
was a rhythmic trope (though it often had the accompanying “habanara bass line”). These 
rhythms were and still are “at the heart of the famous New Orleans ‘second line’ beat, a pattern 
so widely shared by New Orleans musicians that it constitutes the center of that city’s party and 
parade tradition” (33). They also wind their way in and out of early rock & roll.  
The “Spanish tinge” falls in among Jelly Roll Morton’s rich repertoire of performed 
virtuosic evidence, each of which combine to demonstrate his cognizance of the primordial 
elements essential to the jazz sound as well as his deep knowledge of jazz’s cultural value 
system, from “hotness,” to “transformation,” to riffing, and beyond. Morton’s rhythmic rhetoric 
is a demonstration that mythos and aretē persist in their resilience as epideictic tools for the 
building of cultural systems of value and virtue. I conclude here, then, with a reminder of 
music’s power within embedded networks of historicized rhetoricity. For instance, the current 
obsession with ironic imitation in popular music is as well disposed for this kind of sonic 
rhetorical analysis as the 1930s preoccupation with notions of cultural authenticity. In either case 
(and in any number of others), virtuosic musical performance has power to both synthesize and 
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re-present traditional cultural norms and create new mythos and revised values for the next 
generation. The substance of virtuosic performance—what it sounds like and what valued 
elements are performed—is always embedded within and contingent to the historical moment 
and its milieu. Jelly Roll Morton’s performance was particularly poignant. As I have sought to 
demonstrate, Morton revised the trajectory of jazz history itself and inserted himself into it as not 
only a participant, but as one of its prophets. 
Later in his life, Alan Lomax reflected back on his experience with Morton and oral 
history making:  
I later came to call this process ‘the cultural feedback system,’ where people talk 
their images into a recording instrument or into a film, and suddenly begin to find 
that they have importance, what they have to say is significant. All that came out 
of the Jelly Roll interview. . . . This was the first oral history, and that’s how it all 
began on the stage. Jelly Roll invented oral history, you might say.  
It was a process he would repeat to greater and lesser degrees with many others, from Woody 
Guthrie to many whose names are known mostly by archivists and experts.  
 
Postlude: A Dissonant Reframing of Jelly Roll’s Biographer 
“At that time Jazz was my worst enemy. Through the forces of radio, it was wiping out the music 
I cared about – traditional American folk music.”  
Alan Lomax, in Szwed 122 
 
Above and elsewhere in this chapter, I have included epigraph quotes from Alan Lomax 
related to his changing attitude about jazz, Jelly Roll Morton, and the Library of Congress 
session’s effects on his approach to his work as a folklorist and archivist. For the most part, my 
depiction of the younger Lomax in this chapter is, for the most part, a generous one. The Lomax 
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quotes I have included derive mainly from a work Lomax composed in the decade after the Jelly 
Roll sessions. Indeed, in 1950, twelve years after the Library of Congress sessions, nine years 
after Morton’s death, and after five years of work, Lomax published Mister Jelly Roll: The 
Fortunes of Jelly Roll Morton, New Orleans Creole and “Inventor of Jazz”. “I . . . spent five 
years trying to make my audience and my readers hear him as he talked,” he reported (qtd. in 
Szwed Alan Lomax 239). In the book (and perhaps not unlike the WPA books mentioned in the 
interlude preceding this chapter) Lomax carefully reconstructs Morton’s oral/aural narrative into 
a chronological framework giving it the historical logic of a traditional biographical accounting. 
Lomax starts in New Orleans in 1903 and moves forward city by city: Chicago, Los Angeles, 
Nevada, Arizona, Washington, New York and back to Chicago. To this history, Lomax adds 
information gathered from his interviews in New Orleans and elsewhere with people who knew 
Morton—old friends, band-mates, and acquaintances, family members, and his ex-wife Anita 
Gonzalez. In his reconstruction, Lomax takes poetic license in his recasting of Morton’s words 
for print. He smoothens, rearranges, corrects syntax occasionally, and props up Morton’s words 
with his own and with those of the interview participants mentioned above. Alongside the 
Library of Congress recording and the official transcription included in the box set released by 
Rounder, the book offers a third interpretation for scholars interested in the content reported on 
by Morton during the sessions but a very obvious recasting of the content there from its original 
source material.  
In 1950, however, the book was the first taste that a general public had of the Jelly Roll 
sessions. Again, as was the case for the WPA publications, print granted a large audience access 
to Jelly Roll’s story and was the primary access point for those interested in a more careful study 
of his life and work. The book was well received. It garnered over a hundred reviews, including 
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laudatory reviews from Louis Armstrong in the New York Times and Carl Sandburg in the 
Chicago Sun Times (Szwed, “Dr. Jazz” 31). Since then, critics and scholars of jazz history have 
begun to scrutinize Lomax’s approach, both within the book and in the sessions themselves. For 
example, Howard Reich and William Gaines cast a shadow of near villainy over Lomax in their 
recent book, Jelly’s Blues: The Life, Music, and Redemption of Jelly Roll Morton. They are 
particularly concerned that Lomax’s authorial agenda would get in the way of Morton’s during 
the sessions:  
Though Morton wanted to talk about music, Lomax grilled Morton about sex, 
mayhem, and murders in New Orleans, the sensational tales that Morton gave him 
reluctantly. To keep the bawdiest anecdotes flowing, Lomax repeatedly filled 
Morton’s glass with whiskey, and as he did, the stories became more colorful, 
raunchy, and exaggerated. The composer didn’t realize that by giving Lomax the 
dirt he wanted, he was helping to soil his own reputation for generations to come. 
(154) 
The biographers point out that while Lomax reports in Mr. Jelly Roll that he was incensed by 
Morton’s report that the pianist had been hoodwinked and insulted by his publishers Walter and 
Lester Melrose (who had cheated Morton out of royalties and claimed that he “couldn’t write 
music” ) Lomax had taken advantage of Morton in a similar way (Recich and Gaines 236-238). 
In a letter to his friend Walter Carew, Morton complains “I wonder how Lomax think that I don’t 
need money to live just the same as anyone else . . . I worked for months doing the [Library of 
Congress session] and it meant nothing to me fanatically” (qtd. in Reich and Gaines, 236). This 
report indicates a possibility that there may have been an unfulfilled promise of monetary 
compensation from Lomax to Morton. Reich and Gaines confirm that suspicion claiming that 
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though Lomax’s successful book Mister Jelly Roll was written largely in the first-person “voice” 
of Jelly Roll and drew on the Library of Congress recordings as the primary source, “Lomax 
didn’t share any of the proceeds with the composer’s estate” (236). Perhaps worse, they accuse 
Lomax of codifying “many of the myths that had long gathered around Morton’s name” in Mr. 
Jelly Roll, including an accusation that the book worked to essentialize Morton as a “self-
loathing Creole genius who hated his race, lied about his age, and exaggerated his achievements” 
(237). They claim that these caricatures misrepresent Morton to the public, undermining, I would 
add, Lomax’s original purpose of the Morton project—the defense of Morton’s voice and 
narrative to the story of jazz.  
 These accusations are, to an extent, true. Lomax did ply Morton with liquor during the 
Library of Congress sessions and he also kept all the royalties from his book, Mister Jelly Roll. 
The book, in many ways, does paint Morton with unflattering strokes—and certainly there is 
caricature. Often, however, that caricature emerges from Morton’s telling as much as it does 
from Lomax’s rendering. In fact, the years that Lomax worked on the book were spent working 
to supplement Morton’s narrative with other voices, historical and environmental context, as well 
as his own commentary in order to present a more complex portrait of the man than Morton 
himself relates in the sessions. While Reich and Gaines’s hostility toward Lomax seems directed 
at a perceived nefarious and unethical methodology, another underlying worry emerges and is 
expressed as an uneasiness that aural/oral history makes the interlocutor’s influence invisible to 
the audience. Lomax’s whiskey bottle, his leading questions, and his off-tape prompts and 
direction change the “natural” flow of Morton’s memory. Reich and Gaines prefer a “truer” 
representation of Morton, one “unfettered and unfiltered by anyone else’s preconceptions” one 
that they found “particularly his letters” (154). The primacy that Reich and Gaines’s lend to 
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written discourse is revealing of an underlying prejudice towards written over spoken evidence—
that invisible influences somehow disappear when producing a written document.  
Reich and Gaines’s apparent discourse prejudice aptly characterizes a position not 
uncommon to traditional historians. They are scholars of the paper trail. Their book, Jelly’s 
Blues, is built around a recently discovered and recovered memorabilia collection of William 
Russell, “an eccentric collector” who “had jammed more than a half a century’s worth of New 
Orleans memorabilia” into his small twenty-five by twelve living space (xi). The 65,000-piece 
collection was centered on Morton and included “historic correspondence, contracts, photos, and 
other bits and pieces of music history” (xii). In the presentation of their own historiographic 
method, Reich and Gaines infer that these tangible, written and photographic artifacts make 
indelible what, in the recordings is ephemeral. They point to “real” events with clear evidence 
represented through written documents, official records, playbills, and newspaper clippings. 
Their belief is that Morton is more accurately represented as a primary source when his letters 
are “unfettered and unfiltered” whereas his recorded interview sessions are compromised by the 
fettering filtration of another’s mediating presence. Reich and Gaines’ position raises questions 
related to the ways that historical discourse is mediated though its various sources, interlocutors, 
and modes. Marshall McLuhan’s famous epithet “The medium is the message” becomes all the 
more poignant when the medium is understood to be not just the prominent mediating 
technology carrying the message, but also includes the various mediators around that technology: 
technicians, producers, composers, editors, Lomaxes.  
Throughout the sessions, and as Reich and Gaines correctly point out, the listener cannot 
ignore the presence of Alan Lomax. And even though Szwed posits that as the sessions progress, 
Lomax’s questions “slowly faded as Morton found his rhythm, and Lomax became his audience” 
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(Szwed 124). Lomax is always an audience that talks back. He never completely fades into the 
background. Understanding Lomax’s role in the explicit and implicit dialectic on the tapes is 
important in order to understand the recordings themselves and also shed light on the eventual 
thesis of Lomax’s book. Indeed, the recordings themselves may be seen as the result of two 
competing (though not opposing) agendas. Morton’s, of course, was to argue his case as an 
original jazzman. Lomax, as you’ll remember, was initially interested to “see how much folk 
music a jazz musician knows” (qtd. in Szwed 9). Throughout the sessions, you can hear as these 
two communicative purposes come into conflict and conversation with one another, as 
sometimes the content of Morton’s music and stories meets the criteria of both men’s “motives” 
and other times either one or the other. And surely, the agendas of both men may have 
modulated a bit during the sessions. Morton, for example and as I stated earlier, begins the 
sessions by immediately playing “Alabama Bound” a song that he regards as evidence of his 
claim as a jazz originator. The song was also just what Lomax might have hoped to hear. 
“Alabama Bound” had a rich “folk” history. Early in the sessions, a new exigence emerges for 
Lomax, a new opportunity in both content and method. After about fifteen minutes of recording, 
Lomax says, “Jelly Roll, uh, tell us about yourself. Tell us where you were born, who your folks 
were, and when, and how” (Morton 7). This marks a shift in the dialogue. Lomax recognizes in 
this shift to a less-direct approach to meeting the goals of his agenda, a potential win-win. 
Morton has already, in the first several minutes, demonstrated his ability to produce compelling 
narrative, rich with names, places, and plots. Lomax is interested in Morton’s knowledge of folk 
music or music that sprung from the cultural landscape of his roots in New Orleans and 
elsewhere. The move to a life-story allows Morton to think of himself in the early contexts where 
that music might have been an active ingredient but it also moves Morton to the center of his 
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tale—it gives him control over where the dialogue will move. In the invitation toward the 
development of this larger biography, Lomax expresses a confidence that such a move will bring 
Morton’s agenda in productive overlap with his own. In this way, Morton and Lomax come to a 
sort of mutual-if-unspoken understanding about how the sessions will proceed. From time to 
time, either party will reassert their original agenda through a leading question or a comment 
from Morton that if he follows the requested thread, he’ll get off track. But in this give-and-take 
dialectic, motives are aligned, common ground found, and, as Kenneth Burke would call it, 
identification achieved. Morton and Lomax’s interaction demonstrate an “acting-together” 
(Rhetoric of Motives, 21) and exemplify the way that Burke’s notion of consubstantiality is a 
process of negotiated understanding leading to mutually satisfactory ends.  
So, Reich and Gaines are correct. Morton and Lomax have different motives and are 
therefore, by nature, always at odds, always divided. But that doesn’t mean that we should 
discount the product of their interaction as outside the realm of historical accuracy. Rather, we 
might see their negotiation and its various products as rhetorically and historically rich. In many 
ways, the recordings articulate Morton’s representation of his history filtered through the sub-
voicings of Lomax while Lomax’s book repurposes Morton’s voice and supplements it with 
others in order to tell a slightly different story. Any historian would argue that understanding 
Jelly Roll Morton (or Alan Lomax, for that matter) can never be accomplished in the 
consultation of a single authoritative source. The Library of Congress sessions with Morton are a 
reminder that rhetorical modes outside of textual representation, in this case aural/oral discourse, 
provide evidences and insights into historical circumstances that enrich subject understanding, 
complicate monologic historical narratives, and encourage a more nuanced understanding of 
history-making itself.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Alan Lomax on the Radio: 
The Folk Sounds of Broadcast Democracy on Columbia’s American School of the Air 
 
“The mistake is to think that communications will solve the problems of communication, that 
better wiring will eliminate the ghosts.”  
 
John Durham Peters, Speaking into the Air, 9 
 
“Radio was such an effective documentary medium, a central medium in the 1930s, because it 
inextricably joined the other two methods of persuasion, direct and vicarious. The listener 
witnessed firsthand, yet through another’s eyes. The relation of listener and speaker was 
paradoxical, and like all paradoxes unstable and unresolvable. The listener never could get from 
the speaker just the information he wanted as he wanted it, because to believe entirely he needed 
it firsthand. The speaker never could give the information he wanted as he wanted to.”  
 
William Stott, Documentary Expression, 9 
 
“Radio, more than any other agency, possessed the power not only to assert actively the unifying 
power of simultaneous experience but to communicate meanings about the nature of that 
unifying experience. Radio not only responded to the dominant social tensions of its era but, by 
addressing its audience’s situation directly in music, comedy, and narrative drama, made those 
tensions the subject of its constructed symbolic universe.” 
  
Michele Hilmes, Radio Voices: American Broadcasting, 1922-1952, 11-12 
 
Introduction: 
In the previous chapter, I focused on jazz musician Jelly Roll Morton’s attempt to revise 
history though the virtuosic performance of sonic and musical rhetorics. This epideictic aretē, I 
argued, was presented as a mixture of sonic practices, some dynamic—Morton’s spoken words 
and storytelling, his singing, the lyrics and tunes of the songs he played. Others were more 
embodied—Morton’s great musical skill, deep knowledge of jazz and New Orleans at the turn of 
the 20th century, and his ability to perform them so (seemingly) effortlessly were indicative and 
performative of particular kind of life-lived and of experiences-had. Together, Morton’s dynamic 
and embodied performances provided Lomax, the Library, and potential listeners with not just 
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the facts and figures of Morton’s New Orleans habitus, or even with a list of new jazz tunes to 
enjoy and learn, but with a complete jazz mythology presented in the combination of song, story, 
and skill. In the sessions, Morton positions himself as a professor of jazz and brings together 
each of these elements to provide a rich education—a standards-and practice-based pedagogy for 
understanding jazz history in a new way with himself occupying in a central roll in that history. 
Given the general cultural upheaval experienced in the US during the 1930s, this same 
kind of re-education was occurring along various levels throughout the cultural, political, and 
economic landscape. Indeed, Morton’s sonic rhetorics can be understood as emblematic of the 
refashioning of American culture occurring at large during this period—with thousands of skilled 
and even virtuosic individuals and agencies seeking to influence the sound and shape of a new 
“modern” America. As I explored in Chapter One, this refashioning was occurring within a 
milieu of competing political, cultural, and corporate ideologies with various leaders and 
movements seeking to repair, assuage, or take advantage of the pervasive uncertainty brought 
about through the ongoing Depression. In an effort to establish a new, distinctly American 
culture (one unmoored from European cultural ideals), artists and intellectuals worked to 
refashion or undermine old notions of cultural and artistic authority. This effort, which was 
anything but unified in its efforts, led to a burgeoning of cultural, intellectual, political, and 
artistic production. 
A (if not the) critical undercurrent guiding these tectonic shifts was the unprecedented 
rise of leftist political and ideological influence. This move constituted a distinct paradigmatic 
shift in the United States as up until the 1930s “the left had little influence on the cultures of the 
United States” (Denning 3). This changed dramatically during the Depression due to a number of 
contributing factors including (most prominently) widespread economic uncertainty and, in turn, 
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the rise of organizations and programs to guide Americans to a more secure financial footing. 
Unions and union collectives like the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) began to find 
prominence in order to make what jobs existed more secure. Under Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
influence (and not without significant suspicion and opposition), government programs in the 
form of New Deal legislation like the Works Progress Administration attempted to demonstrate 
how liberal government worked by putting citizens across the country to work. Educational 
reform was also an important, but often overlooked, component of these shifts. Influential ideas 
from philosopher John Dewey and others began in the 1930s to find practical application in 
school districts interested in promoting activity-based, student-centered learning activities 
focused, not only on reading, writing, and arithmetic, but also on making students good citizens. 
Schools, according to Dewey, were an opportunity for not just academic learning, but also 
models for character building and, by extension, civic democracy: “[E]ducation must be an 
active endeavor that connects classroom students to the ‘real’ world” (Bianchi 89). In his well-
known treatise on education, Education and Democracy, Dewey argued for the importance of 
cultivating a citizenry steeped in the habits of artful living, a philosophic ideal that I return and 
expound upon in the conclusion to this chapter, but of which participation in the material and 
cultural arts was an integral part. Dewey believed that an education invested in promoting the 
idyllic virtues of democracy would find success by emphasizing the cultivation of a distinct set 
of values, which, in turn, would shape attitudes toward culture, experience, and history. 
Accompanying and accelerating these trends was increased movement toward a “mass” 
American culture brought about through the unifying power and increasing ubiquity of 
mainstream media. The rise and mass-circulation of print culture in the 18th century began this 
trend as did the mid-19th century invention of telegraphy and, later, telephone and film 
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technologies. But the invention and popularization of radio would have a profound and markedly 
different affect on how the people of the United States understood themselves in relationship to 
one another. As William Stott observed, “Radio was the ideal medium for putting the audience in 
another man’s shoes. Unlike the written word, it offered a sense of intimate participation, the 
immediacy of the human voice and of spot-coverage” (90). Given its mass distribution, radio’s 
capacity for this faux intimacy—and for mass appeal—was remarkable. Indeed, “Broadcast had 
to incorporate the form of interpersonal talk into an utterly impersonal medium (Sterne, Sound 
Studies Reader 325). Not incidentally, speech departments in the 1930s and 1940s took it upon 
themselves to develop and offer courses where radio labs were built and students trained in a 
variety of techniques for broadcast speaking, but especially what was often called “radio 
speech”.48 The result of these and other efforts toward professionalizing radio speech and 
performance was that “audiences could have intense affective relationships with radio 
personalities, even though the broadcast was strictly impersonal in orientation” (325).  
These new imagined relationships between listener and speaker and also among the 
thousands of disparate-yet-together audience members (the so-called “masses”), challenged 
conventional notions of public and democratic interaction, particularly for those tied to a public-
square/town meeting ideal (with its attendant face-to-face dialectic and debate) for citizen 
interaction and community building. David Kennedy argues that radio “catalyzed the 
homogenization of American popular culture” and in so doing “assaulted the insularity of local 
communities” changing their shape and scope forever and promising to “revolutionize politics” 
(229). Further, he laments that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Between 1930 and 1940, there were nearly twenty articles were published in Quarterly Journal of Speech with the 
word “radio” in the title, ranging from Sherman P. Lawton’s “The Principles of Effective Radio Speaking” in 1930 
to H. L. Ewbank’s “Trends in Research in Radio Speech” in 1940.  
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Radio provided a means to concentrate and exercise power from the top, to bypass 
and shrink the influence of leaders and institutions that had previously mediated 
between individuals and local communities on the one side and the national 
political parties and the national government on the other. . . . The radio created a 
political environment unimaginably distinct from the give-and-take of the town 
meeting, which Thomas Jefferson had praised as “the best school of political 
liberty the world ever saw.” (229) 
Kennedy’s thoughts express a common anxiety of mass media’s effect on democracy and 
citizen engagement. These anxieties notwithstanding, the leaders of the various cultural 
movements of the 1930s—be they political, commercial, or cultural—would do their best to 
capitalize on radio’s mass appeal, its potential for mass-influence, and by extension, its power 
for shaping public opinion. The sound of the radio in the 1930s—it’s music, news, politics, 
drama, and comedy—is representative of any number of compromises and conquests between 
these various groups and their sometimes-competing, sometimes-conspiring interests.  
This chapter addresses these interests and their attendant movements, from leftist 
idealism to broadcast capitalism, in order to get a sense for how various attempts toward “mass-
influence” were motivated, theorized, and deployed. Put another way, this chapter explores 
several significant rhetorics of radio broadcasting in the 1930s. Explicit in this exploration will 
be an accounting for radio’s various sonic rhetorics and the powers seeking to control them 
including the effects (and affects) of broadcasting’s widening dissemination and, conversely, its 
various (indeed, “mass-“) receptions. My primary concern, however, will be to explain how, in 
the midst of this milieu, Alan Lomax came to be the host of a nationally broadcasted children’s 
radio program about folk music with no sponsor, and why such a show is significant given both 
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the larger commercial broadcasting trends at the time and also as the terminus of Lomax’s work 
during the decade. I trace Lomax’s career in the years leading up to the war with attention to his 
contribution to the Columbia Broadcast System’s (CBS) popular radio educational program 
American School of the Air (ASA). Lomax was the host of two different (and consecutive) shows 
for ASA, American Folk Song a program directed towards younger students, and later, 
Wellsprings of Music, a program produced for a more general audience. The development and 
success of these programs provides insight towards understanding radio’s rhetorical impact and 
educational potential given a vast (and often captive) broadcast audience. How, for example, did 
Lomax’s archive of folksongs for the Library of Congress come to be seen as “educational,” and 
just what exactly was the intended educational outcome of their use? And what happens when 
songs and vernacular voices recorded in prisons, hollers, roadsides, bars, living rooms, and any 
number of other “field” locations become, first, part of “mass” communication and later 
(potentially) popular culture? I show the ways the American School of the Air—and especially 
Lomax’s contributions—sonically encapsulated the ferment of leftist idealism, educational 
reform, and commercialism and how mass media contributed to the reconstitution of what it 
meant to be an American in the 1930s.  
I begin the chapter, then, with a brief accounting of the radio as a subject of scholarly 
inquiry. This work, especially that of cultural historians and theorists within Communication 
studies, is integral for understanding the relationship of radio to the cultural development of the 
United States. The 1930s present a number of key issues important to those working to 
understand how emerging communication technologies helped shape the developing cultural 
landscape in the United States, especially the emergence of mass media. Broadcasters at 
powerful national radio stations were able to imagine and project programming toward a new 
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collective—a “massive” audience listening disparately but simultaneously. “Mass” as a verbal 
antecedent of “-media,” “-culture” and especially “-audience” invites a variety of rhetorical 
analyses and so I explore radio’s various sonic rhetorics as they were being developed, deployed, 
and received over the air during that time.  
As mentioned, this exploration of radio culture in the 1930s is contextualized throughout 
with a discussion of Lomax’s activities during that time. This includes his continued work with 
the Library of Congress, his growing notoriety in Washington, and how he came to be affiliated 
with CBS and with radio broadcasting. This narrative is interwoven with a discussion of the 
political and ideological climate of the 1930s, including a discussion of the Popular Front 
movement, educational reform and philosophy, and the struggle against growing corporate 
broadcasting superstructures in effort to balance the commercialized content of the radio with 
alternative programing. This will lead to a brief case study addressing the theme, content, and 
participants of an episode of Lomax’s radio program for Columbia Broadcasting System 
including those responsible for its development, production, direction, and distribution. 
As the penultimate chapter in the dissertation (and the last that continues the Lomax 
narrative), I hope to be able to sound the meaningful resonance of Alan Lomax’s work as it 
extended across the 1930s while affiliated with the Library of Congress, from the prisons in 1933 
to the airwaves in 1939 and 1940. And while his programs on American School of the Air were 
far from an ideal or even representative presentation of his larger work (which he himself 
acknowledged), the programs, which were broadcast to millions of students and other listeners, 
underscore the great value placed on Lomax and his work during the decade. They are also 
symbolic of the variety of contrasting ideologies mentioned above and expanded upon below: 
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leftist politics, civic education, and the transformation of vernacular culture into popular, and by 
extension, national culture. 
 
Singing into the Air 
In his influential monograph Speaking into the Air (1999), John Durham Peters presents a 
cultural history of the idea of communication, “one of the characteristic concepts of the twentieth 
century” (1). For Peters, communication as an ideal evokes, “a utopia where nothing is 
misunderstood, hearts are open, and expression is uninhibited” (2). To know and to be known by 
an other completely is communication’s always-unfulfilled promise. Yet, we persist in trying. 
This ideal of interpersonal understanding has a long history. Peters reminds us that Plato’s 
Phaedrus was perhaps the first instance of communication being “defined in contrast to its 
perversion (by manipulation, rhetoric, and writing)” (8). Plato’s platform (one that has echoed 
across the millennia) is that oral communication’s re-mediations disrupt the potential for 
authentic interpersonal intercourse and increase the possibility for miscommunication. Peters 
underscores communication’s dualism, its lofty ideal of a shared mind and the impossibility of 
that reality, in a variety of terms: “telepathy” and “solipsism,” “bridge” and “chasm,” 
“connection” and “disconnection,” each of which express “the dream of instantaneous access and 
the nightmare of the labyrinth of solitude” (5). Communication understood in these terms 
becomes about managing the distance between these polarities—to experience relation, 
understanding, mutuality, interchange, disclosure, with an intended result of intimacy between 
(and despite) always disparate minds. Communication, Peter’s concludes, is “the project of 
reconciling self and other” (9). Communications (mind the ‘s’) technologies, from the hieroglyph 
to virtual reality, extend (as Plato feared) this project from the one-on-one/face-to-face to the 
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one-on-many/face-to-interface, distributing and democratizing intimacy, extending it to anyone 
willing, able, and properly equipped to interface with those communications.  
Plato’s anxieties about the possible miscommunication—or worse—manipulations 
possible with the introduction of the interface (and those implications for society’s well-being) 
remain our problems to solve. As Peters argues, “the scale, systematicity, and punitive 
effectiveness of mass-communicated symbols raise tough questions for the future of democracy” 
(11). These tough questions must address the potentials for communication (and by extension, 
rhetoric) to both “make or break political order” and for binding “a far-flung populace together 
for good or ill” (12, my emphases). Peters’s work is particularly useful for a study of 1930s radio 
due to his deft wrangling of early 20th century philosophers seeking to understand and explore 
the potentials and pitfalls of “communication” as it was being shaped and reshaped by emerging 
technology’s new media. Peters draws together five philosophical strands which can be 
understood as part of the social, political, and intellectual milieu which informed the 
development of the radio in the 1930s but which also continue to resonate with contemporary 
questions about media’s influence, dangers, and potential (which is the premise of Speaking into 
the Air).  
Drawing from several influential thinkers of the 1920s, Peters offers what he calls “five 
intertwined visions” of communication, each addressing various communicative nuances on the 
spectrum between telepathy and solipsism:  
1. Communication as the management (and potential manipulation) of mass 
opinion (Walter Lippman, Public Opinion; Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of 
Parliamentary Democracy; Georg Lukas, History and Class Consciousness)  
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2. Communication as a universal clarity of meaning (Ogden and Richards, The 
Meaning of Meaning),  
3. Communication as an “insurmountable barrier” (T. S. Elliot, The Waste Land; 
Franz Kafka, The Castle) (14) 
4. Communication as the “disclosure of otherness” (Heidegger, Being and Time) 
(19) 
5. Communication as the orchestration of practical action (John Dewey, The 
Public and its Problems, Experience and Nature).  
While a careful accounting for each of these strands is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
the echoes of many if not all of the above philosophies are present in the following sections and I 
expand on a few explicitly. Further, understanding the intellectual climate of the interwar period 
as containing a multiplicity of sometimes consonant and sometimes dissonant influential thought, 
is the sophistic framework wherein the various intertwining historical elements I wish to discuss 
resonate most effectively. The focus of this chapter’s later case study for example is, as I have 
mentioned, a radio program about folk music and as such may not seem that remarkable. But an 
educational radio program produced by a politically conscious and left-leaning national 
government employee (Lomax), for an audience of middle-class suburban white children, 
prominently featuring the music and cultural histories of African-American and other minority 
traditions, all under the funding of a huge corporate broadcasting company (CBS) is a 
remarkable endeavor indeed. Such a program brings together a number of the above 
communicative strands.  
For example, understood through Peters’s purview, Heidegger’s philosophy of “being 
with” forwards the notion that unless we completely isolate ourselves, the world presents us with 
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a constant stream of difference—people who are not us. Successful communication is not so 
much about being understood by others but instead “bearing oneself in such a way that one is 
open to hearing the other’s otherness” (Peters 16). Lomax’s radio program (not to mention the 
aim of his larger work) took a similar tack, literally bringing the sounds of “others” to the 
broadcast audience.  
John Dewey, a pragmatist in the tradition of Charles Sanders Peirce and William James, 
was interested in communication’s potential for community-building, of bringing people together 
towards common goals, interaction, and “participation in the creation of a collective world” 
(Peters 19). Dewey’s name and philosophies come up often in the literature as influential for 
those involved in educational broadcasting as it emerged in the 1930s, as he conceived of 
democracy as an engaged, participatory activity best modeled in the schools. Lomax’s program 
was no different. The children who listened to his American Folk Songs program on American 
School of the Air were encouraged to not just passively listen, but participate—to write and 
perform their own verses to the songs presented and to write Lomax with their results and also 
with questions about the folk tradition.  
Other strands connect as well. Mass-communication’s potential for propagandizing was 
celebrated by some on the radical left, such as the afore mentioned Georg Lukacs, whom, as a 
Marxist theoretician, saw the public opinion-shaping potentials for new communicative media as 
crucial to the revolutionary process. Revolutions need principle-focused participants and what 
better way to achieve this goal than in the propaganda of common slogans, songs, and rallying 
cries (12). Though expressed bluntly here, this kind of thinking wasn’t far from Lomax’s own 
beliefs. Promoting new American ideals required new American propaganda. The right folk 
songs—Woody Guthrie’s “This Land is Your Land” and not Irving Berlin’s saccharine “God 
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Bless America,” for example—should be an important component of that vision. In fact, as the 
US’s involvement in World War II became imminent, Lomax would encourage the various 
branches of the military to use regional folk music as part of the training programs, a method that 
would encourage (he thought) both community and patriotism.  
Finally, but certainly worth noting, is the recurrent theme of authenticity, or more 
specifically here, “authentic communication,” and how it manifest itself in the communications 
of the interwar period. One way this ideal was communicated was in Ogden and Richard’s thesis 
in The Meaning of Meaning. That thesis held that language’s great potential for 
miscommunication required a new system all together where “authentic” meaning could be 
communicated accurately. And while Ogden and Richards’s theory has been largely written off 
(with good reason), authenticity in communication was also a concern of Heidegger who saw 
communication’s ideal as an engagement between the “authentic selfhood” of two or more 
individuals, but also return as a dominant preoccupation of media theorists such as Walter Ong 
and Marshall McLuhan who sought to account for radio’s power and prominence by naming the 
sound of language a more authentically communicative representation of human being than those 
offered by print and visual media. Ong’s fascination with the sonic worlds of preliterate ancient 
oral cultures and his belief that such cultures were more connected—both to their communities 
and to a sense of cosmos—led to a hearty endorsement of radio. Radio’s potential for sonic 
saturation, he writes, “exploits to the maximum the old oral-aural structures, building up around 
the hearer the resonances, personalist loyalties, strong social or tribal feelings and responses, and 
special anxieties […] characteristic of the old oral-aural world” (The Presence of the Word 257-
258).49 McLuhan was similarly minded, stating in his well-known Understanding Media (1964) 
that radio was “a subliminal echo chamber of magical power to touch remote and forgotten 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 See also Ong’s Orality and Literacy (1982). 
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chords,” a “tribal drum” that promoted a collectivity not unlike “the ancient experience of 
kinship webs” (263-264). These influential ideas may strike the contemporary reader as 
hyperbolic (and perhaps even problematic), but are examples of the various ways that radio’s 
sonic power was being imagined, historicized, and explicitly tied to behavior that harkened to a 
more natural preliterate, “tribal” (and therefore more community-centered and authentic) 
humanity. 
  
Radio’s New Communities  
When radio became part of the national mainstream in the 1930s, its communicative 
power was not better or more effective than print was or had been, but it was different. These 
differences have been characterized in various ways. While Ong and McLuhan expressed them 
in terms of bodies in communion with one another and the cosmos, others have explored how 
radio and listening related to and expanded upon the imagination. “Listening to the radio” argues 
media historian and communication scholar Susan J. Douglas, “was like being a child again, 
having stories read to you and being expected to have—and use—a vivid imagination” (4). She 
continues, emphasizing the power of imagination in constructing an authentic self in diverse 
world:  
Unlike other major technologies—automobiles, airplanes, or trains—that move us 
from one place to another, radio has worked most powerfully inside our heads, 
helping us create internal maps of the world and our place in it, urging us to 
construct communities to which we do, or do not, belong. (5) 
This impulse to understand radio in terms of what imaginations it evokes is also one of the 
guiding theoretical principles of one of communication’s most noted scholars of the radio, 
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Michele Hilmes. In her monograph, Radio Voices: American Broadcasting, 1922-1952 (1997), 
Hilmes sites Benedict Anderson’s influential theory of “imagined communities” as central to 
understanding radio’s “unifying power of simultaneous experience” and what that unifying 
experience means for listeners (11). This simultaneity of experience was in distinction to mass 
print media, which, as Anderson explored, had been revolutionary in its ability to draw together 
audiences who could, by reading the same newspaper, imagine themselves as part of a larger 
grouping of engaged everyday citizens (Anderson 35).  
Radio’s simultaneity of experience enhanced the experience of belonging to the print-
based imagined communities Anderson theorized and bridged it with other common mediated 
experiences. Like print, radio was  
a system of productive relations driven by that hallmark of twentieth-century 
capitalism, advertising….[It was] a technology of communications significantly 
different from print, yet even more capable of negotiating not only the linguistic 
but the ethnic and cultural diversity brought about by the transformations of the 
modern age; and like film, a machine for the circulation of narratives and 
representations that rehearse and justify the structures of order underlying national 
identity. (Hilmes 12).  
Radio promoted an even more focused experience of unity, connection, and of communication 
(evoking Peters’s ideal explored in the previous section) “in its purest sense” (13). Citing an 
article that appeared in a 1922 issue of Colliers by Stanley Frost, Hilmes asserts that “Radio 
would unite a far-flung and disparate nation doing ‘more than any other agency in spreading 
mutual understanding to all sections of the country, to unifying our thoughts, ideals, and 
purposes, to making us a strong and well-knit people’” (13). Radio’s capacity to bridge huge 
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physical distances would not only begin to produce, for better or worse, a “homogenization of 
the American mind,” but would also “bring the public into remote private spaces” and in so 
doing, introduce the United States, more broadly, to itself (13-14). 50 In this sense, the new 
imagined community of the radio simultaneously produced an audience becoming more and 
more alike, but also becoming more and more aware of its many differences, particularly racial 
and ethnic difference.  
This new connectedness with the other held, in Hilmes words, both a “threat and a 
promise” (15): “In a society built on structured segmentation and social division as much as on 
its rhetoric of democratic equality,” she writes, “connectedness posed a danger to the 
preservation of those physical and geographic divisions supporting social distinctions…” (15). 
Included within these distinctions were those relating to race and ethnicity. Some early 
programs, like the wildly popular Amos & Andy (which combined minstrel show and vaudeville 
comedic stylings) maintained and even trafficked in the racial stereotypes of earlier generations. 
On the other hand, “race music,” a genre developed by commercial record companies to be sold 
to black customers, was now accessible to anyone with a radio who chose to dial it in, including 
a growing (and eventually booming) white suburban audience “threatening a cultural 
miscegenation that made self-appointed moral guardians apoplectic” (Douglas 18). Indeed, 
according to Susan Douglas, radio as a “passageway between white and black culture,” 
“simultaneously reinforced and profoundly destabilized white supremacy and racial segregation 
in the United States” (18). Listening, in many ways, was often an act of both acquiescence and 
rebellion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Note, however, that Hilmes’s work offers a popular, but perhaps too glossy, conception of radio’s reach and 
power to homogenize American experience. Literary historian Trish Loughran, for example, debunks the myth of 
print culture’s ability to create national monoculture in her monograph The Republic in Print: Print Culture in the 
Age of U.S. Nation Building, 1770-1870.  
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Radio’s unique impact on Western culture during the 1930s and 1940s, its capacity for 
communication in so many modes, its potential for creating and sustaining new communities of 
the air, as well as its quick rise to cultural centrality brought with it what Jonathan Sterne terms 
“new sonic cultures” (325). Radio “provided its listeners [with] a ‘new mental world’ and a ‘new 
type of auditory background for life’ structured by new modalities of listening and interaction 
(325). Given these modes, it is not difficult to understand the multiplicities and even conflicting 
debates around radio. These dualisms come up again and again in radio scholarship. Individual 
radio listeners were both isolated and “coupled” intimately with the sounds of the airwaves. 
Families gathered around dinner tables and living rooms and instead of conversing, sat passively 
listening to evening dramas or situation comedies. Yet, thousands of those same “passive” 
listeners sent letters in to actors and even characters on the shows they liked—some unable (or 
unwilling) to tell the difference between fact and fictional representation (Douglas 134). Radio’s 
keen ambivalences as “both passive and active” and at once “participating and withdrawing,” 
would, according to Sterne, make it a harbinger of (and amplifier for) post-structuralism, 
postmodernism, feminism, and other theories built in and through uncertainty and contradiction 
(325). Not incidentally, and with foundational work by McLuhan, Hilmes, Douglas, and others, 
Sterne identifies radio studies’ potential for interrogating collectivity as one of the possible 
origins for modern sound studies.  
This collectivity was an integral part of radio’s contradictory nature as its “collectives” 
were not the publics of the “sphere” Habermasian bourgeois coffeehouse, nor could they be 
characterized in quite the same way as newspaper print culture’s collective “public” of 
participants. Indeed, as Sterne points out, and as is apparent in the above discussion, “the 
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problem of radio’s collectivity”—the way it accounts for “relationships among concepts of 
audience, public, polity, and nation,”—should be central in studies of radio (325).  
 
 Airing Authenticity: Alan Lomax on the Radio 
By 1935s, over two thirds of American homes had a radio (Russo 155). Broadcasting had 
matured beyond its experimental and novelty phases of the first two decades of the century and 
into the realm of everyday experience. Recognized as an important “new media,” radio’s 
possibilities began to inspire innovation from citizen, artist, politician, and theoretician alike, 
each anxious to take advantage of radio’s powers of collectivity and coupling. The ubiquity of 
radio in the 1930s presented a country, now steeped in the ideals and industrialism of Henry 
Ford, with new opportunities for participating in both commercial mass-production and 
consumption. But instead of cars or cornflakes on the production line, Americans were recipients 
of the conveyer-belt presentation of mass culture. The sound of radio broadcasts, fueled by a 
steady stream of commercial advertising, regulated by the newly organized FCC, and directed at 
captive audiences across the country became a locus for debate for influential citizens across the 
country, from business executives to public intellectuals and from artists to radical politicians. 
At the center of these debates was a concern for radio and its broadcasters’ potential for 
influence—broadcasting’s epideictic power as a disseminator of cultural, political, and consumer 
values. Some feared that radio would create a monoculture and in so doing preempt the 
democratic process. Others believed the opposite—that political ideas could not only travel much 
further, but also that radio’s many channels and programs gave listeners freedom to access 
information and content in new and exciting.51 These opinions, which came in response to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 See the first chapter of Bruce Lenthall’s Radio’s America: The Rise of Modern Mass Media for a fascinating 
discussion related to this split in opinion over radio’s democratic potentials. Lenthall traces these opposing views in 
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radio’s increasingly central place in American lives and its potential for shaping lifestyle, 
inevitably produced intense debates about the power structures governing radio’s production and 
content. Columbia Broadcasting System’s American School of the Air might be understood as a 
compromise between various “collectivities,” corporate, governmental, an educational. Alan 
Lomax’s series on the program would introduce a listening audience—most of them school 
children—to programming and content that he believed to be unique. “It was the first time 
America had ever heard itself,” he would later say, “and it went into all the schools” (Eisenschitz 
52). But that programming should also be understood as the product of a number of competing 
interests.  
Whether it was, indeed, the “first time” Americans heard traditional music from “other” 
American traditions can be debated, but it is true enough that Lomax’s programs for American 
School of the Air introduced a musical American folklife to the nation’s children and educators 
in a variety that most had likely not yet encountered—especially when it featured the voices of 
African Americans. That said, music—including folk music—was a common subject in various 
educational programming and could be heard alongside other radio programs with educational 
content in the sciences, history, and the arts. For example, in 1938, the not-yet-famous Edward 
R. Murrow was working in Europe collecting and recording European folksongs for a similar 
program for the ASA, and American folksongs were used prominently in music-focused 
programs several years before Lomax’s program aired.  
Still, the diversity and depth of Lomax’s content and knowledge including his 
experiences as a field worker and an archivist brought to American School of the Air 
programming a sonic “authenticity” so fetishized during this period. Lomax’s ethos granted him 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the writings of two figures, culturally conservative economist William Orton and Marxist poet and journalist James 
Rorty.  
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wide popular acceptance: He was the “real deal” and so was his program. It helped that he also 
had at his disposal a growing network of friends and acquaintances like Lead Belly, Woody 
Guthrie, and Pete Seeger, who (like himself) had begun performing archival material publically 
and who were willing to contribute to the radio programs. And while it may seem odd that the 
field recordings themselves were never part of the radio program—only re-appropriations of 
them—producers (including Lomax) likely would not have even considered their use for on-air 
programming. Playing recorded music on the radio (let alone field recordings) was not yet a 
common radio practice. FCC regulations (and often the recording artists themselves) favored the 
use of live music on the air and it wasn’t until the mid forties that playing recorded music 
became mainstream practice (M. Fisher 11). For Lomax, it was the songs, and much less the 
material recordings, that were interesting and important. For contemporary listeners, however, it 
is with a particularly authentic American irony to note that songs recorded in the black prison 
yard were being silently repurposed by professional musicians in order to be made more 
accessible to the audiences inhabiting the country’s white suburban classrooms. 
 
Alan Lomax in Washington and New York 
1939 was watershed year for Alan Lomax. His reputation as curator at the Library of 
Congress had grown, as had his influence in New York where he attended Columbia University 
for a year in order to work on (but eventually abandon) a Master’s degree in anthropology. In 
New York, Lomax busied himself with a variety of projects, some self-directed, and other 
assignments from the Library. With his credential from the Library of Congress, he was brought 
on as a consultant for the recording divisions of RCA and Columbia. Lomax’s keen knowledge 
of American roots music was useful to the company for settling copyright disputes about song 
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origins that might otherwise take several months of correspondence and costly litigation to solve. 
Alan’s access to the commercial archives opened his eyes to the value of what were often known 
as “race” and “hillbilly” records. His preconceived notions about commercial recordings began 
to diminish, as he found music in the commercial archives very much like that he and his father 
had collected during their Southern trips in 1933 and 1934.  
Lomax began a systematic search through these archives, recruiting his sister Bess 
Lomax and his New York friend Pete Seeger to help him find quality recordings. His goal was to 
“develop a discography of the best American commercial recordings and organize them by artist, 
biographical information, title, geographical location and type of music, ‘so that the basis would 
be laid for a really intelligent study of American taste’” (Szwed 142). Said Lomax,  
My opinion is that the commercial recording companies have done a broader and 
more interesting job of recording American folk music than the folklorists and 
that every single item of recorded American rural, race, and popular material that 
they have in their current lists and plan to release in the future should be in our 
files. (Cohen 130) 
This comment was no small concession for a man who had spent the better part of a decade as a 
folklorist in the field, but no one before Lomax had taken commercially recorded music as 
seriously (Szwed 143). Lomax was surprised by the diversity of the recordings including several 
that exchanged or modulated stereotypical ballad tropes common in much of folk music for 
protest songs, recorded, “without the constraints or censorship of commercial interests” (143).  
Lomax’s growing notoriety around the country, particularly in New York and 
Washington, made such opportunities more and more common. But that growing fame and 
influence also began to make him target. Like many others working toward a more socially 
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conscious understanding of art and culture, Lomax became a subject of suspicion for those 
orchestrating the nascent Red Scare in the United States that would begin in earnest after the 
War. Often, Lomax confronted both of these realities simultaneously. In the summer of 1939 
Lomax was invited to perform at a special concert at the White House. Eleanor Roosevelt was 
the organizer for the event, which was being held as part of a visit from King George VI and 
Queen Elizabeth of England. The first lady asked composer and musicologist Charles Seeger to 
produce the concert and when Seeger couldn’t find any real cowboys who could sing the 
traditional Western songs he wanted at the performance, he asked Lomax to sing them. Lomax 
agreed and took his preparation for the concert very seriously. He never considered himself a 
professional musician, and, though he was asked to perform publically more and more often, it 
always made him uncomfortable. And now he was being asked to perform, not just for the 
President and First Lady, but for the King and Queen of England.  
Lomax’s reluctance was tempered by a sense of greater mission: “When the evening 
arrived,” Lomax’s biographer reports, “Alan was thinking about all those singers who had asked 
him to let them send a message to the president or Mrs. Roosevelt, messages he sometimes 
recorded, sometimes wrote out as letters for them. It was how he saw himself on his best days, as 
the people’s messenger” (Szwed 149). But Lomax’s ideological view of himself was in stark 
contrast with the way that he was treated once he arrived at the White House for the concert. 
Men in suits kept bumping into him. At first he thought they were just clumsy, but after it kept 
happening he figured out that they were secret service agents taking covert opportunities to frisk 
him. “They told me later that some woman who said she was my aunt had warned the FBI that 
her crazy nephew was going to blow up the building” (149).  
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Though the woman knew something about Lomax’s history most of her claims were 
outlandish and inconsequential. She knew that Lomax had been arrested while at Harvard for his 
involvement in a political demonstration organized by a radical leftist organization, but also 
claimed that during that time Lomax “had lived with a Russian-born Communist,” a “Jewess,” 
and that his current wife was a Communist (Szwed 150). She also claimed to have overheard a 
conversation he had with his father at a wedding confessing his identity as and support of the 
Communist party. Lomax pushed ahead with his part in the program that night at the White 
House, but even Eleanor Roosevelt would remember that on stage Alan looked “so frightened he 
could hardly sing” and that she “hoped fervently that he would not reach for his handkerchief 
during the performance” (Roosevelt 191).  
 
“Unless I Go Red”: Sounding Popular Front and Modernist Culture 
Alan Lomax was not a Communist, but he was sympathetic to some of the Party’s 
platforms and ideals. Indeed, Lomax was part of a growing number of citizens in the United 
States who identified with some ideals on the radical left but not others and therefore did not 
profess primary allegiance. Communism in the United States, then and now, has been fetishized. 
Lomax was subject to this fetishizing vis-à-vis government leaders like J. Edgar Hoover—a fever 
that would reach a particularly shrill pitch after the war and under the influence of Senator 
Joseph McCarthy. Michael Denning, a cultural historian and expert on the political and cultural 
climate of 1930s, argues that many contemporary historians have made a similar mistake when 
considering Communism’s place in the American landscape in the first half of the twentieth 
century. The variety of competing social and political ideologies, movements, and beliefs are 
often collapsed too easily and codified into the single idea of Communism, when really the 
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Communist party was only one of many circulating systems of belief organized by a much looser 
framework often designated as the “Popular Front.” Denning suggests that the “heart of the 
Popular Front as a social movement lay among those who were non-Communist socialists and 
independent leftists, working with Communists and with liberals, but marking out a culture that 
was neither a Party nor a liberal New Deal culture” (5). Such independent Leftists, Alan Lomax, 
Orson Wells, and Kenneth Burke among them, worked with but not for the Party. 
David Roediger calls those participating on the periphery the Communist Party “fellow 
travelers,” (qtd. in Denning 5) but, as Denning points out, the numbers of those on the periphery 
of the Party were far greater than those within it. Contributors to the Popular Front movement, 
with its union members, non-Party sympathizers, and others who—while not explicitly 
communists—were influenced by (and supportive of) some, but not all, Communist activities. 
Denning’s work on Popular Front ideals is crucial to understanding Lomax and cultural workers 
of the time as Denning is able to show that the Popular Front was part of a larger cultural shift 
during the era—a cultural front—that, promoted, for the first time, a diverse American populous. 
The Popular Front was made up of the “new America,” the “depression generation"—which was 
“the most working-class cohort in American history,” and was also ethnically diverse and as 
such had created “the multi-racial, multi-ethnic metropolises of modernism” (8).  
This modernism, as both an artistic movement and an increasingly public and economic 
one, might be understood as a vast merging of disparate narratives and a rhapsodic forging of a 
new “we” in the Constitutional “We the People.” This forging included a “paradoxical synthesis 
of competing nationalisms—pride in ethnic heritage and identity combined with an assertive 
Americanism—that might be called ‘ethnic Americanism’” (9). “Under the sign of the ‘people,’” 
Denning argues,  
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this Popular Front culture sought to forge ethnic and racial alliances, mediating 
between Anglo American culture, the culture of the ethnic workers, and African 
American culture, in part by reclaiming the figure of “America” itself, imagining 
an Americanism that would provide a usable past for ethnic workers, who were 
[generally] thought of as foreigners. (9)  
Modernism’s new multiplicities of thought, ethnicity, political ideology, and artistic taste stand 
in paradox, however, to the emerging concept of the “mass”: mass production, mass 
consumption, mass media, mass culture. Indeed, and echoing Jonathan Sterne’s sentiments 
expressed above, modernism might be understood in terms of these paradoxes and the tensions 
between the functionalist utilitarianism of Fordism’s assembly-line production model, the 
experimental art of the avant-garde, new progressive moral standards, and their accompanying 
class, gender, and even age struggles for prominence. “Thus,” Denning concludes,  
modernism came to be the expression of the dreams, discontents, and cultural 
contradictions of the disaffected young people of the predominantly Anglo 
bourgeoisie as they came to grips with the changes in the corporate economy and 
the changes of proper sexuality and gender roles, with the new imperialism, with 
the ‘foreign hordes’ of immigrant workers. (28) 
 
Popular Front Radio:  
Civic Education/Corporate Administration/Government Regulation—“Uplift and Sell” 
At the center of this cultural milieu was the radio—a medium with the power to project, 
promote, and proliferate all of these multiplicities. Radio’s potential for reaching a mass 
audience appealed to corporate advertisers and Popular Front adherents alike. The two groups 
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would find themselves in odd partnership during the 1930s—along with a third bedfellow, the 
United States government. Regulating legislation (or threat of legislation) would act as a buffer 
between competing corporate and Popular Front ideals and result in programs developed along a 
variety of trajectories. Programs like the hugely popular serial Amos & Andy were designed 
carefully (often by the advertisers themselves) to have a mass appeal. But Amos & Andy played 
alongside other programs such as the experimental Mercury Theater on the Air, which was 
produced by a troupe of Popular Front writers and actors led by Orson Wells. On the day before 
Halloween in 1938, the Mercury Theater on the Air broadcast Welles’s War of the Worlds, 
famously fooling many thousands of listeners that the country was experiencing an invasion 
from Mars. Welles’s reflection on that event is telling of the ways that radio was being 
challenged by non-corporate producers looking to balance the playing field:  
We were fed up with the way in which everything that came over this magic box, 
the radio, was being swallowed. [Radio in the 1930s] was a voice of authority. 
Too much so….It was time for someone to take some of the starch….out of some 
of that authority: hence my broadcast. (Brown 227, qtd in Lenthall 4) 
That programs like Mercury Theater on the Air existed at all is a testament to the way 
that the Popular Front influence, buoyed by some governmental support, was able to wrest a 
small amount of power from growing corporate influence. To be clear, Popular Front programs 
were rare and existed as part of a compromise for what was called “sustaining” non-commercial 
programming that came about as a result of the creation of the Communications Act of 1934 
which created the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). But that small gap created a 
large enough opening to allow for a variety of programming—experimental work like what 
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Welles was producing, but also (and especially) educational programming, including the 
development of long-term programs like CBS’s popular American School of the Air.  
The Communications Act of 1934 came at the conclusion of many years of debate and 
litigation. Broadcasters wanted more freedom to monetize the air, and in the end, that freedom 
was largely granted. There was, however an expectation—an implicit sense of responsibility 
carried by broadcasters—to be “the best possible custodians” of a dual mission within broadcast 
to mission, to both “uplift and sell” (Hilmes 188). Indeed, “conditions in the regulation of the 
broadcast industry made a visible commitment to public service and educational programming 
highly advisable” (140). In both anticipation and response to the Communications Act, both 
NBC and CBS instituted educational and so-called “cultural” programming starting in the early 
1930s. With an aim to “uplift,” cultural programming supplemented the regular schedule of news 
programs, soap operas, and dramatic and comedic serials. Broadcasters introduced programs that 
dramatized history, explored and explained classical music, as well as programming aimed at 
aimed at making public policy and politics more legible to the average citizen. This was, after 
all, the era of President Roosevelt’s famous Fireside Chats, perhaps the most famous example of 
radio’s power to strengthen (and propagandize) the democratic presidential ideals. As Robert 
McChesney explains,  
The commercial broadcasters had to convince the public and public officials that 
they were firmly committed to high-grade cultural and educational programming . 
. . . establishing a commitment to cultural programming was seen as being of 
fundamental importance in keeping increased government regulation or even 
radical reform at bay. Any and all network programs along these lines were 
heavily publicized by the networks. (115) 
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The sacrifices of such programs were also noted. In 1934, for example, CBS president William 
Paley reported that only 30% of its programming was supported by advertising and that the cost 
of the remaining 70% “was defrayed by revenues from this 30 per cent” (3). 
One way that the mission to “uplift” was taken up explicitly was through the 
development of programs produced specifically for the classroom. The power of radio as an 
educational tool was widely promoted. For example, in “The Radio Influences of Speech,” one 
of the many Quarterly Journal of Speech articles about radio published during this era, L. B. 
Tyson writes (somewhat hyperbolically): “It is a well-known fact that radio has become one of 
the greatest educational mediums in the world today. It is one of the most powerful factors in 
moulding [sic] public opinion. Every word that is uttered over the radio has its effect upon some 
person’s mind” (221). A variety of opinions emerged with strategies for making the best of that 
power. In a 1945 text called Teaching Through Radio by prominent Cleveland educator and 
broadcaster William B. Levenson, the author chronicles both his experience and expertise in 
educational radio. The first chapter contains a section called “How Can Radio Help?” Therein is 
a list of the virtues of radio education, which also serves as a useful litany for understanding the 
ways radio was conceived of pedagogically at the time. I have curated a short list of highlights 
below:  
• Radio is timely: “Radio presents and interprets the event while it is still current and 
before it becomes history, whereas textbooks and even magazines cannot do that.” (6) 
• Radio can give pupils a sense of participation: "When a child hears an ‘actuality’ 
program, such as a presidential inauguration or the opening session of Congress, he has a 
feeling of participation in the event and history becomes a living and vibrant experience.” 
(7) 
	   182 
• Radio can be an emotional force in the creation of desirable attitudes: In other words, 
radio can be a useful teaching method to aid in the accumulation of facts, “but in the 
whole process of democratic living, attitudes, not facts, are paramount.” (8) 
• Radio can be used to develop discrimination.  
In modern vernacular, that radio might help develop “discrimination” is a bit disconcerting. As 
Levenson explains, however, by discrimination he means the “development of good taste and the 
ability to make intelligent choices..." (8). In Levenson’s view, radio helps develop critical 
thinking based on a well-developed palate of “good” art, drama, literature, and music. The list 
includes several other virtues: “Radio can add authority” (in specialized areas, beyond that of the 
teacher), “Radio can integrate the learner's experience,” “Radio can challenge dogmatic 
teaching,” “Radio conquers space,” “Radio can help in continuous curriculum revision,” “Radio 
can ‘up-grade’ teaching skills,” and “Radio can interpret the schools to the community” (9-17). 
Despite these virtues, he promises (in all caps), “RADIO CANNOT REPLACE TEACHERS” 
(19).  
By the time of this text’s publishing in 1945, educational programming on the radio was 
at least a decade old and Levenson’s observations are those of a broadcaster’s long experience 
teaching with the medium. Particularly striking, then, is his section on the shaping of attitudes. 
Levenson’s description of radio’s epideictic power differentiates between the rote memorization 
of information and education’s power to transform the learner’s values:  
The conveyance of information is a comparatively simple phase of teaching. Far 
more difficult is the development of desirable attitudes […] Emotional drives 
have a powerful influence. Here is where radio can be of great help to the teacher, 
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for radio has learned to use drama and music, two potent forces for creating 
emotional impact” (8). 
Levenson understood the rhetorical power of both dramatic and musical oral performance, and 
without reservations, recommends them for use in sonic educational contexts.  
The list Levenson offers is both revealing of a particular moment educational history, but 
also in communication (and media) history itself. His observations are resonant with those that 
would be made subsequently about television and later the Internet. In fact, Levinson’s 
description of radio’s power to shape attitudes, taste, and culture, as well as the his observation 
that radio is “timely” and “participatory” is a foreshadowing of Marshall McLuhan’s theories of 
radio and other media that would emerge a few decades later in his Gutenberg Galaxy (1962) 
and Understanding Media (1964). Levinson’s pedagogy, however—one steeped in philosophies 
of civic mindfulness and engaged participation—was also the result of what media theorist 
Daniel J. Czitrom (1982) calls the “progressive sensibilities” of pragmatist thinkers, theorists, 
and teachers. This was particularly the case in the work of John Dewey, who was fascinated with 
the speed, power, and efficiency of media technology, but also with the “nearly mystical 
qualities” communication technology had for encouraging and enhancing sharing and 
participation (108).  
The influence of Dewey’s educational philosophies could be seen in the various “schools 
of the air” across the country, including Columbia’s. Indeed, Dewey’s educational influence was 
broad, but he had interest in “the political and social implications of modern communication” 
including radio, particularly “the durable tradition in American thought that has ascribed spiritual 
meaning to new communications technologies” (Czitrom 108). That “spiritual meaning” might 
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be ascribed again to the idea of communion, or more specifically radio’s power to make common 
and, by extension, to make society. In his Democracy and Education (1915), Dewey writes,  
Society not only continues to exist by transmission, by communication but it may 
fairly be said to exist in transmission, in communication. There is more than a 
verbal tie between the words common, community, and communication. Men live 
in virtue of the things they have in common; and communication is the way in 
which they come to possess things in common” (5).  
This idea of common people having a common experience and sharing common ground through 
ritual, aesthetics, and modern communication demonstrates the power and potential Dewey saw 
in the mediated arts. Dewey believed that art was the “paramount expression of communication 
as shared ritual” (Czitrom 109) and, in oft-quoted line from his 1934 book Art as Experience, 
Dewey wrote that artistic expression offered “the only media of complete and unhindered 
communication between man and man” (which hearkens back to John Durham Peters and the 
myth of perfect communication noted earlier) (110).  
What is important here, however, is that Dewey saw in these ideals a potential for what 
might be understood as an artful democracy—a reconceiving of education that served 
community by promoting what was “common” and away from an insistence upon the primacy of 
the individual. For Dewey, and as Czitrom argues, democratic theory that placed the individual 
at its center “was obsolete, or at least in dire need of repair”:  
For the machine age had “enormously expanded, multiplied, intensified, and 
complicated the scope of the indirect consequences” of conjoint behavior, 
forming “such immense and consolidated unions of action, on an interpersonal 
rather than a community basis, that the resultant public cannot identify and 
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distinguish itself.” There was too much public, a public too diffused and 
scattered. (Dewey qtd. In Czitrom 111)  
This argument implies that a diffused and disconnected public needs common artifacts, not as a 
means of producing same-thinking, but as a starting point—a common rhetoric of 
understanding—before the tangle of democratic difference emerges. Nathan Crick, a rhetorical 
scholar and Dewey expert, expands upon these notions, reminding us that the “commonness” of 
art (rhetoric itself being one of those arts), was central to Dewey’s conception of a new radical 
democracy, and with a Sophistic bent: “Dewey put great faith in the emancipatory potential of 
aesthetic experience, but his attitude toward art—as a mode of production—was wholly 
continuous with the Greek tradition that linked it not just to sculpture and painting, but also to 
industry, knowledge, and economy” (5). Crick invites us to take seriously the critique that 
Sophistic rhetoric “makes the weaker argument appear stronger” by embracing that principle as 
the kernel of radical democracy’s potential. Sophistic rhetoric’s power to disrupt hierarchies—
those institutions built upon the “stronger argument”—in order to first notice, then begin to 
understand, and finally identify with the minority view (with its so-called “weaker” arguments) 
is part of rhetoric’s promise. As Crick writes, 
to make a minority view into one accepted by the majority, one must seize the 
opportunity to envision new possibilities by making full use of the playfulness of 
language to break the engrained habits of thought of one’s audience through 
aesthetic performance that simultaneously critiques, advocates, and creates. (12) 
Folk music meets these qualifications almost perfectly. It is quintessentially an exercise in 
playful language use and when the songs were those from a minority viewpoint, that music had 
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power to not only offer a new perspective, but to break “engrained habits” and begin forging new 
ones.  
 
American School of the Air: “Columbia presents . . . FOLK MUSIC OF AMERICA”  
When Alan Lomax was offered the opportunity by CBS executive Davidson Taylor to 
develop a 25-episode series of programs for American School of the Air, he was reticent. He was 
no fan of radio, believing it to be a “waste of time” or, even worse, “a tool with the potential for 
fascistic manipulation” (Szwed 152). Famously, Lomax’s criticism of the radio didn’t stop short 
of the scatological: “I thought this was a joke. I didn’t know that anybody could be seriously 
interested in working on the radio, a pile of crap” (Eisenschitz 52). Lomax’s friend, popular front 
writer and director Nick Ray, would help convince him of radio’s potential for social 
commentary and change, partially by encouraging him to listen to the radio documentaries of 
Norman Corwin. After that, he said he “did a flip,” and that with the help of good scriptwriting 
and well-developed drama, “I realized that radio was a great art of the time” (52).  
American School of the Air was developed in partnership between CBS and the Board of 
Education of New York City. And while ASA had hosted a number of different kinds of 
educational programming over the years, Lomax’s program was to be a singularly unique 
endeavor: “It would be the most costly production radio had ever attempted, with four 
scriptwriters, ten actors, five producers, three commentators, a fifty-piece symphony orchestra, 
singers, educational directors, engineers, and announcers” (Szwed 152). Alan’s first series, 
American Folk Song would reach 120,000 classrooms (153). By its second season, when the 
program name was changed to “Wellsprings of Music” and the target audience broadened, an 
	   187 
estimated fifteen million listeners tuned in, school children and adults alike (165).52 “Each week, 
[Lomax] would present a new musical or social theme: British ballads in America, the gold rush, 
love songs, lumberjacks, railroads, sailors, the American Negro, the blues” (153). The shows 
proceeded with Lomax introducing each song with a brief historical vignette or anecdote about 
his travels after which he or a guest would perform a series of related songs on or around the 
topic. The music would often be supplemented by a bit of drama, acted out by the visiting guest 
singers. Each episode also featured a special orchestral reimagining of one or two of the folk 
tunes presented. Popular front and other popular composers were recruited and paid $400 for 
their work. Many participated: Aaron Copland, Ruth Crawford Seeger, Charles Seeger, Roy 
Harris, Henry Brant, Ross Lee Finney, William Grant Still, Nathaniel Dett and Ferde Grofe 
among them. This scenario, where the raw material for art was supplied by the “folk” and was 
then repurposed and refined by a “serious” artist and presented to the public via popular media 
was, “in the eyes of the high modernists of the times,” the way “culture was supposed to operate” 
(153). 
Despite his conversion, Lomax was still uneasy with the process. He was worried that the 
radio program would be a way of pandering or selling folk music to an audience who didn’t 
really appreciate it to begin with. The move to transform folk music into “high art” didn’t sit 
right with him either. Lomax was initially unimpressed by Aaron Copland, whose uninspired 
rendering of “John Henry” left Lomax wondering if the composer even understood the power 
and beauty of folk music. Copland would later catch the spirit of folk transference in his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 These listener projections, reported by John Szwed, call attention to a number of unknowns. Broadcast speculation 
about potential listeners is just that, speculation. The actual numbers of how many classrooms and students heard the 
program was likely much lower than the 15 million estimated “projected” listeners. Given radio’s open signal, it’s 
also impossible to know who else (besides students) was listening into the educational programs. So while the 
intended audience may have been limited to an imagined somewhat homogenous grouping of schoolchildren and 
their teachers, the actual audience could have been significantly more heterogeneous.  
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masterful repurposing of the Library of Congress’s recording of the fiddle-tune “Bonaparte’s 
Retreat” (played for the archive by William H. Stepp) which would become the central theme of 
Copland’s “Hoe-Down” in his well-known ballet, Rodeo. The question remained, however (and 
remains today) whether or not such remediation and repurposing was a legitimate pursuit. When 
thought of within its historical context, it is easy to understand why Lomax was opposed to the 
notion that folk art needed legitimizing through high-art transformation. In hindsight, however, it 
is easier to allow the appropriation of vernacular music traditions into “classical” settings as one 
of many legitimate avenues of the folk process.  
Lomax may have had his reservations, but his programs on American School of the Air 
were precisely what the Library of Congress hoped for in terms of publicity for the archival 
material. The library was thrilled with the hope that “the music it had recorded and collected 
would be the means of introducing all of America to its many parts and regions, while at the 
same time communicating the government’s interest in the vernacular arts of the country” 
(Szwed 153). The actual production process of the sessions tempered this vision for the music of 
the archive. Alan complained that producers of the radio program didn’t seem interested in the 
quality of the folk performances—his own, especially. His lack of confidence in his own abilities 
as a performer was only assuaged in a negotiation to hire other, more professional musicians. 
This action, which would introduce the nation to the talents of Woody Guthrie, Pete Seeger, 
Lead Belly, Josh White, and Burl Ives (among others), would also further undermine Lomax’s 
desire to bring vernacular voices to the nation. Instead, Lomax settled for an “authentic-enough” 
approach. He believed the musicians performing folk music on the program could do so in a way 
that represented the folk ethos most accurately in a way that would be accessible to the students 
on the other side of the radio broadcast. In fact, the one regular performer who did have 
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legitimate ties to a so-called “authentic” folk history was Lead Belly, but producers were 
concerned that his thick Southern accent was too difficult to understand for the broadcast 
audience. When they recommended a replacement for his spoken parts, Woody Guthrie was 
incensed and quit the program.  
Despite these reservations, bumps, and departures American Folk Songs was quite 
successful. So much so, in fact, that the National Association of Music Education (NAME) 
began including folk music in recommended curricula for public school teaching. NAME even 
awarded one episode (which featured Woody Guthrie) best Music Education Program (Szwed 
165). In Pix, CBS’s press release publication, Lomax was quoted as saying that the purpose of 
his program was “to show that America has an authentic music lore which should be as 
important and exciting to students as the works of great masters” (155).  
Quips like this notwithstanding, if there was tension between the competing ideologies of 
Lomax, the CBS producers, and the participating musicians that performed on the shows, they 
remained off-air. Indeed, the programs themselves created an illusion of fluidity between the folk 
and the expert or master-musician and students and teachers were encouraged to participate 
within that interrelationship. Teaching materials were prepared by Lomax and CBS to 
supplement the program with lesson plans and assignments. Students were encouraged to make 
up their own verses to the folk songs, thus furthering the folk process. They were also 
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African American Music on the Radio 
In a letter to a colleague written late in August 1939, Alan Lomax described the purpose 
of his program on American School of the Air as “aimed at stimulating the interest of children in 
. . . . very simple and straightforward presentations of American folk music and folklore” 
(Lomax, Letter to Richard Allen). And so it was. Folk Music of America relied on a very simple 
formula. Each episode began with a short introduction from ASA announcer Niles Welch, who 
would give that week’s episode some context and description before seguing into Lomax’s 
prepared content. Students listening would sometimes be entreated to join in, sing along, and 
participate in various ways. From there, Lomax introduces that week’s topic in greater detail 
before moving to a prepared dialogue. Those dialogues, each of them scripted and rehearsed for 
dramatic impact, further contextualize the music by inserting it into a narrative. Listeners could 
then be transported on board a fishing vessel in the Nantucket Sound in an episode on sea 
shanties, into a Tennessee holler to dance along to a fiddle tune, or out to the playground in an 
episode on children’s game songs. Each episode featured renditions of songs from the Library of 
Congress’s archive performed live, but then also had special arrangements of selected songs 
performed by the CBS orchestra. 
Like all American School of the Air programs, “Folk Music of America” was thirty 
minutes long and aired on CBS at 9:15 A.M (Bryson 19).  The first several episodes were 
produced with only Lomax behind the microphone and he had to handle everything: the stories, 
the instruction, and the singing. As might be expected, he was not yet acclimated to the realities 
of radio broadcasting and his performance left much to be desired. In a letter from Harold 
Spivacke, Chief of the Division of Music at the Library of Congress (and Lomax’s boss), 
Spivacke criticizes nearly every aspect of the first show: Lomax’s guitar playing (“I suggest that 
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you ask the orchestra guitarist to accompany you”), his nervous speaking (“you were a bit 
breathless”) and his inability to keep up with his script (“you must remember to practice a thing 
and repeat it a hundred times or more if necessary”) (Spivacke, letter to Alan Lomax). In 
subsequent episodes, Lomax became more comfortable, but also recruited a troupe of musicians 
to help him present the material. As noted above, those performers included Lomax’s friends and 
associates, Pete Seeger, Woody Guthrie, and Lead Belly among them. With Lomax’s help, CBS 
also recruited the Golden Gate Quartet, a well-known African American singing troupe, and also 
blues guitarist Josh White and singer Burl Ives whom (with Seeger, Guthrie, Lead Belly) would 
become key contributors to the various narratives and dramatics worked into the program. 
The teaching in the programs was usually implicit, with Lomax pausing only 
occasionally (if ever) to invite the students listening to participate or with any specific instruction 
to the audience. Explicit instructions generally came from the program’s announcer Niles Welch 
at the beginning of the program. In the following analysis I examine the content of one 
representative episode of the program in order to better understand the educational agenda of 
Folk Songs of America. I’m interested especially in how the program might it be understood as a 
part of the larger tapestry of the socio-historical movements and ideologies explored in the 
previous discussion. The episode that I explore is titled “Negro Work Songs” and appeared as 
part of a three-episode series exploring the “songs of the Negro.” I have chosen this episode 
because it draws directly on field recordings collected by Alan Lomax and his father John A. 
Lomax during their 1933 trips to Southern African-American prisons. In Chapter Two of this 
dissertation, I worked to show the complex relationships between the Lomaxes, the men they 
recorded, and the United States vis-à-vis the Library of Congress (as well as the Lomaxes’ 
various publications that followed). As noted earlier, the use of these field recordings on the 
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radio was precisely the kind of use that the Library had in mind for the archival music. But that 
African-American work songs were imagined as having pedagogical value for the largely white 
middleclass audience (of children, no less) raises a number of questions and is worth further 
analysis. The bulk of the remaining chapter will be an examination of the episode and work to 
determine the various rhetorics at play on Lomax’s program.  
 
“Work Songs of the American Negro” 
“There are only two important kinds of work songs in the United States:” Niles Welch 
declares at the opening of the February 20, 1940 episode of Folk Music of America, “the sea 
shanties . . . . and the work songs of the American Negro.” He continues, at length:  
Both serve the same purpose……..to make a hard job easier and pleasanter 
through the melody and particularly the rhythm of music. They are the natural 
expression of natively musical people to whom singing is as much a part of their 
lives as eating and drinking.  
Today, for our American School of the Air program on Negro Work 
Songs, Alan Lomax has as his guests the Golden Gate Quartet of Charlotte, North 
Carolina, and the famous Negro singer Huddie Ledbetter. In Negro work gangs 
throughout the South, each laborer is given a nickname by his comrades; and 
Hudie’s nickname of “Lead Belly” has become familiar to lovers of folk music all 
over the country.  
Alan and his father, John A. Lomax discovered Lead Belly in the 
southwestern Louisiana, and from his singing and guitar-playing they compiled 
the most important collection of southern work songs yet published.  
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Now in today’s broadcast we’re going to take you on a trip from Virginia down 
through South Carolina, Alabama and Mississippi and then up through Tennessee, 
Arkansas and Texas….following a gang of Negro laborers at their jobs of road-
building, cutting timber, hoeing the fields, and piling up the levees along the 
muddy rivers of the South. And there are two songs we want you to join the 
quartet in singing on the choruses. The first is “Stewball”, and your part, you’ll 
remember, goes like this:  
(LEAD BELLY AND QUARTET SING CHORUS OF “STEWBALL”) 
WELCH:  Then, the last song on today’s program is “The Gray Goose” and 
we want you to join the quartet on all the refrains Lead Belly sings:  
LEAD BELLY: (SINGS) ONE SUNDAY MORNIN’ 
WELCH:  And you sing: 
QUARTET:  LAWD, LAWD, LAWD 
(A. Lomax, “Negro Work Songs” transcript 1-2)53  
In this first segment, Welch introduces the program, the participants, and the theme of the 
episode. He also gives the listening audience a participatory task—to sing along during two of 
the songs. We also begin to get a sense for the program’s pedagogical and rhetorical 
underpinnings. Students of American Folk Songs are to be introduced to a particular facet of 
“folk life” and then invited to participate in that experience sonically. In this way, student 
listeners are able to have a breadth of proxy experiences: as seamen, African American laborers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 In the excerpts of the transcript I have transcribed here and below, I have been careful to maintain the format and 
casing of the text as it appears in the script, archived in the Folklife Center at the Library of Congress. Words spoken 
as part of the drama presented in the script appear in upper-case, while the introduction from Niles Welch as well as 
Alan Lomax’s initial framing are written with regular casing. While at the Library of Congress, I also listened to an 
archived recording of this and other episodes of American Folk Songs on reel-to-reel tapes. Acquiring the recordings 
for off-site use was not possible due to questions of copyright, which the national archives do not hold. 
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(as is presented here), lumberjacks, cowboys, balladeers, and square-dance callers, among others. 
Each subject is, no doubt, a vernacular trope and the songs reflect a codification of the traditional 
practice represented. Some attempt at nuance is attempted, however. “Work Songs” is one of 
three episodes focusing on African American vernacular tradition, with accompanying episodes 
on railroad work songs and gospel music.  
The program proceeds with a handoff to “folk music expert from the Library of 
Congress” Alan Lomax (A. Lomax, “Negro Work Songs” 3). His opening remarks exemplify the 
pedagogical approach of the program:  
Africa is the continent of work songs. Early explorers always report that their 
porters sang as they carried loads through the jungles or paddled their dugout 
canoes up the river. The natives sing while they are grinding grain, the blacksmith 
while he hammers his iron, the farmer as he clears his land. These people brought 
to this continent as laborers, naturally kept singing as they worked. Their 
employers soon found out that the Negroes did more work when they were 
singing. (3) 
There is much to unpack here. Indeed, it is difficult to listen to this depiction with twenty-first 
century ears and not hear its blatant and even egregious misrepresentations. Schoolroom listeners 
were entreated to imagine, with help from Lomax’s opening monologue, an African monoculture 
of singing workers who, once under the “employ” of their American captors, continued 
singing—“naturally”! However, the larger purpose of this opening paragraph speaks to the 
possibility of a more progressive purpose than the mere propagation of racist African-American 
stereotypes. The depiction of a world, for example, where Africans were industrious and 
productive before being “brought to this continent as laborers” runs counter to narratives 
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justifying their enslavement that may have still been in circulation in the early 20th century 
(Though, even this narrative may just substitute an old argument for African enslavement with a 
new one: Black Africans are a hardworking but dependent race and require the “guidance” of 
masters.) The depiction of African Americans on Lomax’s program would have also been 
competing directly with concurrent popular broadcasts like Amos & Andy, a program that, as 
noted earlier, trafficked in the comedic stylings of the blackface minstrel show.  
Lomax and the other writers of American Folk Songs had fifteen minutes to communicate 
something about African-American folklife that moved beyond these popular stereotypes. The 
replacing of old tropes with new slightly less racist ones is difficult to champion as a productive 
method of social progress, but it is, perhaps, the most important legacy of the program and of 
American School of the Air. Though there is much to critique in Lomax’s production, that 
critique is leavened when the program is contextualized within a larger timeframe of racial 
progress in the United States. Generationally speaking, the seeds sown in these radio programs 
may have contributed in productive ways to the shaping the ideas and beliefs of the listening 
students. Children listening in the late 1930s and early 1940s would grow to become the adults 
working, voting, and raising children of their own a generation later when civil rights had moved 
from a radical ideal of the 1930s to a popular movement of the 1960s.  
To its credit, Folksongs of America’s episode on African-American work songs finds its 
focus and does eventually acknowledge that those working for United States “employers” were 
actually slaves and that their singing was an accompaniment to the grueling nature of their work:  
“Singing seemed to enable them to endure the unbelievably long hours under the hot sun of the 
South. Sometimes a greatly talented singing leader was employed to do nothing but sing, so that 
the work would go faster. A sort of musical speed-up system” (A. Lomax, “Negro Work Songs” 
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4). Lomax goes on to describe the ways that work songs persisted after abolition and suggests 
that African-American labor was integral to the redevelopment of the South. Their song, Lomax 
infers, was at the heart of the work that went into clearing land, picking cotton, and building the 
roads, levees, and railroads that would bring the South into sync with the rest of the country. But 
also key to his description is the emphasis on the difficulty, pain, and even sorrow of that work. 
“They had the blues,” he announces, “and they sang them away on the job. Virginia, North 
Carolina, Georgia to Texas they were throwin’ them hammers” (4).  
This introduction to the first song, “Nine Pound Hammer,” is accompanied by a dialogue 
between members of the Golden Gate Quartet, acting in roles as laborers (and reproduced here as 
it appears in the transcript, in all caps, with a different voice picking up at every line break): 
SAY MAN HOW HEAVY IS THE HAMMERS ON THIS JOB? IT’S A NINE 
POUND HAMMER AN’ YOU GOT TO BE A MAN TO DRIVE IT.  
WELL BOY IF YOU WANT A MAN I’M A MAN FROM MONGT MEN. BUT 
I DON’T LIKE NO NINE POUND HAMMERS.  
THAT’S ALL WE GOT IN VIRGINIA ON THESE ROUND JOBS IS NINE 
POUND HAMMERS. 
AN WE GOT A BOSS THAT’LL MAKE YOU EITHER DRIVE THIS 
HAMMER OR LEAVE.  
AN CORN BREAD ON MOLASSES IS WHAT MAKES US MULES SO 
STRONG AROUND HERE.  
YEAH A MAN CAN’T THROWN NO NINE POUND HAMMER ON NO EGG 
SANDWICH. 
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LOOK OUT HERE COME DE BOSS – MAN, LETS GET ON ‘WAY FROM 
HERE. 
BIZ [direction for on-air sound effects]: (SOUND OF HAMMER BEGINS) 
COME UP WID A LITTLE SUMPIN TO EASE MY TROUBLED MIND SO I 
CAN THROW THIS HAMMER, LITTLE BUDDY. (A. Lomax, “Negro Work 
Songs” 4-5) 
The Quartet then begins singing “Nine Pound Hammer,” a song that explicitly expresses 
the discomfort and dissatisfaction of day labor. Lyrics include phrases like, “Take this hammer . . 
. . carry it to the captain . . . . tell him I’m gone” interspersed with the rhythmic “Yow!” of the 
hammer strike. After the song concludes, the laborers continue their dialog:  
 MY HOME AIN’T HERE, IT’S FURTHER ON DOWN THE LINE. 
NORTH CAROLINA, VIRGINIA, GEORGIA, ALL THEM STATES AIN’T 
NOTHIN’ TO ME, IT’S JUST THE SAME OL’ SOUP WARMED OVER ALL 
THE TIME. […] 
SAME OL’ HOT BROILIN’ SUN 
SAME OL’ MAN OU THERE KEEPIN’ US ROLLIN’ DOWN THE LINE. 
SAME OL’ LOW WAGES. 
SAME OL’ NINE POUND HAMMER ALL DAY LONG DRIVE FROM SUN-
UP TO SUNDOWN.  
NOW DOWN HERE IN OL’ SOUTH CAROLINA THE MENS BE SINGIN AN 
OL’ SLAVERY-TIME SONG. (A. Lomax, “Negro Work Songs” 6-7) 
The narrative here, written for the broadcast by Alan Lomax, depicts a Southern dialect in the 
African-
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his several publications. Interestingly, the men of the Golden Gate Quartet had to be coached by 
Lead Belly on how to sing prison songs and speak in a similar “country” dialect (Szwed 163). 
Lomax’s insistence on a Southern AAVE dialect, present in both the song and the discussion 
(and other songs) that follows it, are indicative of the kind of shift that Lomax was seeking to 
promote related to African-American vernacular experience in the National imagination. This 
shift might be understood as update of the easy-going or easily-confounded simpleton caricature 
of minstrelsy and Amos & Andy (as a sonic cue in the AAVE) to a more nuanced depiction of the 
underpaid, overworked, and undervalued African-American labor force. In any case, it is a 
notable example of the way radio programs might contribute to Levenson’s above-noted shift in 
“attitude” activated here by Lomax through his program.  
This same theme continues in the next segment. The work has changed from hammering 
to saw work, and Lead Belly sings the stanzas of a song known by various titles, but later 
recorded by Lead Belly as “Ain’t Gonna Ring Dem Yallow Woman’s Do’Bells.” Sung to the 
rhythm of pulling a saw back and forth through lumber, “Ain’t Gonna Ring” also has a stunning 
depiction of an incarcerated or otherwise imprisoned African-American man:  
TAKE THESE STRIPES, STRIPES FROM ‘ROUND MY SHOULDER 
 TAKE THESE CHAINS, CHAINS FROM ROUND MY LEG 
 LAWD, THESE STRIPES, STRIPES THEY SHO’ DON’T WORRY ME 
BUT THESE CHAINS, CHAINS ‘BOUT TO KILL ME DEAD (A. Lomax, 
“Negro Work Songs” 9) 
The rest of the song depicts the quick sentencing of the singer for the crime of ringing an Asian 
woman’s doorbell. It is difficult to predict how this depiction of human suffering at the hands of 
an unsympathetic (implicitly white) justice system would play in a classroom. The several mixed 
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messages it sends about racial prejudice, including a reference to a lighter skinned “yallow” 
African-American woman (which is an abbreviated form of the offensive designator “high 
yellow”) alongside what seems to be an appeal to empathy for the transgressor), may have been 
confusing to children and teachers listening over the air. More likely, however, the song would 
have been taken in stride, with the central message again pointing to the injustice experienced by 
African Americans. From the perspective of those working on the production of the program, a 
song such as “Ain’t Gonna Ring,” which was part of Lead Belly’s frequently-performed 
repertoire, may have been chosen due to its depiction of a different kind of work (sawing). But 
its central blues message, so pervasive as to enshrined and circulated widely in the rhythms of a 
work song, is remarkable.  
The episode also introduces audiences to songs, such as “Stewball” and “Rock Island 
Line,” that would go on to have lasting popularity. While these songs present a less-explicit 
emphasis on African-American suffering, they too were first recorded by the Lomaxes during the 
Southern prison visits and are good examples of work songs about lighter subjects. Both also 
may have offered several entry points for further classroom conversation. “Stewball,” for 
example, is a song appropriated from an Irish song about a popular racehorse named “Skewball.” 
It was recorded by the Lomaxes in 1933 in a Mississippi State penitentiary and is featured as 
hoeing song on American Folk Songs. Notably, “Stewball” also receives an orchestral rendering 
in the episode and given the three versions of the song (Irish, African-American, and orchestral), 
a classroom discussion about what constitutes an “American” song would be fruitful.  
“Rock Island Line,” as I mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation, was a railroad 
song that would eventually become a huge hit in the United States. As its later popular success 
shows, “Rock Island Line” is the “catchiest” song featured on this episode of American Folk 
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Songs. The song is introduced as the end-point and distributor for lumber cut by day laborers 
and/or prisoners. The Rock Island Line is a “mighty good road” and the “road to ride,” but also 
serves as an example of genre mixing: Most obviously, “Rock Island Line” is an introduction to 
railroad songs (and Lomax would devote a whole future episode to others), but it also contains 
lyrics you might expect in a gospel tune (“Jesus died to save our sins, glory to God we gonna 
meet him again”), and also a game song (“A, B, C, double X Y Z, cats in the cupboard, but it 
don’t see me”) (16). The accompanying teaching manual encourages teachers to invite their 
students to add lyrics—refrains or new verses—to the featured songs. With its open genre 
potential, “Rock Island Line” would have been a perfect song for students to experiment with. 
After concluding “Rock Island Line” a member of the Golden Gate Quartet offers a short 
monologue that moves back to a more somber tone and describes the loneliness and unrelenting 
nature of work in the fields. The monologue reflects on the song “Ol’ Hannah” (or “Go Down, 
Old Hannah” as my earlier analysis in Chapter Two references the song): 
WHEN A MAN’S ON THE ROAD, HE CAN’T DEPEND ON NOBODY. HE 
CAN HAVE HIM A BUDDY, BUT HE GOT TO WATCH HIS BUDDY. 
THAT’S WHAT MAKE THE OL’ ROAD SO LONESOME. DOWN’T HAVE 
NOBODY BUT YO’SE’F TO DEPEND ON. YET AN’ STILL WHEREVER HE 
GO, TRAVELER THROUGH GEORGIA, THROUGH ALABAMA, WALKIN’ 
TIES IN LOUISIANA, THROWIN’ HIS PICK IN TENNESSEE, HE GONNA 
FIN’ ONE FRIEND TO MEET HIM EVERY MORNIN’ WHEN HE RISE. I 
MEAN, OL’ HANNAH, I MEAN THE SUN. (A. Lomax, “Negro Work Songs” 
17) 
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The sun is the only reliable companion but is also a nuisance who, after “boilin’” and “beamin’” 
all day seems to stop at about three o’clock, “just stop an’ punish you.” Such is the sentiment 
expressed in the song’s lyrics: “Go down, old Hannah. Won’t you rise no more?” This treatment 
of loneliness is juxtaposed with the final, and perhaps most poignant, segment of the work songs 
episode, an exposition of the song “Grey Goose” and a recollection of the “Ol’ Slavy’y Days.” In 
those days (paraphrasing the script), slaves woke at four in the morning and worked until eight or 
nine at night. That work, be it plowing, hauling corn, chopping cotton, driving cows, or feeding 
pigs, was back-breaking: “You gotta be hard men to make it” (18). “And if you had anything to 
say about it, you better not say it. You better say it low an’ easy. You better make a joke about it. 
You better laugh about it” (18). This is the introduction to the song “Grey Goose”—a metaphor 
for the unbreakable persistence of slave life—and by extension, a powerful symbol of both 
hidden power and hope, even in the worst of circumstances:  
NOW PEOPLE IN THE OLDEN TIMES MADE UP A SONG ABOUT THIS. 
THEY MADE UP A SONG ABOUT THEMSELVES AND SUNG IT ABOUT 
A GREY GOOSE. THE OL’ GREY GOOSE, YOU COULDN’T STOP. 
DAY SHOT THAT GRET GOOSE AN’ PICKED HIM FOR SIX WEEKS.  
AN’ THAT DIDN’ STOP HIM. 
THEY COOKED HIM FOR SIX WEEKS. 
AN’ THAT DIDN’ STOP HIM.  
THEY CUT HIM, THEY THREW HIM TO THE HOGS, THEY PUT HIM UP 
AGAINST THE CIRCULAR SAW.  
AN’ THAT OL’ GREY GOOSE STILL LAUGHGIN’ AT ‘EM.  
HOW DID ALL THAT HAPPEN, MAN? 
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WELL LET’S GIT TO HOPIN’ HERE AN’ I’LL TELL YOU JUST ZACKLY 
HOW IT WAS. (Lomax, “Negro Work Songs” 19) 
“Grey Goose” is a comic song about an invincible magical bird. Saw blades break, hog 
teeth crack, guns explode, and no knife is sharp enough to kill the goose. Children are to sing 
along with the refrain, “Lawd, Lawd, Lawd,” even as they root for the goose to escape its next 
dangerous captor. Not unlike other popular trickster characters African-American (and more 
broadly, African) literature and folk traditions such as the Br’er Rabbit stories, the symbology of 
the Grey Goose invites listeners to consider both the injustice and absurdity of African-American 
captivity. Kathleen Glenister Roberts writes that while there is ongoing debate around the 
purpose and precise nature of meaning attached to Br’er Rabbit and other folk heroes often 
connected to African and African-American identity, “one thing is certain: . . . . Tricksters 
propel, without hesitation, the right of the individual to question inequalities in society” (176). 
Like Br’er Rabbit, the Grey Goose’s seeming invincibility “captures the audience’s imagination 
because [it] never closes off the option of freedom; [it] espouses the rhetoric of possibility and 
perhaps even inspires it in his listeners” (176). It is impossible to know whether students made 
these connections as they sang Grey Goose’s refrain (“Lawd, Lawd, Lawd”). Likely not. But, the 
rhetoric of possibility noted by Roberts was certainly present. Middle-class children listening to 
and singing along with the songs of an adjacent culture, but one with such strong implicit ties to 
their own freedom, is a striking example of Burke’s often-cited theory of identification. I 
conclude this chapter below with a short exploration of the possibilities of identification, 
including how contemporary scholars have theorized the notion, but also how similar notions 
were an integral part of the most influential thinkers (Burke among them) within the cultural and 
intellectual milieu described above.  
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Conclusion: Democracy’s Folk Possibilities for Identification through Rhetorical Listening  
In their book, Kenneth Burke in the 1930s, Ann George and Jack Selzer trace (but do not 
belabor) the development of Burke’s theory of identification through its nascent stages and as 
embedded within and respondent to the intellectual context of his 1930s environs. In ways that  
Shades of that theory, as I mention in Chapter One, can be traced through Permanence and 
Change but first becomes an explicit part of his published work in the 1937 work Attitudes 
Toward History. Significant to this chapter and also to the larger dissertation, Burke’s 
introduction to identification in that text comes during a discussion of epic poetry. “The epic is 
designed,” argues Burke,  
under primitive conditions, to make men “at home in” those conditions. It 
“accepts” the rigors of war (the basis of the tribe’s success) by magnifying the 
role of the warlike hero. Such magnification serves two purposes: It lends dignity 
to the necessities of existence, “advertising” courage and individual sacrifice for 
group advantage—and it enables the humble man to share the worth of the hero 
by the process of “identification.” The hero, real or legendary, thus risks himself 
and dies that others may be vicariously heroic . . . . The process of identification 
[…] dignifies any sense of persecution that may possess the individual, who may 
also feel himself marked for disaster. This sense of a flaw serves happily to 
promote an openness to realistic admonition—the invitation to seek the flaw in 
oneself promotes in the end the attitude of resignation. (44-45) 
This definition of identification as it begins to emerge in Burke’s late 1930s work as a meditation 
on the usefulness of poetic ideals and heroic figures resonates well with how a song like “Grey 
Goose” or “Nine Pound Hammer” might work to help reconstitute public opinion. The 
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promotion of African-American figures and symbols as subjects for heroic emulation—as folk 
metaphors for courage, perseverance, and hard work in the face of near impossible obstacles— 
might resign listeners of American Folk Songs to a reconstituted belief about African Americans 
as a larger group. In other words, exposure to and identification with the poetic materials of folk 
life can lead to new attitudes toward the real lives of those they represent.  
Of course, Burke’s theory develops beyond identification as a tool for interpreting poetry 
and toward a more complete reexamination of rhetoric’s power for encouraging understanding, 
cooperation, unification, and the “acting-together” possible when people experience mutual 
“consubstantiality.” 54 All of these, Burke, admits, are ideals—division is the default human 
condition. Identification retains its folksy earnestness “precisely because there is division. 
Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one another, there would 
be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity” (Rhetoric of Motives 22). Symbolic 
discourse, best expressed by Burke in poetic masterpieces, is useful in its power to create a 
“common substance of meaning” in the face of constant divisiveness: “The Wrangle of the 
Market Place, the flurries and flare-ups of the Human Barnyard, the Give and Take” and 
ultimately, “the War” (23). For Burke, and towards the argument I have sought to make in this 
chapter and throughout this dissertation, the promise of rhetoric is its potential for the co-creation 
of something “common” and it is the commonness of African-American folk music, not its 
political sophistication, that gave it power. Identification precedes persuasion (56).  
Krista Radcliffe draws the notion of identification and the problem of race relations 
together with the challenge to listen in her monograph Rhetorical Listening: Identification, 
Gender, Whiteness (2005). Rhetorical listening, as Radcliffe defines it, is a “stance of openness” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 His gestures toward the poetic remain, however. In A Rhetoric of Motives, Burke introduces identification within a 
discussion of Milton’s Samson Agonistes.  
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that advances the pursuit of understanding as part of the ongoing negotiation of difference (1). 
Rhetorical listening is a regimen to be employed during moments of “cross-cultural conduct” 
(17) and as such might be understood as identification in action. Radcliffe is particularly 
concerned with learning to “hear people’s intersecting identifications with gender and race” (17) 
and as such, is also about avoiding the impulse to displace listening—to not hear or ignore 
difference. Together with Nathan Crick’s claim that “the unique function of rhetoric in a 
democracy is to express and advance minority viewpoints in exigent circumstances such that 
they have the opportunity to transform public opinion” (12), Radcliffe would have us make a 
greater effort to become accustomed to listening to those expressions—especially if we find 
ourselves within the majority, or (expanding upon Burke here) experiencing what she calls 
“troubled identifications,” or “those identifications troubled by history, uneven power dynamics, 
and ignorance” (47).  
Race relations in the 1930s were certainly a mesh of troubled identifications. Rhetorical 
listening, Radcliffe teaches, does not collapse difference, neither does it seek to ignore the 
substance of what is troubling about those differences. Instead, listening as a rhetoric of attentive 
care makes the troubling aspects of dis-identification (injustices, inequality, power and privilege 
differentials) more audible and thus opens up new possibilities for understanding and 
discourse… possibly—no guarantees (66, 68). Rhetorical listening, for Radcliffe, is about 
humbly learning to recognize “interdependency among subjects” and out of that 
interdependency, building new avenues for accountability (73). Rhetorical listening, then, brings 
a profound ethics to Burke’s notion of identification and Dewey’s radical democracy, reminding 
us of what is at stake when we seek to teach about and work through differences.  
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A pedagogy that included listening to the radio program American Folk Songs on 
American School of the Air was a pedagogy attuned for rhetorical listening. Tuning in to the 
program was an opportunity for identification that did not ask anyone for votes, money, or 
immediate societal change. Instead, episodes like “Worksongs of the American Negro,” invited 
students and other listeners merely to consider the experience of the other, to imagine a 
community different from their own and, if possible, identify aspects of that experience worth 
deeper consideration. American Folk Songs was about learning to listen to difference, and, if you 
were so inclined, to sing along. 
 
Alan Lomax, a Coda  
 
Alan Lomax’s work for the Library of Congress would extend briefly into 1940s, but 
soon after the United States officially joined the war effort in 1941 Lomax found himself being 
investigation by the FBI, under suspicion, once again, for Communist activities. He denied 
affiliation, but when Lomax’s boss and supporter Archibald MacLeish was reappointed from the 
Library of Congress to a new position in the Office of War Information (OWI), Lomax resigned 
his position as Assistant in Charge of the Archive of Folk Song. Soon after, the FBI cleared his 
name of any suspicion and he went back to work for MacLeish at the OWI where his work 
involved building programs that would improve wartime morale and nationalism. As ever, 
Lomax was enthusiastic about this work and even joined the Army in 1944 where he served in 
stateside training camps before being discharged in 1946.  
After his official association with the United States government ended, Alan Lomax 
efforts as a folklorist and an educator persisted. He spent several more years doing fieldwork in 
the US and on the radio teaching people to listen to and appreciate the traditional music of the 
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Americas. He even won a Guggenheim Fellowship to aid him in that work. Eventually however, 
Red Scare pressure mounted again and Lomax, along with many of his friends including Pete 
Seeger, Orson Wells, and Aaron Copland were blacklisted. Lomax left the country in September 
of 1950 and spent much of the next decade overseas. While in Europe, however, he continued his 
work as a folklorist and made thousands of recordings that would become treasures to a number 
of countries and their national archives.  
Lomax returned to the United States in 1959 and continued his work for almost four more 
decades, drawing on new technologies to promote, developing new theories to understand, and 
always doing his best to champion vernacular and traditional music. In 1983, Lomax founded the 
Association for Cultural Equity on the Fine Arts Campus of New York City’s Hunter College. 
Cultural equity, he argued, was “the right of every culture to have equal time on the air and equal 
time in the classroom” (Pareles). This philosophy motivated Lomax’s work until his death on 
July 19, 2002. The New York Times published a tribute a few days later that summed Lomax’s 
method: “He did whatever was necessary to preserve traditional music and take it to a wider 
audience . . . Bob Dylan once described him as a ‘missionary’” (Pareles). Dylan’s descriptor is 
poignant as Alan Lomax, more than anything else perhaps, was a folk music evangelist.  
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Conclusion 
 
Rhetorical Folkness: Reanimating Ong in the Pursuit of Digital Humanity 
 
“I Can Feel it Coming in the Air Tonight”  
I conclude this dissertation with a somewhat off-topic confession, but one that will help 
to draw some connections between my work exploring the sonic rhetorics of the Lomax archive 
and the sonic rhetorics of such archives as we move toward increasingly digital futures. The 
confession is two-fold, actually, and starts with the odd admission that I am a big fan of Genesis 
drummer-turned pop superstar Phil Collins. The other, as I return to in a moment, is the 
confession that I am also a fan of Walter J. Ong. Both of these once-iconic figures have, with 
good reason, gone out of style.  
Recently, while searching YouTube for interesting Phil Collins tunes, I stumbled upon a 
version of “In the Air Tonight” sung by the choral group Choir! Choir! Choir!.55 Choir! is an ad-
hoc ensemble that meets in a bar in Toronto once a week to sing pop music. The group was 
formed by Daveed Goldman and Nobu Adilman and modeled after an Argentinean peña, which, 
as Goldman explains, “is just a place where people can go and hang out, even at 3 o'clock in the 
morning, and sit at tables with their guitars, drinking red wine or Coca-Cola, and stay up all night 
singing Salteño folk songs” (Meyers, “Choirstarters”). Goldman and Adilman’s choir operates 
on a completely volunteer, no-audition basis. Folks just show up and sing. Adilman directs the 
group and Goldman accompanies on guitar. Together, they arrange the harmonies and make the 
song selections, which range from A-ha’s classic “Take On Me” to Robyn’s more contemporary 
“Dancing on My Own.” In a recent NPR story on the group, Adilman relates that the choir 
started with just twenty participants, but quickly grew to a group of over a hundred singers. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Generally, I refer to the group as Choir! hereafter for brevity. Find Choir! Choir! Choir! on their website 
www.choirchoirchoir.com. 
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the NPR piece, Choir! members speak of the ways that the group became a thriving and 
meaningful community for its participants—a kind of musical refuge—and how the group filled 
a gap in their social lives. Since its formation and success, Goldman and Adilman now 
frequently take Choir! into the larger community where they preform in hospitals, for veterans 
and other groups. In addition to community outreach, the group worked up a slightly revised 
version of Sting’s “Russians” in response to Vladimir Putin’s homophobic comments about 
LGBTQ athletes participating in the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. They also have several songs 
(such as a version of Alice Cooper’s “Liar!”) dedicated to disgraced Toronto mayor, Rob Ford.  
In my initial YouTube encounters with Choir! I was moved by their ability to project a 
spirit of participation, care, and celebration of shared cultural experience. That spirit reminded 
me of the work of another favorite artist of mine, Pete Seeger. For over seventy years, Seeger 
was an ambassador of vernacular music, an amplifier of marginalized voices, and an untiring 
advocate for cooperation—for coming together in both song and labor to remember history and 
plan for the future. Choir!’s undertaking resonates with Seeger’s values. They are a diverse 
group and not particularly virtuosic, but when you hear them it is clear they have spent time and 
care rehearsing their songs. Aside from our shared love for Phil Collins, I was surprised by my 
strong emotional response to the group’s performances. I never cared much for Gordon 
Lightfoot’s “If You Could Read My Mind,” for instance, or thought to juxtapose it with “Basket 
Case” by Green Day, but re-presented in this context, those tunes took on a new and vibrant 
quality, a kind of sonic vernacular newness. In a strange but unmistakable way, the group’s 
YouTube Channel has become a spontaneous digital archive of twentieth and twenty-first 
century popular culture, one that many of us are still very much ensconced within. More than a 
playlist on iTunes or a mix CD you might give to a friend, the embodied nature of community 
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singing stored and shared on the public network of YouTube is affecting, drawing me in as a 
proxy participant. I spent time not just listening to the group but singing along. In fact, I was 
inspired to try it out myself. Soon after discovering Choir! I brought a guitar and a pile of lyrics 
sheets to a friend’s party and, without much prompting, had twenty people singing “In the Air 
Tonight” on a porch in Champaign, Illinois. It turns out I’m not the only one with a secret.  
Choir! Choir! Choir! embodies an overlap between popular culture, sound as orality, and 
the archive that is only beginning to be imagined and activated, let alone theorized within our 
contemporary digital culture. My sense, however, is that Alan Lomax would be pleased. The 
Toronto-based project is a powerful example of what might be called digital humanity—a kind 
of vernacular residuum resulting from the same digital affordances, technologies, and 
methodologies now being utilized and studied by the emerging institutional formation called the 
Digital Humanities. Ungoverned by any institution or discipline, “digital humanity” describes the 
myriad ways humans are linked together digitally through the common cultural experiences, 
tools, networks, and technological ambience of the electronic age.  
Lomax’s material archive is significant, but even as it is being digitized in spaces like the 
Association for Cultural Equity, there is need to acknowledge the ways that YouTube and other 
digital technologies contribute to new and vibrant archival spaces. Doing so will help us plan for 
the scholarly future of digital sound studies by tracing “deep histories of digital sound 
technologies and their predecessors” and also to “critically evaluate how technology continues to 
shape auditory culture” (Lingold, Mueller, and Trettien 4). As in the introduction, this conclusion 
revisits concepts from ancient and contemporary rhetoric to theorize and historicize this notion 
of digital humanity for the future of digital sound studies, and also for rhetoric. As I have 
mentioned in previous chapters, the rhetorical tradition has been underutilized as a tool for 
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understanding sound thus far in the larger field of sound studies—an oversight I believe is (at 
least in part) tied to the disavowal of rhetoric vis-à-vis media scholar Walter J. Ong. In fact, Ong 
is mostly absent from the preceding work due his diminishing ethos. But as I work toward a 
conclusion and think about the future of rhetoric and sound studies in particular, an accounting 
for Ong seems more and more necessary.  
It is indisputable that Walter J. Ong anticipated the current media landscape, including 
the circumstances I have designated above as “digital humanity,” and tied these contemporary 
mediated realities to both sound studies and rhetoric. Further, a concept like “digital humanity” is 
plausible only because its evidence is everywhere. Everyday lives are becoming more and more 
reliant upon digital tools for not just connecting and relating to one another, but in the rhetorical 
practice of preservation and propagation of cultural values and systems of civic belief. Digital 
humanity is part and parcel to this emergent vernacular digital culture and can be understood and 
made useful for scholars of sound in terms first conceptualized by ancient rhetoricians, but re-
theorized by Ong. Given the legitimacy of Ong’s fall from scholarly approval, I tread carefully if 
deliberately through that critique in order to articulate a future of digital sound studies that is 
open to both rhetoric and a remixed and reanimated Ong. The history of rhetoric is itself tied to 
sonic ways of value- and knowledge-making, but the future of sound studies—particularly at its 
cutting, vernacular and digital edge—can be better understood when rhetoric is included as part 
of the field’s conceptual Pro Tools. I conclude then with a call for Ong’s reanimation—zombie-
like, if needs be. He remains an important figure and may help forge a tenuous bridge between 
rhetoric and sound studies: our common zombie. 
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Reanimating Walter J. Ong 
Once known as a preeminent sound theorist whose “version of the ‘great divide’ between 
orality and literacy [for a time] dominated the approach to literacy” (Street 153), Walter J. Ong 
now occupies a tenuous position within the field of literacy studies and now also sound studies 
literature. As alluded to, Ong has become a kind of Phil Collins figure: both had hits in the 
1980s—and while many of us know and can sing along to both, it is becoming harder and harder 
to admit it in public.  
Ong was associated with Marshall McLuhan and the influential Toronto School of 
communication theory, and emphasized key epistemological differences between orality and 
literacy, arguing for the need to “reawaken the oral [and sounded] character of language” within 
the scholarly world (Orality and Literacy 6). He taught that an emphasis on visual, literate (and 
by extension, logical, empirical, and positivistic) epistemologies led to a diminished 
understanding of oral/aural types of knowledge. Ong argued that the sound of the voice is an 
essential feature to understanding humanity and that “the phenomenology of sound enters deeply 
into human beings’ feel for existence, as processed by the spoken word” (73). These claims won 
the theorist wide acclaim as a theoretical innovator and, for a time, helped to bring sound into the 
scholarly vogue. However, critics have since maligned Ong as part of a larger grouping of 
misguided “phonocentrists” who mistake voice and sound for a metaphysical and mythic 
presence. As one of these critics, Jonathan Sterne describes Ong’s position as theocentric and as 
part of an “audiovisual litany” that seeks to privilege sound over visuality in a kind of hierarchy 
of the senses. For Sterne (2003), Ong’s championing of orality is merely “a restatement of the 
longstanding spirit/letter distinction in Christian spiritualism” (16). Sterne’s perspective is 
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persuasive and his voice coupled with other prominent critics (see Derrida, 1982; Street, 1995) 
has led to Ong and his work falling out of scholarly fashion.  
Seeking to “recover” Ong or to rationalize his spiritualism would be futile. He was, after 
all, Father Ong—a Jesuit priest—and was generally careful in his scholarship to acknowledge his 
particular positioning and gesture toward its more universal applications. Instead, in much the 
same way that Choir! brought Phil Collins into a new sonic space, it is more useful to work to 
reanimate and redress Ong’s intellectual contributions within a secular, rhetorical paradigm with 
attention to how Ong connected his theories of sound to a more technologically diverse 
understanding of human flourishing—to digital humanity. Indeed, Ong’s work is important for 
the ways that he understood and began to theorize contemporary society as a hybrid of the 
traditional and the technological and what that hybridity might have to teach us about human 
value making as we move deeper into the digital age. 
 
Thinking Conjuncturally: Epideictic Rhetoric, Folkness, and Ong’s Secondary Orality  
I have already used the term “digital humanity” to gesture toward the idea that humans 
utilize technology to generate new knowledge, tools, and networks for understanding the world 
and other people, but the notion that these behaviors lead to the disruption, modification, and 
even creation of new systems of value has ancient origins. As explored in the introduction, 
Aristotle conceptualized the deep, humanistic work of belief formation and propagation as a 
species of rhetoric he called epideiktikon, or “epideictic,” and used to describe the value-making 
oratory inherent to ceremonial, ritualistic, and poetic discourse. “Epideictic” remains common 
parlance in rhetorical criticism, but there are many synonyms across the disciplines. Echoing 
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Aristotle, recall from my introduction musicologist Charles Seeger and his use of the word 
“folkness” as the 
funded treasury of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings toward life and death, work and 
play, love, courtship and marriage, health and hearth, children and animals, 
prosperity and adversity—a veritable code of individual and collective behavior 
belonging to the people as a whole. (3) 
While this definition hails from a particularly poignant moment of folk revival, I contend that it 
points to a more-or-less universal idea about how humans build systems of value and public 
memory together in vernacular, or everyday, discursive spaces. Neither epideictic nor folkness is 
inherently sonic, but both have a close historical relationship with sounded and rhythmic 
expression, which can also be found commonly at the vernacular level, particularly when paired 
with rhetorics of remembering. Sound’s rhetorical folkness is alive and well within our digital 
culture making. It is at the heart of Choir! Choir! Choir!’s ethos, for example—but can also be 
found in any user-generated or open-source community where memory keeping and making has 
become a public, digital affair due to the increasing ubiquity of electronic affordances.  
In his recent collection, The Sound Studies Reader (2013), Jonathan Sterne asserts that a 
primary goal for the future of sound studies should be to “think conjuncturally about sound and 
culture” (3). I have been working here, as I have throughout this dissertation, to draw 
connections between disciplines and terms in order to map these potential conjunctures. Ong also 
works conjuncturally, making the connection between value-making, rhythmic sound, memory, 
and technology explicit in his recurring notion of “orality.” Orality was derived from the system 
of thought known as “media ecology,” a central philosophical tenant of the Toronto School. 
Media ecology’s trajectory holds that technological mediation is central to understanding the 
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development of human consciousness and has traversed four major “ages”: the tribal, literate, 
print, and electronic. Working mainly within the trajectory of Western cultural history, Ong’s 
work deals, in large part, with the transition between each age, and updates “tribal” with his term 
“oral.”56 Ong is fascinated by the liminal moments between each age—with the profound 
transference that occurs as one dominant mode of communication gives way to the next. One can 
get a sense for Ong’s modus operandi in the title of what is arguably his most intellectually 
enduring work, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the 
Art of Reason (1958). In Ramus, Ong chronicles the cultural impact of the sixteenth century 
printing press, which included a shift from the dominance of speech and dialogue in the public 
sphere and led, through new emphases on method and “reason,” to the cultural circumstances 
that directly preceded the Enlightenment.  
Each age, as Ong imagines them, is marked by a kind of technological law of diminishing 
returns. In the sixteenth century, a literate (but still quite oral) culture transitions into an age 
when the practitioners of intellectual progress become consumed by an exploration of visual 
ways of knowing and understanding. Scholars in this age concerned themselves with “the 
‘structure’ of our intellectual activity—a notion which cannot be conceived of except by analogy 
with some sort of spatial diagram . . . and [no longer] concern[s] itself with ‘tone’ or other aural-
type phenomena (Ramus 107). Ong’s anxiety was that in the wake of progress, traditional ways 
of knowing and remembering would be designated obsolete, left behind to languish, and 
eventually forgotten. For Ong, the historical trajectory starting with pre-literate culture through 
the age of print always included a steady march away from “aural-type phenomena” and towards 
ways of knowing structured by visual-type methodologies and the abstract thinking made 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Ong’s veers from this Western focus at various moments within Orality and Literacy. He mentions several 
anthropological studies outside of the Western paradigm, what, what, and what among them.  
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possible by the affordances of literacy. This was the case, at least, until the mid-twentieth 
century. Ong develops the notion of “secondary orality” as a way of describing the state of 
human consciousness in the then-emerging electronic age where the visual’s dominance was 
beginning to wane. The electronic age is one imbued with a “high-technology ambience” where 
“a new orality is sustained by telephone, radio, television, and other electronic devices that 
depend for their existence and functioning on writing and print” (Orality and Literacy 11). 
Secondary orality is “new” because technological advance brings sound back into prominence 
within communication technologies in a way not emphasized since the days of ancient or 
“primary” orality. 
Primary and secondary orality are the bookends of media ecology’s historical trajectory. 
Ong’s writings on secondary orality, however, were somewhat limited. Given this openness in 
the canon, Ong scholar and rhetorician Abigail Lambke argues that “secondary orality should be 
read as incomplete, suggestive, and germinal” (203) (and this, perhaps, is the right approach to 
working with Ong in general!). Lambke points us toward two particularly cogent elements within 
Ong’s cursory beginnings that help to get a handle on the definition of this slippery term. First, 
Ong writes that “new orality has striking resemblances to the old in its participatory mystique, its 
fostering of a communal sense, its concentration on the present moment, and even its use of 
formulas” (Orality and Literacy 136). Next, secondary orality also “promotes spontaneity 
because through analytical reflection we have decided that spontaneity is a good thing. We plan 
our happenings carefully to be sure that they are thoroughly spontaneous” (137). Rendered this 
way, secondary orality reminds us that humanity, as we currently experience it, is a mix of both 
traditional and progressive paradigms and can not be otherwise. Digital humanity, then, reveals 
itself within this symbiosis of the past, present, and future as our technologies present 
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opportunities to participate in, preserve, and be “conspicuously spontaneous” in our various 
digitally enhanced social interactions. Recall again the ways that Toronto’s Choir! Choir! 
Choir!’s embodies each of these elements. Participants gather together in planned spontaneity to 
sing. Their performances are recorded, archived on YouTube, and thereby distributed to the 
world where we can then participate with and even emulate them in our own communities.  
But YouTube isn’t the only avenue where technological advance is creating new 
communities of participatory sonic culture. For example, the Berlin-based online audio 
distribution platform SoundCloud has become a hub for musical collaboration, sample sharing, 
and new-artist promotion and has a reported 40 million registered users and five times that many 
listeners (Jefferson). Also, smartphone platforms such as Instagram, Vine, and Snapchat, which 
allow for the quick and simple distribution of vernacular sound and video to a large audience, 
also meet these criteria. Vine in particular has become so popular and ubiquitous (more than 70 
million users) as to produce its own “stars”—fascinating evidence of a vibrant community 
drawing upon both traditional (celebrity culture) and emerging paradigms of interaction 
(“followers,” “revines,” and “likes”). 
  
Memory, Archives, and a Step Beyond Secondary Orality 
In many ways, Ong relies on his audience to intuit their sense of what secondary orality 
entails by following along carefully with his development of primary orality. Whether primary or 
secondary, “[o]rality is orality in some ultimate sense,” Ong quips in his trademark essentialism, 
and we are left to assemble the pieces on our own (Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology 284). 
Ong’s interest in the sonic experience of orality was often tied to a deeper human interest in 
technologies of remembering. And while Ong had an implicit preoccupation with spiritual 
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remembrance (or not forgetting God), we need not be spiritualists to find some insight and value 
in the importance of memory and its connection to sonic activity. Archives, for example, offer an 
important site for understanding the negotiation, interplay, and overlap between memory and 
data, a dichotomy that fits more or less analogously beside the notions of orality and literacy, 
tradition and progression, folkness and technology—all ideas that I have been engaging here. 
Orality, if tied to our understanding of the archive, loses much of the acrimony the concept 
receives from Ong’s critics. After all, even before digital or material archives, humans used (and 
continue to use) their memories as archives to preserve important cultural knowledge and also as 
a way of carefully organizing the memorized elements of an eloquent oral performance. Ong 
developed orality’s relationship to human memory’s potential as an archive along two disparate 
but related trajectories, one with anthropological ends, and the other rhetorical. Each, however, 
were concerned with what he and other media ecologists call “oral-formulaic composition,” or 
the use of rhythmic formulae as a way of preserving memory, knowledge, and culture. 
Ong was intrigued by the literary-turned-anthropological work of Milman Parry and his 
student Albert Lord. Parry is known for his pioneering work in Homeric oral poetry where he 
demonstrated convincingly the formulary nature of the Iliad and Odyssey, which, though 
eventually written down and deemed “literature,” hailed from a much earlier oral tradition. That 
the Homeric poetry survived in such vivid detail was “due to the economy enforced on it by oral 
methods of composition” (Orality and Literacy 21)—mnemonic formulas that Homer and other 
expert rhapsodists could memorize and then carefully stitch together with their minds in 
sequential chunks. Albert Lord took Parry’s work into the former Yugoslavia where he studied 
Yugoslav narrative poets who could not read and found the same kinds of formulaic devices at 
work there that Parry had found in Homer (59). Ong jumped to some problematic conclusions 
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using this research, conclusions that seemed to suggest that literacy develops with clean 
evolutionary determinism across all cultures, in predictable patterns, and always toward 
alphabetic literacy. This paradigm has come under significant critical scrutiny, the sharpest of 
which is from ethnographer Brian V. Street (1995) who sees much of Ong’s work as 
methodologically deductive, based in assumptions about cultures he knows little about, 
empirically weak, and theoretically deterministic. In a like manner, this (pseudo-) 
anthropological line of thinking does not do much to advance the development of secondary 
orality. 
Anthropological wanderings aside, oral formulas as “knowledge storage and retrieval 
devices” have a rich history within the rhetorical tradition (Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology 
285). Ong recognizes this and connects the orality of ancient rhetorical theory to the secondary 
orality of his twentieth century moment. Like the above example, the rhetorical tradition also has 
its roots in ancient poetic traditions where the formulaic and rhythmic memory-aids, fashioned as 
oral mnemonic devices, passed as oral tradition from the Homeric epoch into later antiquity. The 
use and memorization of poetic figures, commonplaces, as well as the use of carefully curated 
topoi or topics, are well-documented practices in both the teaching and performance of rhetoric 
in ancient Athens. Writing about the methods of ancient teachers of rhetoric known as the 
sophists, George Kennedy relates that even “as the composition of oral poetry and the oratory in 
it was built up with blocks of memorized material adapted to a variety of situations, so sophistic 
oratory was to a considerable extent a pastiche, or piecing together of commonplaces, long and 
short” (28). Aristotle cataloged many of these “formulary materials” (as Ong called them) in his 
Rhetoric written in the fourth century BCE and was followed in this practice by Roman 
orator/teachers Cicero and Quintilian in the first century of the Common Era.  
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Writing at the end of the 1960s, Ong points to the folk revival—to folkness!—as a site of 
secondary orality where this same kind of oral-formulaic discourse of public memory reemerges. 
For Ong, the appeal of folk song “derives from the overwhelming persuasion of its devotees that 
it is of great antiquity (often it is not) and connects with their past” (Rhetoric, Romance, and 
Technology 298). In the United States, folk “revival” in the early and mid twentieth century 
revolved around the search and archiving of vernacular artifacts that reverberated with the 
cultural memory cataloged in Charles Seeger’s earlier definition, but also with that longing for 
authenticity that has been such an important theme in this dissertation. Since that time, “folklife” 
archives have become an important part of countless communities and are housed (often with 
digital components) in libraries and universities across the US with the preeminent example at 
the Library of Congress. Ong, however, pushes past the idea of folklife as something that should 
only be engaged within a careful cataloged archive and toward a more dynamic folkness of 
innovation, satire, improvisation, and play that begins to emerge when figures and 
commonplaces begin to decay and/or become hopelessly cliché.57  
Certainly over the last half-century we have circulated at least once or twice through what 
now appears to be the revolving cycle of secondary orality: from the earnest seeking of 
authenticity, through satire and irony, to innovation and play and then back again. Here again, 
Phil Collins becomes a useful lodestar for understanding this process. Other closeted fans will 
remember that before his solo career took off, Collins performed as part of the progressive rock 
group Genesis who were known for their innovative musicianship and frequently political 
themes. As a solo artist, however, his popularity reached its peak during a brief period of (now 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Ong points humorously to the then-contemporary duo Simon and Garfunkel whose music, he argues, is rife with 
play on “worn rhetorical clichés,” blatant informality within formal musical settings, “total irony” and “total 
casualness”—all as playful innovations replacing tired formulaic commonplaces. Recall, for example, the comically 
mundane line “Citizens for Boysenberry Jam” from their 1968 song “Punky’s Dilemma.”  
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cringe-inciting) earnestness during the 1980s. Since then, however, Collins has remained in the 
popular sphere, in karaoke bars and among community sing groups like Choir!, to be sure, but 
also as samples in the work of hip hop DJs and MCs. In fact, my favorite song “In the Air 
Tonight” has been sampled by such artists as DMX (“I Can Feel It”), Lil’ Kim (“In the Air 
Tonite”), Nas (“One Mic”) and even the legendary 2Pac (“Staring Through My Rearview”)58. 
Collins’s work takes on new life as a DJ’s sample. When juxtaposed with hip hop lyrics and 
themes, the song functions as a common cultural touch-point—a backbeat—useful in response to 
(and even subtle commentary on) evolving exigent issues. “In the Air Tonight,” carries with it 
the broad cultural marker (or commonplace) of emotional intensity, which can be taken up, 
reworked, and deployed in the praise and blame—the epideictic critique—of shared values 
within and across US popular culture. 2Pac’s lyrics, “I wonder when the world stopped caring 
last night / Two kids shot while the whole block staring,” rapped over the iconic keyboard and 
drums of “In the Air Tonight” are indisputable as poignant oratory and an example of what 
contemporary epideictic rhetoric sounds like. Collins work, then, is part of a revolving cycle of 
rhetorical folkness: from innovative art, to tired cliché, and back to art—but in new keys and 
accompanied by new voices. 
The folkness of digital humanity, which exists, perhaps, as a step beyond secondary 
orality, takes advantage of a technologically hybrid culture where knowledge/retrieval systems 
(or “external memory” as we are now wont to call it) have become ubiquitous. In other words, it 
is when evidence of the kind of technical literacy and rhetorical fluency central to the DJs 
expertise (mash-up/remix) can be observed across media and in digital discourse of the everyday. 
This notion of digital humanity invites a new and emergent folkness that embraces, circulates, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 The useful site whosampled.com helped me discover this information. According to their search engine, “In the 
Air Tonight” has been sampled in 43 hip hop songs to date.  
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and rearticulates each of these stages ad infinitum, blurring the lines between tradition and 
progression forever. Harkening back to both Aristotle and Lambke’s insights, while the ever-
changing folkness of digital humanity presents unprecedented opportunities for participation and 
spontaneity—from open-source software builds to open-audition community choirs—this new 
openness also requires new ways of understanding the dissonance of this potential cacophony of 
competing voices and values. It is here that rhetoric’s concepts and theories, starting with 
epideictic and blossoming outward, can be utilized in order to provide both perspective and 
conciliatory resonance to these issues as well as those within conversations around digital sound 
studies more broadly. In the final section, then, I return to Jonathan Sterne’s important critique of 
Ong and model a final time how the insights of rhetoric and its scholars might contribute to 
difficult questions at the intersections of the various fields interested in sound.  
 
Revisiting Plato’s Paradox 
As mentioned earlier, Sterne describes Ong and, by extension, the Toronto School as 
theocentric and chronicles their position on orality as part of an “audiovisual litany” that 
privileges sound over visuality (rather than giving them equal prominence in the sensorium). For 
Sterne (2003), the notion of orality provides a mere “restatement of the longstanding spirit/letter 
distinction in Christian spiritualism. The spirit is living and life-giving—it leads to salvation. The 
letter is dead and inert—it leads to damnation” (16). This attitude, as Sterne points out, is found 
in the writings of Augustine and the Gospel of John, all of which he sees as derivative of 
Platonist anxieties about both writing and speech. Sterne’s critique is not just of Ong, then, but of 
a whole critical tradition embedded within an ongoing debate about the normative function of 
language within society, a debate that begins with Plato. My discussion of secondary orality 
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above responds to this critique: whatever his spiritualist leanings, Ong seems quite aware that 
wisdom exists outside of the primary orality paradigm. As I have sought to show, secondary 
orality is itself built upon the paradox of competing so-called aural- and visual-type media—a 
paradox reverberant of an ancient platonic epistemological conundrum. 
Like many, Plato was suspicious of technology’s rapid advance. Though he was a gifted 
writer himself, he worried that writing was damaging to memory. This opinion was complicated 
by a mistrust of Greek oral traditions. Poetry, Plato argues in the final book of his Republic, 
cripples the mind, “[i]t is a kind of disease” requiring an antidote consisting of “knowledge ‘of 
what things really are’” (4). Eric Havelock argues that Plato’s critique is levied not just on poetry 
per se—or at least not on poetry as we currently imagine it—but upon poetics: the oral, 
mythopoetic cultural norms of speech and discourse that undergirded traditional Greek society. 
Susan Jarratt (1991) summarizes Havelock’s argument: “Plato condemned mythos, meaning the 
poetic transfer of crucial cultural information, because of its hypnotic effects, arguing that it 
fostered an uncritical absorption of the dominant ideology. Instead, Plato recommended the hard 
mental work of dialectical thinking as an objective process” (xxii). Plato’s concerns, understood 
in this way, are actually not altogether unlike Sterne’s: both orality and mythopoetics represent 
the potentially damaging habits of a false tradition. Plato’s critique of writing takes a similar if 
slightly different cadence. Said Plato in the Phaedrus: “If men learn [to write], it will implant 
forgetfulness in their souls; they will cease to exercise memory because they rely on that which 
is written, calling things to remembrance no longer from within themselves, but by means of 
external marks” (275a-b). Plato goes on remark that writing will inhibit the process of wisdom, 
replacing it with a mere “reminder” or reference to what “true” wisdom consists of.  
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Hearkening back to my earlier discussion, memory is implicated in each of these Platonic 
anxieties. In the first case, poetry, or more precisely, the mythopoetic and rhythmic vernacular 
discourse of oral tradition (folkness), is the disease of rigorous rational thought and by extension 
prosperous society. For Plato, poetry’s conservative, constitutive nature has fascistic potential if 
relied upon to inform structures of governance. Mythopoeia refashions memory and by extension 
history toward a simple mythic narrative reinforced through rhythmic (and therefore memorable) 
orality. On the other hand, writing (or more broadly, technological mediation) undermines 
memory and, by extension, the potential for greater wisdom by eliminating the motive for the 
pursuit of excellence or the disciplined mind/body exercise of remembering and treasuring up of 
the virtuosic knowledge that gives way to wisdom. Plato’s paradox, of course, is that these ideals 
are presented as mutually exclusive of the other when they are not. There is no way to separate a 
kind of “pure” memory from mythopoetic influence, nor are the ideals of the wise free of the 
culturally situated (and saturated) rhetorics of tradition and belief. 
Part of Sterne’s critique of the Toronto School in general and Ong in particular is 
Sterne’s perception that Ong, in his persistence to develop a theory of language based around the 
preeminence of sound and orality, is seeking wisdom from the wrong source. But, even Plato 
seemed to know better than that. Developing scholarship (post-Havelock and Ong) in pre-
Platonic and sophistic rhetorical history theorize Plato’s paradox in ways I think are resonant 
with both Ong and Sterne’s ideas. For example, the work of Christopher Johnstone charts notions 
of what constituted wisdom within ancient Greek culture through a mythopoetic consciousness 
and toward a more “naturalistic” rational one. Importantly, for Johnstone, there is never such a 
thing as “existence only in sound.” As he argues, developing Greek notions of 
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“rational cosmology” and natural philosophy retained important links to myth and 
poetic language, and the "transition from mythos to logos" […] signaled not so 
much a break with the past as the emergence of a new form of consciousness that 
coexisted with and was infused by a mythopoetic mind set as old as humanity 
itself. (5-6) 
Like Johnstone, Sterne insists that orality does not cleanly give way to literacy ushering in a new 
dawn of “external memory” transmission through writing. But a closer look at Ong’s work 
reveals that beyond his speculative and spiritual idealism around orality, he didn’t think so either. 
In fact, in his writing on secondary orality, he seems very much within the extended trajectory of 
Johnstone’s model coalescing both mythos and logos within cultural development.  
Consider, in conclusion, how Ong’s view on technology, which always exists as a 
demonstration of the hybridity of oral and literate ways of thinking, speaks to this hypothesis:  
Technologies are not mere exterior aids but also interior transformations of 
consciousness, and never more than when they affect the word. Such 
transformations can be uplifting. Writing heightens consciousness. Alienation 
from a natural milieu can be good for us and indeed is in many ways essential for 
full human life. To live and to understand fully, we need not only proximity but 
also distance. Thus writing provides for consciousness as nothing else does.  
Technologies are artificial, but—paradox again—artificiality is natural to human being. 
Technology, properly interiorized does not degrade human life but on the contrary enhances it. 
The modern orchestra, for example is the result of high technology. (Orality and Literacy 82-83)  
Technological phenomena such as YouTube, SoundCloud, and the DJ sample exist along 
a continuum of mediated experience that includes activities that look and sound like Ong’s 
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descriptions of primary and secondary orality. One need not subscribe to Ong’s spiritual ideals to 
find something transcendent and human about the activities implied by these terms, their various 
permutations, and the ways that they relate across that continuum. On the other hand, subscribing 
to and expanding upon Ong’s frequent use of rhetoric to account for the complexity of oral and 
aural experience has immense potential. This conclusion has been about drawing that potential 
out, connecting rhetorical terms firmly to sonic experiences, and about beginning to theorize the 
folkness of digital humanity. Sterne’s popular critique of Ong’s orality and “oral culture” is 
important but need not invalidate Ong’s contributions to his various fields, nor should it disrupt 
the rhythm or impact of sonic experience in both ancient and contemporary culture. Instead it 
encourages a reorientation of how we understand Ong’s orality in relationship to sound studies 
and creates new avenues for future sound and rhetoric studies. The rhetorical tradition provides a 
myriad theories, trajectories, and terminologies to complicate and nuance our understanding of 
sonic practice. Accordingly, sonic rhetoric’s rhythms resound in our memories and through the 
various technologies of the archive: orality, rhapsody, and melody mediated materially on paper, 
vinyl, magnetic tape, and in the burgeoning code and algorithms of the digital.   
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Appendix 
Songs in the order of their appearance in Chapter 2 
 
1. “The Angels Dropped their Wings and Gone on to Heaven.” Sung by group of Negro convicts. 
Tennessee state penitentiary. Nashville, TN. AFS 00179 B02. John A. Lomax, August 
1933. 1.TheAngelsDroopedtheirWings.mp3 
2. “Levee Camp Holler.”  Sung by John Gibson (Black Samson). Tennessee state penitentiary. 
Nashville, TN. AFS 00179 B03. John A. Lomax, August 1933. 
2.LeveeCampHoller.mp3 
3. “Good God A’Mighty.” Sung by group of Negro convicts with ax-cutting. State penitentiary, 
Huntsville, TX. AFS 00179 B03. John A. and Alan Lomax, November, 1934. 
3.GoodGodAlmighty.mp3 
4. “Run Nigger Run.”  Sung by Mose Platt (Clear Rock). Central state farm, Sugarland, TX. AFS 
00196 A01. John A. and Alan Lomax, December, 1933. 4.RunNiggerRun.mp3 
5. “Ol’ Rattler.” Piano rendering from sheet music. Thanks to Michelle Ross for her piano 
performance in this recording. Made in Clemson, South Carolina on March 23, 2014.  
5.OlRattlerPianoRendering.mp3  
6. “Ol’ Rattler.” Sung by Mose Platt (Clear Rock). Central state farm, Sugarland, TX. AFS 
00208 B01. John A. and Alan Lomax, April 1934. 6.OlRattler.mp3 
7. “Shorty George.” Sung by James Baker (Iron Head). Central state farm, Sugarland, TX. AFS 
00202 A02. John A. Lomax, February, 1934. 7.ShortyGeorge.mp3 
8. “Go Down, Hannah.” Sung by James Baker (Iron Head), Will Crosby, R. D. Allen, and Mose 
Platt (Clear Rock). Central state farm, Sugarland, TX. AFS 00195 A02. John A. and Alan 
Lomax, December 1933. 8.GoDownOldHannah.mp3 
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